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ABSTRACT
The thesis discusses the origin and development of land 
ownership, tenancy and labour, and the pattern of economic
organization, in North Bihar. These questions are considered 
both in terms of the relation between production and rural 
trade, and in regard to tenancy and other laws of British
administration. The attempt is to make an ovei— all estimation 
of agrarian relations in the region. This includes the value 
of land, the rent system, the nature of the proprietary
interest, and the social and economic gap between the upper 
and lower classes of the population. In particular, the
intention is to describe the historical current in the 
structure of society, land tenure, production and subsistence. 
Did the condition of the lower classes as revealed in the
courses worsen in relation to the condition of the
agricultural community as a whole? Vas there a rise in 
population, and if so with what effect? What was the impact 
of tenancy legislation from the point of view of changes in 
the condition of the agricultural classes? How important was 
government policy generally In relation to the agrarian 
society of Bihar?
The thesis concludes, among other things, that
institutional factors and social and economic ideas were 
responsible for the devlopment and maintenance of the social 
hierarchy. The conditions of the lower classes worsened, as 
their rights were not increased. Government legislation at 
first ignored tenant rights too, but later improved the
position of occupancy tenants. The internal market continued 
to be controlled by landed proprietors or local merchants, but 
their external interests, in towns and trade, increased their 
desire to control the village economy.
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Apart from an introduction and conclusion, this thesis is 
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discusses: <i) dominant social classes and the formation of
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estates, (iii) raiyati right by proprietors, (iv) zirat land;
(v) management of zamindari estates; and (vi) intermediaries 
and tenure-holders. *J*he second, on Raiyats, deals with: (i)
the evolution and growth of raiyats in historical perspective; 
(ii) the categorization of raiyats, status in land, society 
and tenancy law; (iii) the transfer of raiyati rights by 
zamindars; and (iv) raiyats and production relations. The 
third, on Land Rent considers: (i) customary practice of the
extraction of surplus produce^ a historical dimension; (il>
raiyati land, production, rent and tenancy law; (iii) the 
rental income of zamindars and the collection of rent by various 
elements of society; (iv) how rent was enhanced: methods and
classes of tenants subjected to such enhancement; (v) abwabs
(cesses); and (vi ) whether the rent increased in the late
nineteenth century in North Bihar.The fourth, on agricultural 
labour, is divided into nine sections: (i) the historical
genesis of labour, bondage slavery and its continuity; (ii) 
population and labour; (iii) labour and expansion of 
cultivation; (iv) " the paradox of labour scarcity; (v)
government intervention and emigration; (vi) wages and the 
labour market; (vi) the late nineteenth century: rising demand
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: the Agrarian Society of North Bihar 
in the 19th Century
Empirical research on the nineteenth century economy and 
society in India has assumed much significance in recent 
decades. Study of the different regions within India is 
imperative. Varying features of geography, social organisation 
and custom create regional patterns and specific problems. 
North Bihar is one such region, where a highly developed
agriculture and a hierarchy of producers have existed since 
very early times.
Research on the nineteenth century depends largely on 
British documents and other records prepared during British 
rule. Oral evidence can depict a clearer picture of recent
years, but in the nineteenth century the land system, fiscal 
policy and political organisation of the country were quite 
different. Hence my study is confined to the sources of the 
British period with which it deals.
There is a considerable literature on the agrarian 
history of Bihar (a part of Bengal Presidency) in the
nineteenth century. 1 Among some recent work, concerned with 
areas outside Bihar, there is evidence of new thinking about 
the changes in agrarian structure and other aspects of rural 
society:-.::. One book, that of Sugata Bose on agrarian Bengal, 
has called for a re-consideration of economic relations in 
society in eastern India as the basis for the exploitation of 
the lower orders by dominant social groups2 . In this study I 
am also trying to trace the development of social classes and 
their relations with each other. But I suggest that the 
social hierarchy remained a crucial basis for relations 
between the haves and havenots, and for the exploitation of 
agricultural production. Hence I will examine the relations
between landlords and peasants, of various categories, and in 
a broad historical perspective. My idea is also to analyse 
the qualitative differences between the various
categories|andholders and their dominance in the society. 
Since the occupational distribution is quite insignificant so
1
far as the agricultural production is concerned, I argue that 
the caste hierarchy remains important for understanding the 
status of the peasantry or lower classes, even in conditions 
of commercial agriculture. I am concerned to identify the 
producers and exploiters, and to explain why, in changing 
economic conditions, inued to suffer from oppression in
the period under study. This question arises also in regard 
to the tenancy legislation which was supposed to protect 
cultivators as well as landholders. The concern is thus with 
the class basis of the differentiated raiyats and cultivators, 
at a time of increasing commercialisation of agriculture, and 
the growth of the market economy. I will not deal in detail 
with production or marketing, except in so far as they were 
relevant to the material life of the raiyats, and the 
maintenance of agricultural classes. Recently, much has been 
written on commercialisation, deindustrialisation and de- 
peasantisation, which I do not want to repeat. My main concern 
is to investigate the developments in agrarian relations 
during the nineteenth century in regard to the economic and
f'
hierajchical bases of the society. In considering the changes 
taking place, it is suggested that peasant production and 
social structure are related to each other, and that certain 
production relations persisted even with the development of 
capitalist relations in agriculture; it was thus that the 
social and economic orders appeared to be changed.
In relation to the British, the question is whether 
their efforts were likely to bring changes in the society. 
The policy of the government was more to maintain the 
equilibrium between the zamindar and raiyat than to ameliorate 
the impoverished condition of the lower classes and the 
landless labourers. Amongst the aspects considered in this 
connection are rent and the extraction of shares of the produce 
by the zamindars and intermediaries by means of their general 
influence but also of their administrative control and the use 
they made of tenancy law. The role of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 
1885, and the later measures of the government under the 
Survey and Settlement procedures will be considered 
specifically, in comparison with the old methods of the
2
Company's rule, and in relation to the zamindars and the other 
dominant social elements such as village officials.
Another important theme in the social structure and 
economic relations is the emergence of intermediaries and rich 
peasants, whether by the creation of the tenancy laws or 
otherwise. But, it is argued, there remained essentially just 
three classes in the society — —  the zamindars and 
intermediaries, the raiyats, and the agricultural labourers.
Why study North Bihar agrarian history in the late 
nineteenth century? Regional examinations are needed in order 
to give an accurate idea of the process of transformation. 
The nineteenth century is important as the most formative 
period of the British regime from the point of view of 
economic development. The North Bihar region formed (and even 
now forms) the most fertile tract of the Indo-Gangetic areas; 
80 to 90 per cent of the population depended on agriculture, 
but since the early period they had also developed indigenous 
art, craft and trade. Thus though people lived in the village 
community and were apparently self-sufficient, a social and 
economic hierarchy was very much present. Yet the greater 
development of a market economy did bring changes in other 
aspects of the society including the agrarian structure; that 
is one subject for this study.
To what extent was Bihar different? Administration and 
tenancy law were generally similar for the entire Bengal 
Presidency. There were basic similarities in social structure 
too between Bihar and Bengal. But there were also differences 
in the status and nature of the zamindars and raiyats. Bihar 
was poorer. There was, in addition, a sub-regional pattern 
within North Bihar. Prosperity varied across the districts of 
Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur, as did the degree of dominance by 
the zamindars. There were thousands of acres held by a single 
superior zamindar; there were areas controlled by a multitude 
of small and intermediary proprietors. Likewise we find very 
local differences in geographical and ecological features. 
Yet it is possible to ask, in the historical perspective, why 
one region is different from another? Why, for example, were 
the raiyats in Bengal more prosperious than their counter 
parts in North Bihar? How do the jotdars (rich peasants), a
3
dominant land holding class of intermediaries, differ from the 
intermediaries found under zamindars in Bihar?
To answer such questions, it is necessary to take a long 
view. The importance of the agrttrian and administrative 
history of Bihar in the early periods of the nineteenth 
century has been realised by a few histor Ians, notably K, K. 
Datta on the period under the East India Company, H. R. Ghosal 
on economic history, J. S. Jha on the Darbhanga Raj, and 
recent works of B. B. Chaudhuri on agrarian history. These 
works suggest a need for further research on elite formation 
and agrarian questions in the nineteenth century. I intend to 
study the main characteristics of the rise and growth of the 
agrarian problems which need serious consideration.
Land was never held in outright ownership as private
property before the British arrived. The state possessed a
traditional claim to a share of the produce, the land revenue
demand, collected by the intermediary classes. They were of
diverse origin. Some were Hindu or Muslim nobles, the milifary
chiefs and tax collectors of the Mughals or those who rose,
from the revenue administration having been chaudhuri & and
o~
Sadar qanungos. The mahai^ja of Darbhanga was in this
category. Some were heads of clans and claimed to be 
descendents of ancient rulers of kingdoms, such were the 
Hathwa maharaj , and several other rajas of Bihar and Banaras. 
During the decay of governmental authority in the eighteenth 
century, many of these chiefs had vastly enhanced their power 
over the land, and encroached upon the rights of the State. 
This power fell short of a true proprietary title, for the 
zamindar had still to take account of the customary right of 
his tenants. The cultivator or raiyat was obliged to pay a 
share of his produce as rent to the superior holder, but this 
share was usually fixed by custom, and so long as it was paid 
the cultivator and his heirs were entit led to remain on the■w”
soil. The peasant thereby acquired an effective right of 
occupancy, which protected him from unjust enhancement or 
eviction, and gave him a tangible interest in the land. 
During the anarchy of the eighteenth century, although often 
subjected to extortion by powerful zamindars and forced to 
contribute to the support of armed bands of retainers, the
4
cultivators were still^a fairly strong bargaining position. 
The population was relatively small, and much land lay 
uncultivated. A raiyat. who considered himself oppressed, 
could always take his labour elsewhere, and be certain of 
finding favourable terms. Such was the situation when the 
English introduced revenue administration and awarded 
proprietary rights in the soil to those upon whom they settled 
land revenue. 3 In Bihar a great portion of the land was 
distributed amongst a few Rajas; economic and social control 
was always in the hands of a handful of persons. The control 
of land and the distribution of its product were and are 
central to social relations and the social structure. 
Moreover, in Bihar as in other areas, land tenure was not 
only about ownership of land, rents and taxes, but also about 
kinship, marriage, ritual status, and prestige.
Under such an agrarian society, where one finds vast 
distinctions, the role of the foreign power was important for 
settling the zamindari system in line with the British system 
of proprietary rights, and for encouraging the growth of a 
capitalist agricultural economy. In this connection, the
recent historiographical trends lay much emphasis on the 
condition of agricultural labourerr and the depressed classes 
under colonial rule. Their poverty has been explained as 
depeasantisation and deindustrialization, and is said to be 
revealed in labour migration. In this thesis the causes will 
be located in underlying political and economic factors 
related to the zamindari structure and other changes 
associated with colonial rule.
Vhat the records bring out, from the seventeenth century 
to the twentieth, is the significance of the assessment of the 
land revenue. The zamindar's position after the Permanent 
Settlement was as a revenue payer as fixed by^**East India 
Company on the terms and conditions agreed upon, and also on 
the basis of actual returns. Hitherto in a large ami i 
zamindari ; only a few villages or a couple of parganas would 
ordinarily be earmarked for istamrari (revenue) settlement, 
while revenue for the remaining portions of zamindari would be 
based on annual assessments. Such a zamindar was called
IA~
mukarrari peshkash istamrari. Where continuous records oi a
5
particular zamindari family for the 17th and 18th centuries 
are available, it is clear that the revenues of the villages 
or parganas were revised at times annually and at times after 
two to five years. In respect of istamrari villages or 
parganas, at every settlement, the zamindar requested the 
government to retain the previously fixed revenues. The 
government had the discretion to accept or reject the demand. 
It might retain fixed revenues in respect of some villagers or 
parganas, and revise the demand for others. For some
istamrari villages and parganas the assessment remained fixed 
for considerable length of time, but others were revised 
every two to five years.'4 The terms depended on the political 
relations between the zamindar and the state— on the loyalty of 
the zamindar or the power and influence of the government.
Murshid Quli Khan (1700-1727), reassessed the revenue 
machinery and zamindari institutions, in Bengal subah, and his 
methods were adopted in principle by the East India Company 
before the Permanent Settlement. Moreover, when the Permanent 
Settlement was introduced over wide areas of Bengal 
Presidency, there remained tracts in Bihar which were not 
included; in some areas it took half a century and more for 
the Company's government to complete the process. In the 
district of Tirhut the Permanent Settlement was made gradually 
as late as the 1830s and 1840s. Even with the raja of 
Darbhanga, the biggest zamindar of Bihar, no settlement was 
concluded until 1799. Moreover, the great estates in Bihar, 
such as Hathwa, Bettiah, Ram Nagar, Madhuban, Tekari and 
Dumraon, evidently came terms with the Company's government
for the protection of their mutual interests. There were also 
certain pecularities in the administration of Bihar under the 
Company. In the first place, in the Bihar districts, the 
Company's government hardly experienced any financial deficit; 
indeed the surplus provided regular supplies of money to the 
Commercial Resident of Patna for the Company's annual 
investment, and also to various other districts to meet 
deficiencies. The reasons were the great fertility of the 
soil, and the increases in production under the influence of 
European capital, supplied by European indigo planters, and by 
the Company for opium and saltpetre.5
6
In the long revenue history of the zamindari estates, the 
British administration is thus linked to three interrelated 
processes - continuing peasant cultivation, a new production 
of raw materials for British-owned manufacturing enterprises, 
and the retention of a system of revenue collection based on a 
feudal control of peasants by landlords. At independence, 
therefore, there was not simply a traditional, backward 
peasantry which had to be 'modernized' by benevolent elites. 
This was an old agrarian system harnessed to the interests of 
international and, later, domestic capitalism. The system of 
tenure was conducive to a low level of investment in 
agricultural technology and infrastructure; it was a structure 
which was pervaded by exploitation from top to bottom.
Continuities and institutional factors thus played an 
important part. In agricultural production and distribution 
the persistent factors were caste and class distinctions, and 
the division of labour, but above all patterns of ownership 
over productive property, most especially land but also 
including marketing and distribution. Against this one
considers variable inputs - law and order and revenue systems, 
that is, the political process both formal and informal 
through which the State acquired its particular complexion. 
The structure of agrarian society reflects the way in which 
numerous interest are accoWMdated in a scale which reaches 
from the tiller of the soil to the highest authorities of the 
State.& It was the integration of the zamindars, tenants and 
State authority that are to be known as zamindari system, and 
which this thesis examines. The zamindars of Bihar in the
nineteenth century came, as said, from hereditary revenue farms 
with full administrative authority over the area under their 
control. In the pre-British days independent or semi­
independent Chieltains who had been given independent 
authority were peshkash-payi ng subordinate allies or 
mansabdars of the empire.
The zamindars of the British period were derived from the 
above classes in Bihar, and hence retained a sense of 
legitimate authority and absolute right in land.The concept of
'land to rule' was in the mind of the zamindars and the
government. The British administration made certain
7
innovations but maintained the hereditary ownership of land. 
Therefore, the idea of absolute authority, control over both 
the production and the producers, was common to both British 
administration and the zamindari system. In addition to these 
social and economic inequalities, the capitalist mode of
production created various other dominant groups - rich 
peasants, thikadars, mahajans, money-lenders and village 
merchants. On the other hand, the raiyats, and agricultural 
labourers who were the victims of the intermediary groups, 
also remained the back-bone of agricultural production. Each 
level of society exploited weaker sections.
The basis of the exploitation was that, in a caste and 
economic hierarchy, and under a rental system as with a 
capitalist mode of production, the subservient peasantry was 
bound to part with surplus, and to supply begar or bonded 
labour. Maurice Dobb's idea of feudal hierarchy as the basis 
of social structure and economic relations is very relevant 
here.7 Later analyses of class formation and economic
relations in the light of historical materialism have also 
opened up new thinking about the linkage between various 
social groups and their economic status. In this context, D. D. 
Kosambi has analysed the social problem on the basis of his 
understanding of the ancient tribal society, of how a food- 
gathering tribe was absorbed unto the food-producing 
agricultural economy, as a lower economic group. He finds how 
the transition from one phase to another interrelates with 
social and economic distinctions as the basis of caste on 
Indian society, 6:1 The occupational specialization itself makes 
the sub-castes inferior once they had adopted a labouring 
occupation in agriculture. In Bihar, of course, the status of 
each individual was decided by caste within each range of 
villages, and linked also to his economic power, R. S.
Sharma describes as 'feudalism' the main features of social 
formation, caste hierarchy and appropriation of economic 
surplus in ancient Indian society; the key is the overall 
control of production by a segment of society, the upper 
castes. He notes that a "servile peasantry is charactistic of 
a feudal society" ; but also that kin based or tribal society 
was superseded by State and class-based society.3 The same
8
phenomenon can be seen repeated in modern times. In the 
nineteenth century in Bihar, the concept of caste as a 
hierarchy based on the direct appropriation of surplus, and on 
bondage and slavery, was institutionalised through the various 
social, economic and administrative measures of the land 
system and the Judicial administration of the British.
Vhat was constant was that, in North Bihar, the upper 
castes (Brahmins, Babhans or Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas) 
continued as the dominant groups in land-control^ production 
and distribution. The old hierarchy of caste based on birth 
and ritual status (including the medieval Muslim arist^ocracy) 
remained significant in both zamindari and occupancy right. 
Its monopoly over landed property and economic power created a 
large gap between the lower and upper castes. Nonetheless, 
cultivating castes,namely Koeri, Goala, Sheikh, Sonar, Nonia, 
Teli, and Lohar,created a middle rank, including (with some, 
usually more prosperous, high-caste raiyats) the majority of 
the occupancy tenants. The even larger numbers of agricultural 
labourers were drawn similarly from sociaLly and economically 
depressed castes. Some of these, with other caste
occupations, were too poor to maintain their families except by 
field labour or service. Their subservience was increased by 
their economic dependence, including that which resulted from 
hereditary debt.
To some extent this very considerable match between caste 
and occupation and income, was repeated in the access to other 
advantages. Only some of the higher castes, for example, were 
sufficiently educated to be engaged in the management of 
agriculture, or employed in village administration and in 
government offices. Rajputs were less educated than the other 
three upper cast©, but then they were also more dominant in 
landed property in the western part of North Bihar where they 
were concentrated. In the eastern part Bhumihars were more 
dominant notably in Saran with the Hathwa maharaja and his 
allies. Brahmins were scattered all over the North Bihar with 
Naithili Brahmins predominant in some areas, such as Darbhanga 
raj , where poor Brahmins were generally taken into the service 
of the zamindar as goraits, barahils, lathials, peons and 
bodyguards. They helped the officials in land disputes with
9
truculent tenants and litigants. They also collected cesses, 
salamies and various kinds of illegal abwabs. The Kayasthas 
were mainly concerned with the maintenance of accounts, 
diaries, Khatas of zamindari estates. They worked, as patwari, 
quango, and amin, Some of the well-educated Kayasthas were 
employed ftV high posts in the government offices. In some 
areas they acquired the status of landlords, 10 for example by 
investing the proceeds of service.
The Bhumihar caste formed a category of the landed 
aristocracy in almost every part of Bihar. The big zamindars 
of Hathwa, Bettiah and Tekari were all Bhumihar, as were many 
rich peasants. They were not on good terms with the Rajputs 
whom they competed for dominance. There w®t£- frequent 
violence and court cases due to agrarian disputes between 
these two castes.
There were some prosperous raiyats among the middle
castes, the Goal as, Kurmis and Koeris, who were skilled
agriculturists and occupancy raiyats. The castes of Baniya,
Teli, and Sonar- were money-lenders and traders. Some were 
also engaged in agriculture. But mostly they were involved in 
rural credit, holding mortgages of land and jewellery and 
claiming heavy interest. 1 1 To some extent they dominated the 
rural market and controlled the grain-trade. The village hat
was the main centre of their business.
Caste consciousness played a vital part in the society; 
when prosperous Goala and Kurml peasan^ts were oppressed by 
the upper castes, physical violence could occur. There was 
rivalry between Brahmins and Bhumihars, as the later tried to 
occupy the social status of the former. '^  Above all, the
position of the lower castes was precarious. Mostly they 
formed the group of non—occupanty raiyats and landless 
agricultural labourers. Their oppression by rich peasants and 
proprietors was based on the principle of caste—ranking as 
well as economic status. As Mandelbaum says, the
economically well-off groups acquired ritual hallmarks to 
raise their relative position in the hierarchy. 1 Over time,
however, the reverse was also true in___ ^ K o r t h  Bihar:
inequality originated from caste, through its impact on land-
tenure and occupation.
10
Status was thus inextricably linked also to the next 
problem to be discussed,namely, the rights and interests of 
different classes in land, tenancy and rent. The nature of 
landed property under the British as expressed in the Fifth 
Report was that the land belongs to the zamindar and the 
rent to the King.WJ The main idea of individual land 
ownership was, as said, alien to Indian society, but as it 
became effective it influenced the status of various 
elements - zamindars, tenants, and landless labourers. The 
last of these had no rights in property in law. Vho was 
the true proprietor of the land in Bihar: the estate, the
zamindar, or the cultivator? The conclusion must be that, 
in practice, it was he who extracted the surplus of the 
produce. This was done on the basis of customary or legal 
rights in collaboration with the State and with the help of 
a band of intermediaries. This exercise of the controlling 
power, identifies the 'owner' of the land. However,
individual rights, rents and performing other obligations
could be remodelled under a changing legal system.
North Bihar's tenurial structure was similar to those 
of Bengal and the North Vest Provinces. The four major
districts of Darbhanga, Muzaffarpury Champaran and Saran had 
both small and big zamindars. We have already mentioned the
Maharaj a_^^________  of Darbhanga, the Haharaja of
Hathwa in Saran, the raja of Bettiah in Champaran, and the 
raja of Ram Nagar in Motihari, who all dominated their 
areas.The^Darbhanga raj extended also into parts of Purnea, 
Bhagalpur, Saharsa and Monghyr. However, in Muzaffarpur,
thete were small estates where many resident properietors 
fawned villages. In the south of Saran, too, small estates 
predominated, and the same was true of the sou thern part of 
Darbhanga where there were many intermediaries and small 
zamindars. Again, there some small estates in the south 
east of Champaran district.1®
Koreov^er, even on the large estates there were many 
small sub—proprietors who were given the right to control 
the mauzas (villages) and collect rents. They were often 
allied by kin or caste to the zamindar of the main estate.16 
According to the Settlement Officer many of the small
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propr fetors in the district of Muzaffarpur derived from an 
indigenous group of khurdia xoaliks who styled themselves 
pro^prietors, They belonged to the high castes, Brahmin, 
Bhumihar and Rajput. Their status and holdings were greater 
than those of the petty proprietors of other districts.
r*
They also acquired land by acting as co-shares, paying rent 
for the parts held in excess of the extent of their 
interest. Varieties of tenure-holders and intermediaries, 
the thikadars, and mukarridarst also acted as zamindars.1-7 
European indigo planters took advantage of this role. 
Generally tenancies were more complex towards the East. 
There were systems of joint management of estates in many 
regions. ie In such cases the settlement of revenue was 
made with the propreitary body and generally paid by the 
head of the family. Individual responsibility occured when 
these estates were divided.
In the later half of the nineteenth century, a sharp 
tendency for the sub-division of proprietary estates was 
found in the North Bihar districts. The encouragement of 
sub-division and the creation of small estates greatly 
increased the number of petty propreitors. Along with the 
systems of local control, for the maintenance of records, 
and for the collection and enhancement of rent, this 
accelerated the worsening of landlord-ten^ant relations. It 
also led to the mismanagement of estates. The joint
proprietary estates were not broken down only because of 
internal polarisation in the families, but because the new 
revenue and rent regulations created various complications. 
For the same reason disputes between zamindars and raiyats 
came to be salved less by mutual understanding than by legal 
proceedings. The interest of proprietors in their zirat 
land increased. They let such land on thika to the tenure 
holders who extracted higher rents from the raiyats. A 
further complication was provided by zamindars who held 
proprietary status at the time of the Permanent Settlement 
but were unable to strengthen their position. Their 
proprietary status was superseded by that of a stronger 
zamindar but they received malikana in recognition of their 
previous status. Some small proprietors who owned a few
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hundred acres of land and had a few villages under their 
control, but whose revenue demand was less than Rs.100, also 
survived as decaying proprietors. The result of such 
survival, of the partition of estates among various
pattidars, and of the minute vested interests of the
proprietors in land, increased suffering for the poor 
raiyats. Their number increased, according to the Survey 
and Settlement operations in the late nineteenth century,
but their condition worsened. They were made to pay
enhanced rents and various kinds of abwabs to their 
proprietors.
The pattidari system, though it could work well, 
also complicated the management of estates.It tended to 
increase the rent demanded by the zamindar. The share of 
the rent was divided between the co-sharers of the joint 
proprietary estates according to their geneological 
relation. But those who had settled the revenue of the 
village first with the government, took the major portion of 
the rental income, and also paid more revenue. The rental 
income of the zamindars of jointly managed estates was 
higher than that of the divided estates. But the partition 
of estates could also assist the intermediaries and usurious 
classes who controlled production in the guise of tenure- 
holders and village mahajans. The changes brought under the 
legal system, and the creation of petty estates merely added 
to a protracted process of expropriation of the maximum 
surplus from the producing class.
The size of the holdings of the various categories of 
land-holders and tenants differed from district to district. 
The estates of some proprietors extended to hundreds or 
thousands of acres. The holdings of tenants varied
considerably. Those in Champaran had bigger holdings on 
average than their counterparts of Saran and Darbhanga, 
where, however, holdings were even smaller than in 
Muzaffarpur. Virtually all the cultivated area was held by 
tenants. The zirat land of the proprietors was leased out 
to tenure-holders and rich farmers or fixed-rate raiyats, 
though it was legally the private land or homestead farm of 
the zamindars. It was land of good quality from the point
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of view of productivity as well as income. According to 
Hunter, the size of holdings in Tirhut varied also from north 
to South. Holdings of rice land were larger in the Northern 
part/ seven to eight acres were standard. The largest 
holdings were eighteen to fifty acres, but very few raiyats 
possessed this much. The southern parts of North Bihar were 
more productive, and the holdings were smaller—ranging between 
four and thirty acres. In effect any raiyat who possessed a 
large acreage approximated in status to a proprietor. The 
agricultural labourers, by contrast, possessed at best tiny 
holdings. Hunter suggests they ranged between 0.37 acres and 
1.48 acres, while a poor cultivator would have between 0.74 and 
6.66 acres, and well-to-do cultivator would occupy between 10 
and 30 acres.20
The main feature in the later nineteenth century, however,
as shown in Dufferin's inquiry and later in the Settlement
operations, was that the_ . holdings in all categories, of
landholders as well as raiyats, were very d i v e r s e N o n e  the
less, as a general rule the holdings of the cultivating classes
Lat»«*-
were shrinking and those of the^holders were increasing. The 
landless labourers' and agricultural labourers' condition 
deteriorated from bad to worse. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 
did not affect the size of holdings for each class of 
cultivators and landholders which it defined. Nor, accurate 
though the Settlement Reports may be in revealing the situation 
at one time, do they fully show the changing pattern of 
cultivation, the transfers of raiyati holdings, and the
worsening condition of some landlords and tenants. The tenancy 
legislation was not based on a distribution of land according 
to need, and the record of rights was the only device in which 
the legislation provided for preserving the right to occupy 
land as long as the rent was paid. Finally, it is also
important to note that, if the caste-wise distribution of 
holdings is observed, the holdings of upper castes were 
considerably larger than the lower castes.
Ve have already referred to the fertility of the
al luvial^plain of the Gargetic basin in North Bihar. The
southern and western parts of the region were the most 
productive. Their alluvial and calcarious soils were suitable
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for food crops such as rice, maize, wheat, pulses, oilseeds, 
vegfctabl tobacco and chillies. The more northerley lands in 
the area were not calcarious and were less fertile. They 
required irrigation for the cultivation of paddy and were used 
for the millets, marua and chinna, and for other food crops. 21
The cultivators had their own methods of defining the 
nature of the soils. Generally they were divided into hangar, 
bhit and goenra. Bangeur soil was found in low lands inundated 
by rain-waters. It was a hard clay suited for the cultivation 
of rice in winter. Bhit soil was found in the south of the 
region) it had a mixture of sand. These lands were above the 
level of the Ganges, and there was no fear of inundation. The 
goenra soil was found in the uplands of the villages. If well 
manured and cultivated it produced good crops. The costliest 
lands were those most readily supervised by the cultivators.22
The high and low lands had different cultivation systems. 
Bangor lands were useful for winter rice, whereas bhit lands 
were valued for other food crops and cash crops. In Bihar, 
there were three main harvests: the aghani, the rabi and the
bhadoi. The winter crops called the aghani were sown in May or 
June and reaped in November. The chief crop of this season was 
rice. The bhadoi crops, generally sown in June, were harvested 
in August or September. The chief crops of the season was 
maize <makai>, but it also produced a sixty-day rice called 
'sathij and millets, maru^a, Kodo, and sawan. Rabi was the 
spring harvest; the crops, sown in June and July, were wheat, 
barley, oats, gram, pulses; arhar, masur, matar, khesari: they
were reaped in March and April. Sometimes two harvests were 
combined in one, and practice depended on the nature of the 
soil. On bang&r soils aghani rice was the major or only crop 
of the year; it could be followed by a harvest of the ordinary 
kinds of rabi crops such as Khesari, a food generally used by 
poor peasants as a pulse and as a paste of ground flour and 
water eaten with salt. But in bhit areas, bhadoi was the major 
harvest and cash crops such as indigo were grown. In the same 
agricultural year rabi crops such as wheat and barley were also 
sown on these lands, which made them specially useful and 
valuable. The peasants' economic prosperity depended more on 
the bhadoi crops than on others.23
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The following table shows the distribution of the main 
harvests in North Bihar in 1900 in each district of North Bihar 
in each category of harvest.
Table 1
Percentage distribution of harvest (by area) in 1900 in
North Bihar
District Aghani Bhadoi Rabi Do-fasli Non-food
Darbhanga 62 27 47 37 15. 79
Muzaffarpu r 48.1 38. 2 60. 1 46. 4 11.5
Champaran 38 46 55 39 17. 8
Saran 34 38 48 39 14. 4
Sources: Darbhanga Settlement Reports Para 319
Saran Settelement Reports Para 387 
Muzaffarpur Settlement Reports Para 711 
Champaran Settlement Reports para 405
The table shows regional variations. Bhadoi was relatively
important in Saran, while the aghani crops dominated in
Darbhanga. The rabi was most important (by acreage) in
Muzaffarpur and Chamaparn. The food crops were produced in
larger quantities in Saran than in Darbhanga which produced
more non-food crops. In Muzaffarpur rabi crops were grown
after the aghani rice had been reaped on the poor banger land.
In Saran the rabi crops were produced on fertile uplands, and
thus were more valu able than thoseof Muzaffarpur. The table
suggests too that Champaran produced a high proporition of
bhadoi crops; in fact this district concentrated more on rice
growing than Muzaffarpur did. Generally Champaran was subject
to flooding, and therefore rice was produced as an autumn
instead of winter crop.
The Northern parts of the area were more dependent upon 
aghani crops than those in the south. Indeed North Bihar had 
two agricultural regions. Indigo plantations were especially 
important on good soils in Champaran, parts of Darbhanga, and 
Muzaffarpur. Another variation, as already suggested, was the 
liability to flooding. Thus bhadoi and rabi crops were more 
important than aghani on the low lands. In the northern part 
of the area near the Little Gandak river in Muzaffarpur, there 
was little high ground, and annual floodings fertilised the 
land for varieties of crops other than rice. The southern
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tracts were just opposite but hardworking cultivators and 
prosperous farmers could sometimes produce four good crops in a 
year.
Ancient methods of cultivation were the practice in North 
Bihar. Local manufactured implements were used for ploughing 
and sowing. Cow dung was used as manure to some extent in
Saran, but much less elsewhere. The Goenra lands were well 
manured. Buffalo dung was used generally as manure by Koeris, 
Goalas and Rajputs for good crops. The lack of regular 
manuring in the nineteenth century meant that productivity
varied from one area to another largely according to the
fertility of the land. The cultivators depended largely upon 
nature. One exception was Saran, where, because manure was 
much more widely used, productivity was much higher than in
other districts by the beginning of the twentieth century. j;:° 
The other exception was cash crops. In Darbhanga, for example, 
manure was used (if at all) only for such crops as tobacco, 
potatoes, sugarcane and opium.27 The fertility of lowlying 
alluvial soils which produced much of the winter rice, was 
maintained by floodwater.
The estimates made in 1876 by Mr. A. P. Macdonnell about 
the bhadoi and rabi crops suggest an average outturn for Bhadoi 
rice of 12 maunds per acre and the same for marua and xoakai 
(maize) . This estimate was supported by cropping experiment 
during the Survey and Settlement Operations in Darbhanga 
district in 1896-1903. Indigo productivity per acre was a 
little higher in other districts than Saran. The figures of 
rabi grains were eight maunds in Madhubani and Sadar sub­
divisions, and twelve maunds in Tajpur. This estimate too was 
confirmed during Settlement Operations. 20
Irrigation was not widely available to the cultivators in 
the nineteenth century. In Saran district some lands were well 
irrigated. Generally Kaccha wells were used in bhit lands 
dug with traditional implements. There was some irrigation in 
Darbhanga also, but very little as a general rule in Champaran 
and Muzaffarpur. But oxen were used to lift water for
irrigation of goenra lands and in Champaran, Sitamarhi, 
Madhubani and other parts of Darbhanga, canals (pynes) were
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built to carry water to the paddy lands. There were also tanks 
in Mudhubani constructed for the irrigation of paddy crops in 
winter. None of this was sufficient for bad years when the 
regions suffered drought.29 In short, the peasants irrigated 
only those lands which gave them high value. They believed
that if they irrigated all the lands, the nature of the soil 
might be changed and they might have to arrange for irrigation 
throughout the year.
It remains to list and briefly decribe the legal changes 
which; will be a background to the more detailed discussions in 
the Chapters which follow. The laws and administration of the 
British are a necessary context for this study. In the 
decades following the battle of Plassey and the political
expansion of the East India Company, the bureaucracy and land 
revenue administration were reshaped. The Company remained no 
longer a trading organisation but a military and political
suzerain, subordinate to the government of Great Britain. In 
1765, the grant of Diwani of the Province of Bihar, Bengal and 
Orissa vested in the Company the power for land revenue
collection, and ultimately for control of_____ ^production and
the protection of the interests of the zamindar. The
Company's government became well acquainted with the land 
problems and production relations among the various producing 
classes of the society. They proposed to halt the decline in 
agricultural production by restoring the traditional power of 
the zamindar within the social and economic hierarchy, and by 
limiting the immediate gains of the government. A series of 
new regulations wtrfc promulgated before the final Decennial 
Settlement of 1789 and the Permanent Settlement of 1793, which 
extended the influence of the zamindars under the Company's 
government, and supported their power against their tenants. 
It is now recognised that this did not everywhere destroy 
tenant rights. Peter Marshall says jjja.taf ter the Permanent
Settlement in the North Bihar districts, the expansion of 
agricultural lands allowed privileged raiyats among high caste 
Hindus and Muslims to improve their conditions,30 thus 
creating or increasing a band of intermediaries.'"11 On the 
other hand the persistence of an imp^ovished mass of small 
cultivators, under-tenants and share-croppers in the post-^
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Permanent Settlement period can be traced to the legislation . 
Moreover, the new class of landed gentry, as desired by 
Cornwallis, differed in character from the hereditary and 
ancient zamindars. Their position in the early years of the 
Permanent Settlement was deplorable due to the sudden increase 
in the financial liabilities placed upon them,3-" In most 
parts of North Bihar, the small zamindars had to mortgage 
their estates in order to pay off the debts. While
agricultural prices remained low in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century, many zamindari estates were sold in 
Bihar.33 By increasing the aggregate revenue demand, the 
British also added to the burdens of the poor. Exactions from 
raiyats increased under the nominally fixed assessment of the 
Permanent Settlement.
The mainstays of the zamindari system were the supposed 
pargana rate of rent and village administration with the help 
of patwaris\ the main feature was the absolute proprietary 
rights of the zamindar before the Act X of 1859. The security 
of the raiyats was hardly taken into consideration. The 
pargana rate in particular was no protection. The zamindars 
collected illegal cesses with the help of village officials, 
who also dishonestly manipulated the records. But the first 
half of the nineteenth century was also a period of experiment 
with laws to eradicate various anomalies in landl ord — tenant 
relations. Steps were also taken for the improvement of 
revenue administration, and, temporarily, with the
institutions of pa^twari, quanungo, and amin. But the 
majority of measures were designed to assist not to control 
the zamindars, and none of them greatly altered the legal or 
administrative position in the permanently-settled areas.
The issue of protecting the raiyats began to become more 
prominent from the middle of the century, when the growing 
commercial and industrial aims of the government were thought 
to necessitate new measures for the protection of the 
producing and rent*'- paying class. In 1855, the Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Halliday, observed the suffering of the 
raiyats of Champaran, and the high handedness of the 
zamindars, thikadars and planters in the eastern parts of the
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North Bihar districts. The result of this new concern was the 
introduction of the Rent Act, X of 1859, intended to improve 
landlord-tenant relations and strengthen the position of 
raiyats, through a definition of their rights, and by placing 
restrictions on landlords' power to enhance rents, and evict 
their tenants. It was spelt out that raiyats were entitled to 
hold land as long as they paid rent. Those raiyats who had 
been holding land at a fixed rate since the permanent 
settlement or whose rent had not been changed for twelve 
years, were entitled to hold occupancy rights* On the other 
hand, however, those raiyats who had held land for less than 
twelve years were tenants at-will. The enhancement of rent 
was not completely forbidden by law, even at the discretion of 
zamindar regardless of whether or not the productivity of the 
soil had increased or agricultural prices had gone up.
Between 1859 and 1885, the law did not impede the 
enhancement of rent, the use of the power of distraint, and 
the transfer of raiyats' rights both by the courts and by 
arbitrary methods. Agrarian relations, particularly as
expressed in indigo and other disturbances, continued to cause 
concern, the more so with the development of communications 
and the commercialisation of agriculture. Various suggestions 
for reform were made, including some in the Indigo Commission 
Reports. The pressure was increased by the uncertainty in the 
judiciary about the law in cases of landlord-tenant relations 
and occupancy rights. The Famine Commission of 1874 also 
recommended that the relations of the raiyats and zamindars 
should be placed on a permanent footing. District officials 
added their voice. Malony, Commissioner of Patna Division, 
recorded that the levying of illegal cesses, the exaction of 
arbitrary enhanced rents, and the forcible termination of 
occupancy rights, were widespread in North Bihar.3'’ He 
suggested a record of rights and changes in the methods of 
rent collection.
The Bihar Rent Committee was constituted in September 
1878. It recommended separate rent laws for Bihar along with 
general measures, all introduced in the Bengal Rent Bill of 
1882. This was modified in the face of opposition from the 
zamindars and other interest.36 But the eventual enactment,
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the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, was still a great land mark in 
the agrarian history of North Bihar.
The main objective of the Act was the improvement of 
agricultural conditions through the maintenance of equitable 
landlord-tenant relations and the protection of the occupancy 
rights of the raiyats. It made elaborate provisions for the 
occupancy raiyats, defining their rents and the power of 
zamindar. Moreover, anyone, whether resident or non-resident, 
who held land for twelve years in a village (not necessarily 
the same land), was a ’settled raiyat' . The zamindars' power 
of distraint was curtailed. The enhancement of rent on the 
basis of contract or suit was restricted by law. Provision 
was made for survey and settlement operations and for the 
preparation ofa record of rights. It was also provided that 
ordinary raiyati land could not be converted into zirat (or 
demjsne) land: this had occurred in order to deprive the
raiyats of his occupancy rights. Non-occupancy raiyats were 
allowed to hold land as long as they paid rent fixed by the 
court, but could be ejected if they failed to pay a properly 
enhanced rent. Landless cultivators and agricultural labourers 
had no place under the rule provided by this Act.
The power of the zamindar was now restricted but still he 
had the protection of law to collect rent, and the support of 
the court in punishing a failure of payment. Abwabs were 
declared to be illegal but were still collected. In
particular, the Act did not attempt to link the occupancy 
right with actual cultivation. The alienation of raiyati 
rights and the enhancement of rent still continued. Hence the 
new law rather accelerated the growth of intermediaries with 
its greater open opportunity for the acquisition of raiyati 
rights by substantial tenants. This advantage was underlined 
by the maintenance of a record of rights, and by the setting 
of fair and equitable rents for those secure, rich tenants who 
could sustain the bargains with the zamindars made in the law 
courts. 3:7 The occupancy rights provided a rich resource for 
the expansion of landholding interests.
The land record and survey and settlement operations from 
the decade following the Bengal Tenancy Act and several other 
legislative measures adopted, certainly contributed to the
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clearer determination of the proprietary interests of North 
Bihar. Thus a measure devised in order to improve
agricultural prosperity, helped maintain landlord and tenant 
relations on the established footing, and to strengthen the 
hierarchic foundation of the society, adding to the domination 
of the proprietors that of the more prosperous class of 
tenants. Sir A. P. Macdonnell pointed out in his historic 
minute about the importance of the survey and settlement 
operations, that the zamindars of the North Bihar had a rental 
income of about 2 Vi crores of rupees in the late nineteenth 
century, probably five times the total of the time of the 
Permanent Settlement. But their net income was perhaps 80 
times greater.31"1 Thus the growth of proprietary interests now 
merely supplemented the wealth derived from trade, money- 
lending and investment in commercial agriculture. Again, the 
small raiyats and landless labourers had no place in this 
competitive agricultural market.
The growth of population and the pressure on the land was 
declared to be the reason for the poverty and landlessness of 
many in North Bihar. Thus emigration and migration reflected 
pressure, especially in the later decades of the century. But 
the economic decay of the agrarian society could be said to 
consist in exploitation of the forces of production, weakness 
in agricultural technology, and dominant control of the means 
of agricultural reproduction. Above all, the great and 
increasing inequalities restricted more than a marginal growth 
in production. These inequalities were by-products of agrarian 
policy. Legislation complicated landlord— tenant relations, 
bringing into being diverse groups of raiyats and jnaliks. But 
there was no corresponding transformation of agriculture. The 
new capitalist enterprise was based on medieval zamindars 
incorporated into a colonial land system. At root the
hierarchy, the technology and the lot of the producing classes 
did not change overtime.
CHAPTER II
ZAMINDARS
Dominant Social Classes and the Formation of Agrarian
Society
Zamindars formed^ . dominant social and economic group 
of agrarian society in North Bihar. In order to examine the 
role of dominant social groups, it is necessary to look into 
another aspect. Was cultural dominance the source of social 
and economic dominance? Various factors are involved: 
relations of production, institutional factors, the nature 
of the ruling classes, demographic trends, ideological 
trends and others. A sociological approach based on the 
principles of tribal society hardly helps the understanding 
of a peasant economy or agrarian society. In a peasant 
society, the two main problems to articulate and 
characterise are the mode of production, and relations 
amongst the peasants, that is amongst the majority of the 
population. Above this we are concerned with the management 
of land, the production of soil and the payment of tax out 
of surplus: these were the principal sources for the
sustenance of non-producing classes in the pre-capitalist 
society. The advanced agricultural settlements produced 
substantial surplus which created favourable circumstances 
and led to the rise of dominant classes whose power was 
based on status and wealth; the over-all picture was one of 
exploitation of the producers by a powerful few at the top. 
The formation of classes in terms of the mode of production 
and the distribution as well as appropriation of surplus 
created a feudal society. ' Before the formation of feudal 
society, occupations defined in terms of caste and on the 
principle of division of labour were very prevalent in 
ancient society, and this practice did not change much over 
time. The nature of the caste system rather became more 
rigid when upper castes withdrew from direct production and 
lived on surplus. The burden of taxation therefore,
increased on the lower castes: the vaisyas and Sudras and
art isans.
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Since the first century of the Christian era, the 
mobility of various tribal groups and the intermixture of 
foreign elements created some of the dominant upper castes 
and certain ruling tribal chiefs, who became a part of Hindu 
society. They showed the attributes of warriors or dominant 
groups and gained the patronage of Brahmins. In this 
category we find a number of ruling dynasties in north, 
south and eastern parts of India such as Rajputs and various 
others. This status was passed on right from the early 
medieval to modern times.
The social stratification based on caste, occupation, 
heredity and custom reduced social mobility and created 
greater rigidity in terms of food taboos, marriage and 
social and cultural barriers. The resultant large gap 
between the upper and lower castes, backed up by land and 
revenue grants to the upper castes, allowed the delineation 
of a landlord class and a cultivating class. In such a 
society the landlord collected taxes from the peasants, 
effectively on the basis of having a charter or land grant 
from the state — — the cultivators were bound to pay these 
either in cash or kind or in labour, even though they were 
in actual occupation of the land. The cultivators were a 
subject class under the growing power of elites and local 
officials. Land tax and services in the form of farm labour 
were not extracted from cultivating classes in order to 
promote agricultural production but to provide for the
consumption of the elites. Production from the land was the 
essential service ideologically or from a religious point of 
view, obligatory on the part of the producing classes for 
the benefit of the landlord class. It was legal to get 
surplus produce from peasants, though force was likely to 
be used. On the other hand, production in this agricultural 
economy, was intended to suffice for local needs and for the 
payment of rent. Salary was paid generally in kind, as the 
market economy was very little developed. The salaried 
classes were connected with services in religious, military, 
political and administrative institutions and they were 
remunerated through the grant of plots in the case of lower 
functionaries, and through grants of revenue from villages
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for the higher functionaries. Socially, hierarchical
difference and impurity, regulated through the varna 
mechanism, created a sharp distinction between landlords and 
peasants even in agricultural production. The upper castes 
were thus dominant through the control of the resources of 
production: land and the labour of the cultivating classes. ^
In Kautilya's Arthasashajtra, share-croppers are found 
to be subservient to rich peasants, and exploited both 
socially and economically. When mahattas (rich peasants) 
grew into local landlords living on rents and benefitting 
from the services of the common peasantry in the village 
community, a relation between both was established on the 
basis of social hierarchy. The social stratification based 
on 'varna' (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vais^yas, and Sudras) was 
itself a dominant factor in the course of the evolution of 
agrarian society. The important question in this regard is 
the role of upper varnas and lower varnas in the overall 
management of production and in the sharing of the surplus.
Land and population determined agricultural production. 
Forms of property and the idea of proprietorship in the 
villages and in rural administration were very much present 
under the Hindu rulers, and continued in the Mughal and 
British periods. According to one view, communities were 
self sufficient and people were parochial. Social mobility 
was limited because technology was simple and only suited to 
handicrafts. Education was restricted to the upper strata 
of society. Caste hindered all-round social mobility. Thus 
according to this view, agrarian society was authoritarian 
and hierarchical. Other views emphasise the fact that 
Indian society developed an economic structure based on a 
variety of agricultural and craft production, a market 
system of inward and outward trade, taxation by regular 
assessment, with record keeping, and a state-controlled 
military and administrative machinery. A systematic
hierarchy of officials obtained in the judicial and fiscal 
systems. Bankers, traders, money-lenders and village
officials existed right from the ancient times to the Mughal 
and British periods. All created a complex society.
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The view of unchanging villages was developed in the 
latter eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, based partly on 
the study of classical texts in Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, and 
Persian. A central idea was that the Brahmins formed a 
■« dominant group in Hindu society and in a manner shared 
political and military power of the other upper castes. 
Indian society was seen to be static and timeless. Scholars 
such as Sir William Jones and William Robertson saw society 
from the point of view of the occupational roles of various 
classes and the maintenance of class hierarchy.
Accordingly the East India Company applied Hindu Laws while 
deciding court cases and running the administration. They 
thought Indians would be best governed under their own law 
rather than under British law. The judges held that in the 
past Indian society had better laws and patterns of life 
which d-i started by the intervention of foreign rule.
On the other hand the missionaries thought differently. 
They believed in reforms and wanted changes in society.
William Jones and others did not pay adequate attention 
to political organisation, land tenure and the functions of 
the legal system and commercial structures. It is possible 
however to see the role of the British in terms of the 
gradual discovery and interpretation of information about
India. The agrarian society of the Bengal provinces of which 
Bihar is a part was more complicated than that of any other 
province. Warren Hastings' efforts in collecting revenue 
documents and records pertaining to the previous rulers 
and land — holding classes of Bengal, provided an
opportunity for getting to know the various aspects of 
Bengal agrarian society. Experienced officials such as 
James Grant and John Shore made efforts to examine the 
nature of the rural society of Bengal before the enactment 
of the Permanent Settlement in 1793. The writings of William 
Tenant, a military Chaplain <1804), provided much knowledge 
about the social and agricultural practices in upper India 
and about the occupations and earnings of various castes: 
carpenters, blacksmiths, potters, chamars, Ahirs, Bhats 
(geneologists) and Brahmins. The descriptions by T.H.
Colebrooke (1806), and his report on the agriculture of
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Bengal and Bihar in the form of statistical material, 
provide good information about commercial crops such as 
cotton, indigo sugarcane, and attest to the
agricultural prosperity of the regions. Celebrooke. was
convinced that the caste system and religion did not hamper 
the development of agriculture and manufacture. The
statistical survey done by Buchanan Hamilton at the instance 
of the Court of Directors (1807), during his seven years 
work in various provinces in Eastern India and Mysore also 
provide valu able information on agriculture, ecology, land, 
papulation, the nature of tenures, trade and commerce, 
dress, food habits, caste and society. He provides
information on various aspects of the lives of peasants, 
farm labourers, the size of their families and household, 
their standard of living, their customs and the type of 
their land tenure. He interviewed the people in villages 
through local officials, and examined the question of 
occupation and class differentiation, as well as religion 
and rituals, for four districts of Bihar (Patna, Bihar,
Shahabad, Gaya). The East India Company became equipped with 
social, economic and cultural information which moulded the 
task of officials and iaw-makers; an official view came to 
exist of the caste and class character of agrarian society 
which was to be applied in tenancy laws in the nineteenth 
century.
The importance of the British endeavour lay in the 
supposedly scientific method of investigation they employed. 
The detailed account of the caste system was adopted by the 
British on the basis of information given by Buchanan and 
others, and it was then published in district manuals and 
histories from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.
The Statistical Account of Bengal edited by V.V. Hunter 
in the early 1870s, and the Provincial and Imperial
Gazetteers of India at the beginning of this century, also 
provided detailed classification of castes and categorised 
the various occupations, customs and marriage-ties of its 
members, as well as defining their role in society.
Census Reports also covered a wide range of social^ economic 
and cultural differentation. From 1872 onwards they
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recorded the main characteristics of each and every caste in 
the society; the Brahaminical theory of the origin of caste 
was very much adopted. The principle of 'varna' was given
the shape of 'caste* as an effective unit. Like in many
rural areas in India today, it was the endogamous unit, not 
the exogamous one which the administrators thought of as the 
effective one in the social system 3 . In the official
view of the government's ethnography, caste was a matter of 
separate castes and their customs. This view was applied in 
effect if not in name, in land legislation and judicial
interpretation, to famine relief operations, and in the 
cadestral surveys, even when the record of rights was being 
made for tenants.
The view of Henry Maine about the village community, 
and B. H. Baden Powell's account of land and tenants, farmed 
an important part of the legislation on rent collection and 
the protection of tenants' rights. In the later 19th 
century Baden-Powell recognised that in general that were 
two claims on the produce of the soil, the State's and the 
land-holder's . He argued that the state employed various 
agencies from village to district level, for the collection 
of revenue. Generally, these officials were remunerated by 
a land grant which, by turning into a hereditary holding, 
created 'ownership' of the land. At a later stage revenue 
farmers also converted their claim to the collection and 
payment of land revenue into ' ow^.nership' . In addition, 
land rights were established by conquest or the government's 
subjugation of villages. Despite this acquisition of land by 
government officials, Maine and Baden-Powel1's underlying 
idea with regard to individual property was that it 
developed in stages from tribal to family and individual 
ownership.This idea was adopted in the law. It implied that 
the property of a landlord and his individual ownership of 
joint villages, should be traced to his descent from a 
single family; thus it also justified his pretensions to be 
of high caste.A These assumptions defined the hereditary 
rights of landlords for legal purposes.
In such ways agrarian society was thought to be based 
on 'varna' or caste hierarchy;'jati' was supposed to define
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■traditional occupation, rituals, social behaviour, marriage, 
food habits and customs, all of which were very much kept in 
view by the administrators when dealing with land tenures 
and the various classes of landholding interests. This was 
true in the late nineteenth century legislation in the 
Bengal Presidency, and was particularly ac^ute in the 
Province of Bihar.
In a recent study, Ronald Inden has criticised the 
notion of caste as a 'substantialised* agent of Indian 
civilization.e Whatever the shortcomings of the European 
interpretations, however, class differentiation is 
undeniably an important feature of human thought and 
material life and culture in the Indian context. The caste 
system like others was based on heredity and hierarchy. The 
'varnas', or castes,were arranged in a ritual ranking from 
high to low. The natural qualities of human beings were 
qualified by the social and material environment into which 
they were born.
The dominant classes and clans had the upper hand at 
the head of a hierarchical social order. The state on the 
one hand and non-pri vi legged producers on the other were 
practically joined by the local controlling authorities, 
whether called maliks or zamindars or landlords. The
privileged class had better claims with regard to tax, and 
were paid tribute from the cultivators and merchants. Over 
all the dominant upper castes derived their power from their 
inherited position and also from the State: through the
administration, as professional military men or from land- 
grants and revenue collection.
The position of a landholder in Bihar can be analysed 
on the basis of documentary evidence found in the
eighteenth century, which says that a person who held four 
or more ploughs, was called halmir and controlled 
cultivation and its extension. But those who fcj&ught new
lands under cultivation were called maliks or zamindars or 
proprietors of the soil. The words Jotdars (used in 
B£ngal), Krisaka and Kisan used in eighteenth century 
documents and even earlier had almost the same meaning as 
free peasant cultivator:ethey might or might not cultivate
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land but were responsible for carrying on cultivation. The 
evolution 01r" growth of zamindars has an historical 
dimension like other elements of the agarian society. 
Smaller zamindars were off-shootSof more powerful zamindars, 
having possessed the customary right to private land and 
revenue villages at the instance of the big zamindars. The 
position of zamindars was strenghtened in the centralized 
State as a result of an increase in their local influence 
and their ability to manage large portions of land and 
control cultivators. This feature was found under the Delhi 
Sultans as well as in later periods under the Mupj^l rulers.
The zamindari right under the Mughals^ although
organised on the basis of caste, clan and local influence,
was not stronger than in the later periods. But the key to
zamindari influence was the relationship between their role
as revenue collectors and controllers of peasant production,
and their social status on the basis of caste. In addition,
because they were utilized to maintain law and order,
develop agricultural production, and protect the
administrative zones of surounding villages from external
aggression, they played an important part in pargana
administration. They often formed a part of the Mughal
nobility, being offered mansabs and shar ing administrative
power. But it is necessary to add^the zamindar in any one
place represented a particular family and a particular
caste; he held the zamindari right an a hereditary basis
over large tracts of land. Moreover, apart from such
primary zamindars, the intermediary zamindars generally also
derived from the caste groups, including khud-kasht raiyats
who held proprietary rights and thus shared political power.
Thus they maintained law and order in the village with the
help of their retainers, extracted revenue, looked after
irrigation work, and ensured the distribution of the land
tax assessment. In turn the services rendered by the
intermediary groups of zamindars gained them various
perquisities, including revenue— free lands, cesses and
V®’
Muhasilana or Jaribana (measu^ment tax or tax for the 
collection of land revenue)7 . It was of course obligatory on
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the part of the intermediary zamindars to satisfy their 
superiors who were directly responsible to the Mughal empire 
or the state. In return, apart from the nankar (revenue 
free grant), intermediary zamindars received a certain
percentage of revenue ranging from between percent to 10 
percent called khidmat (service). Sometimes they were also
given a lower— rate assessment of revenue. But their 
customary right of inheritance was always maintained. 
Therefore, any privilege owned by the zamindars or maiiir^in 
Bihar can be regarded as a delegated part of the services or 
khidmat which all subjects were required to render to the
State.
The great zamindars of the Mughal period independently 
acquired zamindari rights over vast tracts of villages
controlled by intermediaries and khud-kasht raiyats and on 
several occasions they declared themselves chieftains. They 
also clashed with the imperial authorities on occasion and 
could be reduced to the position of inferior zamindars with 
their mansab cut drastically. They were also oppressive to 
the lower grade of proprietors, that is, khud-kasht raiyats. 
The intermediary groups of zamindars gained much importance 
as revenue farmers during the time of Murshid (^Uli Khan (1st 
half of 18th century) and even in the later period, when 
they were given full administrative power over the areas 
assigned to them subject to regular payment of the
stipulated revenue.& The administration was not always
successful in the attempt to keep in touch with the
zamindai—  an-reza (the small^amindars or proprietors, rich 
in resources who controlled village revenue).
The most important and highest in status of the great 
zamindars were the ruling chiefs or chieftains of the
independent or semi-independent mansabdars of the empire. 
They formed an important part of Mughal administration 
whether they originated as nobles or as autonomous rulers. 
Their influence and extra-territorial rights over vast 
tracts of village land inhabited by raiyats was over­
whelming: they controlled a large number of intermediaries
as well as various other small zamindars. Basically they 
supported the administration, the revenue, the military
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system and agricultural production in all respects. They 
were supposed to look after the interests of the khud-kasht 
as well as of the non-occupancy raiyats. Observation of the 
imperia]jstructure of the Mughal administration reveals that 
both at provincial and central government levels, chieftains 
were found in the hierarchy. Governorships and military 
commands were conferred on them as mansabs and they received 
substar^ial grants of land, in the form of jzgirs. The
j agirdars formed a class including chieftainS who held 
military, social and economic power. This was hereditary as 
well as dependent on the good will of the emperor. Their
main duty was to collect revenue from the hereditary classes 
of intermediary zamindars; they too formed a class of 
landlords.
The jagirdarf system of the Mughals developed into a 
strong^hol d of the hereditary ownership of property in the 
form of revenue villages, apart from the 'homogenous class' 
of proprietors and landlords who were also strong in each 
locality.The hereditary dominion of chieftains created an 
aristocracy, a class of lords controlling the soil. On the 
other hand some of them held this position even before the 
Mughals, as we find in the case of a few 'maharajas' of
Bihar. Under the Mughals, all these rulers and zamindars
were subjected to the imperial revenue regulations on the
basis of the actual production of the land. The Mughals
absorbed them into the administrative machinery, making them 
responsible for the land revenue and making use of their
influence in the social hierarchy. They were well equipped 
to deal with the subordinate classes, and thus they usurped 
the maximum landed property.
The intermediary zamindars in areas under the effective
control of the administration were able to hold their
position as long as they collected revenue and paid it to
the government. The administration of Bengal 'subah' in the
second half of the 18th century comprised the zamindars
including the category of original proprietors, the
r
hereditary revenue farmers and talukdajS. All of them formed 
a class, concious of their status and supremacy although 
they were known by a variety of titles. Such was the
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legacy of the Mughals. It was found to be very useful to 
the British for identifying the status of each class of land 
holder at the time of the Decennial Settlement and later on 
when the Permanent Settlement of 1793 was introduced in 
Bihar.
These general features can be observed in greater 
detail in the origin and development of the big zamindars of 
North Bihar, who held a hereditary dominion as autonomous 
chiefs, namely the houses of Darbhanga, Bettiah, Hathwa and 
a few lesser ones such as Ramnagar in Champaran and so on. 
It is evident from the old records of revenue firmans of 
Mughal times that these 'rajas' gained zamindari rights as a 
result of khidmat (services) as head of mauzas, as the 
chaudhari of the pargana, as military chiefs (man^bdars) and 
as amalguzar (revenue collectors). In North Bihar where we 
find a number of cultivators, we also find non-cultivating 
maliks as absentee-landlords. The zamindari right was both 
malguzari and Khidmat gari.
The Raj Darbhanga developed out of Chaudharai and 
q^_,anungoi rights in the Sircar Tirhut during the time of 
Emperor Akbar. He granted a Jagiri to Mahesh Thakur, the 
chief called Mahinath, who became the founder of the Raj in 
Darbhangaio. Mahesh Thakur was a scholar and man of 
influence; he extended the zamindari milkiyat into the 
districts of PuHiea and Bhagalpur. The important factor in 
this expansion was not only the influence of this individual 
but underlying developments in land revenue management, 
administration and the control of subordinate proprietors 
and raiyats under the suzerainty of the raj. High caste 
was not as important in the case of a big zamindar as 
physical force and military prowess, the real instruments of 
zamindari control.
The zamindaris of Hathwa and Bettiah were also 
maintained on the same line as the Raj Darbhanga. The 
hereditary ownership of landed property by these zamindars 
was based on the principle of Khidmat. These rajas like the 
Raja of Bqnaras belonged to the same caste of Bhumihar or 
Babhan; at one time they had been military chiefs. The
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Hathwa Raj traced its history as a ruling dynasty back to
ancient times. In modern times the status of the Hathwa raj
is revealed in the register of the Subahdar (Governor) of
Bihar, Nawa|> Hushiar Jang, for the Fasli year 1180,
corresponding to 1773 AD. Then called Hussainpur, under its
Raja Fateh Sahi.it comprised the major portion of Sircar
Saran, including more than 4^650 villages, 1J540 estates and 15
parganas under direct control. In addition it included 297
villages which at that time were revenue free. The
assessment from the remainder was a little over
Rs. 9,36,201,only a small increase during the year 1765 over
the assesssment made by the Mughal administration. The Raj
Hathwa had its main influence in the north west of Saran in
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Shahabad, and in Chamj^ran; it established ties with the 
chiefs of Banaras, Gorakhpur and Champaran. There is no 
doubt that the predecessors of the Hathwa Raj must have 
served as amalguzars and chieftains under the Mughal rulers 
and thus extended their sway over vast territories. The 
Sircar Saran had the best revenue administration during the 
time of Akbar in the 16th century. Various small zamindars 
seemed to have come up as a result of q^anungoi grants in 
return for collecting land revenue.
At the time of the Decennial Settlement with the East 
India Company,the chief of the zamindari estate, Fateh Sahi, 
did not accept the terms and conditions of the company in 
settlement of revenue demand and rebelled against the 
company. The property of Hathwa Raj was seized in 1790, and 
handed out to one of the recognised minor branches of the 
family whose head accepted the terms and conditions of the 
revenue demand. Therefore the title of 'Raja* of Hathwa was 
conferred upon him. The management of Hathwa Raj developed 
into a Kingdom, like Darbhaga Raj., reinforcing the 
hereditary rule of autocracy* *.
In 1765, when the East India Company acquired the 
Diwani, Bettiah Raj held the largest territory under its 
jurisdiction. It consisted of all of Champaran except for 
a small portion held by Ram Nagar Raj . Bettiah Raj also 
came into being as a result of malikana^ Chaudharai and 
Q^,anungoi\ the connection with the revenue administration
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building on local dominance and the capability of 
controlling and protecting hundreds of villages. Internal 
disputes and family quarrels divided the Raj in course of 
time. Madhuban Raj was created as a consequence. But 
Bettiah Raj was the oldest in the region, and has also been 
a branch of raj rayasat Sarkar Champaran since the 16th 
century (the time of Shah Jehan), when the raja of Bettiah 
was Ugra Sen Singh. His descendants succeeded in getting the 
title of maharaja only when the East India Company became 
sure that this big zamindar was ready to accept their
n\
conditions of maintaining the management of the estate, 
paying the settled revenue, and improving the agriculture of 
the occupied land'1-1-
When the Permanent Settlement was made, it was with 
only six zamindars in Champaran. One of the tendencies of 
British administration was to increase the number of 
zamindari estates (not only in Champaran but in almost every 
part of Bihar and Bengal) because the Company fixed a 
certain amount of revenue to be paid and expected it 
punctually. In default the zamindars would become victims 
of the sale law. Many of the small zamindars who promised 
to pay revenue at the time of the Permanent Settlement 
failed to do so. Gradually the zamindari estates were 
divided. The position of the zamindar by 1800 was quite 
different from that in the mid-eighteenth century. Even some 
superior zamindars who had had real power and influence had 
been ruined. Indeed their hereditary overlordship had been 
reassessed. In such assessments, the East India Company 
considered that original proprietors should be given 
priority in the first instance.
On the other hand in the North Bihar districts, the big 
zamindars were recognised as hereditary chiefs with 
exclusive zamindari rights. If it was difficult to come to 
terms with Bettiah, it was just as hard with the Madhuban 
and Ram Nagar estates which had broken off from Bettiah Raj . 
The British became eager to settle with Bettiah, in order to 
save it from further distintegration.
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The growth of hereditary revenue farmers and revenue 
collectors from the middle of the 18th century led to the 
creation of a vast number of intermediary zamindars. They 
were in effect of f-shoots of the big zamindars and 
subordinate but rich Khud-Kasht raiyats who consolidated their 
position on the basis of caste and social influence. They 
also posed as independent proprietors of hundreds of acres 
of land to get zamindari rights. Since social and economic 
power seemed to be the main criterion for the distribution 
of zamindari right, most of the people in this category were 
well placed to get zamindari rights. Most of them must have 
worked as kazis, q^anungos, Patwaris and other revenue 
officials under the administration oflfcNawab in Bihar, and 
manipulated their position to grab hundreds of bighas of 
land. This was after all the value of social prestige, 
obtained by those who held certain influential positions.
These conflicting claims to customary land rights were
the main problem faced by the framers of the land
legislation under the East India Company in the Presidency
of Bengal. Since all of them claimed customary rights in
land and enjoyed various privileges (such as access to
revenue-free grants, right to cesses and tax-collecting,
and local influence) the subordinate land controllers were
often granted zamindari rights. In North Bihar, they came
«.r
under the categories of Chaudharis, talukdars, mukariqi dars, 
maliks and other petty proprietors. The British recognised 
two categories of talukdars: those who paid land revenue
direct to the district treasury, and those who paid it 
through the bigger zamindars. The talukdar in the first 
category had substantial privileges, while those in the 
second category who had paid a fixed revenue for twelve 
years, on the basis of an assessment made before 1765, were 
regarded as protected.
Whether zamindars and talukdars were the actual 
proprietors of the soil was a matter of great controversery 
among the authors of the Permanent Settlement. The grant of 
Diwani had created a period of transition, where one could 
find various types of land tenures and tenure holders,
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village mahajans, malguzars, birts, holders of "mukarrari 
tenures, thikadars and so on, each differing in rights of 
propretorship, in status, and in actual practice. Ve will 
return to this subject at a later stage while dealing with 
the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.
The owners of most of the tenures and xoahals in Bihar 
were known as zamindars, and it is a fact that zamindars
existed as revenue collectors in the regularly adminis
Shore, one of the authors of the Permanent Settlement,
regarded the zamindar as neither a 'proprietor nor a vassal 
but a compound of both-the zamindar performed acts of
authority unconnected with revenue collecting (mal^guzari) 
or even land owning rights, while the raiyat had rights
without real property'1^ . Moreover, the rights of each 
party - government, zamindar and raiyat— were in great
measure held at discretion, and subject to political and 
economic realities. After the grant of Diwani in 1765, the 
position of the zamindar gradually came to be confirmed in 
legal terms because of the attitude and actions of the East 
India Company. In part this was a restriction of zamindari 
and chiefly rights, which in custom might leave very little 
room for the government of the East India Company; hence 
under a more formal system, the rights of zamindars and
raiyats came to be fixed by the positive law. On the other 
hand it might be said of course that the Company had still 
reserved a zamindari right (as malikana and some other
tenures) even when settling the malguzari right with the
highest bidder, and that this reservation was given full
effect in the Permanent Settlement (or really the Decennial 
Settlement). Thus Philip Francis and his friends marked 
the victory for the opposition to revenue-farming. In any 
case; as is well known, the authors of the Permanent 
Settlement sought to parallel the status of landlords in 
England in the Bengal Provinces. Hence an absolute
proprietary right in the soil was given to the zamindars, 
and it was confirmed that this privilege was to be
territories during the 18th century. Some survived until 
the enactment of the Permanent Settlement in 1793. John
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hereditary. Similar treatment was accorded to all payers of 
land revenue, under various systems, down to those talukdars 
of the United Provinces who were restored to their lands 
after 1858.
Yet the question of whether zamindars and Talukdars 
were the actual proprietors of the soil remained a matter of 
great countroversy, particularly among those who introduced 
the raiyatwari system in the Madras Presidency. It seemed 
that the function of the government revenue collector was 
being grafted on to persons who were thought to be the 
actual proprietors of the soil. Already before 1793, the 
functions of government officer and of land controllers had 
been blended, so that it was difficult to determine the 
actual character of the existing functionary, known as 
zamindar. Certainly in Bihar, many zamindars had a higher 
status than that of collector of land revenue. Their rights 
were hereditary and transferable, and their malikana 
(proprietary) right was always admitted when^ever they were 
dispossessed of the management of their land: they would
receive a certain percentage of revenue, or sometimes would 
retckfn a portion of the land in lieu.
What was the relation of this zamindar, to Government 
and to the tenants under the Perman_ent Until
recently it has usually been claimed that throughout the 
Permaiytly— Settled areas, the law introduced was in the 
nature of a perpetual contract, under which the government 
would relinquish its quota of produce, due in cash on every 
bigha of land, in return for a permanent money rent. The 
persons with whom the settlement was made bound themselves 
to pay the demand without preferring any claim, nor applying 
for suspension or remissions on account of drought, 
inundation or other calamities of the season as Regulation I 
of 1793 put it (see particularly Section VII). By this 
contract, the government professed to be displaying the 
highest good-will toward its subjects. However, the raiyats 
were placed in the position of being absolutely dependent 
upon the zamindars. They were allowed no right of occupancy 
in the soil, though they might have been residing in their 
village for years. The only right given to them was to
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cultivate land at the mercy of the zamindars. Such was the 
legal position under the Permanent Settlement of 1793.
It was clear, thus, that the government was not disposed 
to interfere with existing prop rietors. The Settlement was 
intended (in theory, though this was not the immediate
result) to make the land revenue as light a burden as
possible: this could be accomplished only by setting it at a
fixed rate. It was supposed, too, that each proprietor would 
thus be induced to improve his lands, because his profits 
would increase in proportion to his exertions and in this 
way he would be able to pay the public revenue in an 
improved and regular manner. It was thought that when the 
zamindar was strong and solvent, he would benefit from such 
policies. Raiyats and agricultural labourers had no place in 
the regulation however. It is quite true then that the 
Permanent Settlement, in providing an assessment of the
states' share and a recognition of propioetary rights, also 
gave full recognition to the zamindar* s right to let his
lands at will. The only exception was lands which were 
comprised in any mukarrari holding (vide section 52 of Reg. 
VIII of 1793, Section 49 of Reg. VIII of 1793). Ve have 
noted too, for Champaran, that there were pitfalls for the 
zamindar. If he had no idea of supply and demand, and 
failed in the payments of revenue, the regulations took care 
that he would suffer. And yet above all the reality of the
position of the zamindar depended on the agrarian society. 
In North Bihar the landlords were absolutely powerful when 
supported by their own caste^men, and through the exercise 
of their local social and economic control. The new legal 
position merely gave them the sanction to enjoy the position 
of local ruler which they might have been long enjoying. It 
backed it up, and defined it as absolute by modern law.
In the later development, and in interpretation made on 
various occasions while amending the regulations of the 
Permanent Settlement, this absolute authority of the 
zamindar was never fully and effectively contested. 
Nonetheless by the late nineteenth century, it came to be 
argued that absolute authority did not mean complete control
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by the zamindar over the life and property of their 
subordinate raiyatsy it meant no more than the right to 
receive a fixed portion of rent. It was said that the 
intention of the regulations had been distorted by the 
zamindars as well as by the administrators and the courts 
because of their failure to define the interest of the 
raiyats in 1793. Moreover, it was argued, there had been 
customary rights for a body of Khudkasht or resident raiyats 
which the Permanent Settlement had failed to recognise. Now 
it is evident that raiyats' rights in the India context were 
not cafved out of the proprietary right of the zamindar. As 
Henry Maine said, all interests in land in England were 
theoretically derived from the /ee simple of the landlords. 
It is true too that the zamindar* s position as defined by 
the Permanent Settlement was very similar to that of English 
landlords'4 . Yet the government's contribution in Bihar had 
been to support and further an existing situation in which 
the raiyats were completely dependent on the zamindar. Only 
to the extent that there was a recognised privilege in 
practice for the raiyat to hold a piece of land on which 
they resided or which they cultivated, can th«.s be said to 
have been replaced (except in law) under the Permanent 
Settlement, by the recognition of zamindari property alone.
The purpose of the Company was to extend cultivation 
and reshape the village economy to maximise revenue. The 
permanent assessment was thus to be made only with 
proprietors or maliks who could bring profits in cash and 
kind. The measure of success enjoyed by this strategy is 
sometimes overlooked. The burden of the population on the 
soil of North Bihar districts was much more than in any 
other parts of Bihar or than in some parts of Bengal and 
much interest was taken by cultivators in bringing more area 
under cultivation from the end of the 18th century. But if 
this helped the proprietors in coming to terms with the 
British system, so did the fact that, as shown in the 
records and correspondence of the district officials of 
North Bihar, the Permanent Settelment was not made at a 
stroke in 1793. In effect, it took fifty years to settle 
permanently with the proprietors in Bihar. Of course, large
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tracts in North Bihar were settled in 1793, especially with 
the big. zamindari estates. But some areas were declared as 
"unsettled provinces", and recorded as such in the district 
records of Tirhut until the 1830s and 1840s, especially 
where proprietory interests were very involved and maliks of 
various categories had come up. The delay in initiating the 
Permanent Settlement was due to^large number of small 
estates which ^ come into being from 1750s onwards. These 
estates speedily came to terms with the zamindars, an 
adjustment which <in some cases) made it difficult for the 
authorities to decide whether Settlements should be effected 
with the actual proprietors or with farmers. Moreover, the 
zamindars of Tirhut were very obstinate and class-conscious, 
they were often recusant in coming to terms with the 
Company's governmentis. But above all there was a large 
number of revenue-free tenures in Tirhut and Saran, regarded 
on a temporary basis under the new regulations as new, 
separate estates. Eventually, great attention had to be 
paid to resumption proceedings both on long-existing and 
newly-created estates. The Board of Revenue decided to 
grant Permanent Settlement to the proprietors of resumed 
lands without any long delay. Instances, were found in 
Saran where rent-free tenure had lapsed in some cases, and 
Settlement had not been made. Because rent free-holdings 
were so very numerous, the completion of the Settlement 
procedure was delayed, and the full impact of British land 
legislation was postponed until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The number of estates covered in each year was not
less than a hundred either in Saran or in Tirhut. The
proprietors of these estates remained strong enough, 
moreover, to resist any encroachment against their local
authority. The Company's servants took a flexible attitude, 
and gave them farming leases from year to year pending the 
resolution of their status. In this way the landholders
also were enabled to come to terms with the eventual 
settlement. The process helped perpetuate a large number of 
village-level proprietors in the North Bihar districts. 
Indeed this was the case almost e v e r y w h e r e  in Patna
division.
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In the aftermath of the Permanent Settlement and until 
1859, the changes introduced by the British were most likely 
to provide more power to the land-holding classes: they were
mostly designed to ensure regular collection of rent from 
the raiyats. To the British at this time, landlord-tenant
relations were of interest mainly to ensure that there was 
no failure in revenue payments. Hence arbitrary eviction 
and repressive increases were adopted for the realization of 
rent as part of a broader control over the production of the 
land. Although throughout the period the raiyats enjoyed 
certain rights to land and its produce, these were subject 
to the good-will of the malik which in turn depended on the 
specific economic and political conditions pertaining at 
the time. In the earlier period, as long as there was not 
much pressure on land, the rights of landholding tenants 
were respected, but when there was a shortage of
cultivators, the staliks in attempting to ensure the maximum
cultivation, saw to it that the tenants found it difficult
to leave the estate^. The resultant social and economic 
dominance of the earlier period increased after 1793, though 
on a new basis in law rather than on the old pattern of 
zamindar right. Arbitrary enhancements of rent were common, 
in spite of various attempts in the Patta Regulations and 
other measures to improve matters. It was not in the 
landlords' interests to control or eschew malpractices. The 
British may have thought that fixing the land revenue would 
also restrict the demands of zamindars, or as was later 
suggested, that a restriction of rent increases had occured 
hitherto through the operation of the pargana rate. The 
British had sought to adopt some measures to restrain the 
zamindars, but in North Bihar, given the authoritarian basis 
of social relations and the dominance of zamindars and their 
agents, tenancy reform was unlikely to succeed. In any case 
none of the tenancy legislation before 1859 reduced the 
crucial legal power of the zamindar, that of distraint. Nor 
could any change be expected in this respect while the 
principle of extracting surplus in the form of revenue 
through the institution of a landed gentry called
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'proprietors' guided policies. Such a policy would not lead 
to a rethinking of the occupancy rights of raiyats or to the 
peaceful settlement of landlord-tenants relations.
Eventually, however, the British decided that it was 
necessary to moderate the large scale suppression, arbitrary 
enhancement of rent and eviction of raiyats, as well as the 
imposition of various kinds of abwabs (cesses) by the 
zamindars. Diagnosis of the problem was complicated by 
hierarchy and the dominance of the rich over the poor in the 
society. But it was concluded that it was colonial policy 
based on an English view of private property, maintaining a 
superior class of proprietors and inferior class of tenants, 
which was changing the agrarian structure and altering the 
mode of production, thus sharpening the gap between the two 
classes. The government turned towards limiting the power 
of the proprietors through legislative measures. In Bihar, 
this might have meant adjusting the legal advantages of 
various elements of the society— maliks, thikadars, 
mukarraridars, tenure-holders, Jeth raiyats, birtadars 
village officials, such as patwaris the other officials of 
the proprietors, and all those belonging to intermediary 
classes. The provisions of the Act of 1859, however, 
concentrated on providing an occupancy right for the 
resident raiyats who had held land continuously for twelve 
years; it was supposed that they had had this right, 
earlier, and that through this law their rights were being 
brought closer to those of the zamindars. The act also 
placed various restrictions on the power of zamindars, 
restraining them from ejecting raiyats, enhancing rents,and 
using oppressive methods of rent collection.
This occupancy right for the tenants of zamindars was 
not recognised in reality. One reason was the British view 
of society as essentially made up of only two classes. In 
north Bihar districts, proprietors seldom let out their 
lands directly to the raiyats. They farmed out estate 
management to the thikadars or lease holders for stipulated 
periods. On the expiry of the term, the landlord, as a 
rule, demanded an enhanced rental. Such instances were 
particularly found in the areas of indigo cultivation, but
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also elsewhere. More Important still, the growth of usury 
and of rich peasants, represented an expansion of quasi- 
zamindari rights in the villages; including an expansion of 
holdings under peasant proprietors. The control of
production at the lower level came virtually into the hands 
of rich peasant farmers. The growth of usury in the later 
half of the nineteenth century accumulated the fragmentation 
of the proprietary interest. On the one hand, there was a 
sharp growth in disputes over rent, boundaries, produce 
sharing, the payment of abwabs, and the performance of 
services for the maliks. On the other hand, the Rent Act of 
1859 provided enough power to the zamindar under the law to 
go to court against his raiyats, and, still within the law 
in some circumstances, even to transfer one raiyats 
holding to another. The Act defined three categories of 
raiyats: raiyats at fixed rates, occupancy raiyats, and non­
occupancy raiyats. But in practice it did not curb the 
growing power of proprietors or intermediaries, but merely 
offered some devices, though providing occupancy rights, to 
help tenants of a certain privileged class, thus undermining 
the remainder who were effectively non-occupancy raiyats and 
tenants-at-wi11.
One reason for an acceleration of proprietary interest 
at the same time as its sub-division was that the burden of 
the revenue demand on proprietors was steadily decreased 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards as a result of the 
growing market economy, the rise of agricultural prices and 
the increasing cultivation of commercial crops. The major 
portion of this income went to the proprietors and 
intermediaries as rents, but also to rich peasants who 
avoided increases: the burden was always on the cultivators.
While landlord and tenant relations were a matter of
great concern in official and non official circles, judicial 
c
verdicts favoured the rights of zamindars, and on occasion 
cautioned the government against violating proprietary 
rights. The result was an exaggerated estimate of those 
rights. In a case in Calcutta, Sir V. Muir asserted that, 
while in theory all existing rights (of tenants as well as
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landlords), should receive equal attention, and while the
well-being of the cultivators was always to be taken into 
consideration as a matter of principle, in practice the
position of tenants had started deteriorating because the 
'English idea of proprietorship was allowed to obscure the 
important limitations to which, in India, proprietorship was 
subject, and a tendency arose for the landlord to become an 
absolute owner and the cultivator a rack-rented tenant at a 
competitive rent. ' i
In fact in the existing law before the Bengal Tenancy 
Act of 1885, there was no definite provision defining the
relations of landlord and tenant whether as regards the
recovery or the enhancement of rent. Where the landlord was 
powerful, therefore, it was because he utilized his 
influence and hereditary rights which had been recognised 
under the Permanent Settlement and in later periods. 
However, by the time the Tenancy Act of 1885 was in embryo 
the district officers always considered the landlords to be 
oppressive. A.P. Macdonnell, officiating collector of Saran 
highlighted two points - one the well-known abuses in the 
collection of rent, and the other the zamindars' unlimited 
right of sale of their holdings which was a real 
encroachment on the right of resident raiyats to occupancy 
' conterminous with the mowzah they lived in'.1® As for 
rent, the officials were especially critical of the bhaoli 
system under which zamindars took more than half of the 
produce from the raiyats - MacDonnell was in favour of 
money-rents - but even so, in major parts of North Bihar, 
where money rent was already prevalent, they considered that 
the land system still "suffered from almost every abuse 
calculated to depress agricultural prosperity", and 
complicate the relation of zamindar and raiyats.1® Priority 
was given to limiting the landlord's power as an answer to 
the agricultural degradation of Bihar.
But, though the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 clearly 
limited the legal rights of proprietors, and professed to 
protect the tenants, it left untouched the right to transfer 
land, and a large part of the rental system. Above all, it 
ignored the fact that the structure of zamindari formed only
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a part of a network including government officials, estate 
managers, and the village hierarchy, which established a 
linked control over production, both through the extraction 
of rent (or payment of revenue) and by the accumulation of 
wealth and its investment in commercial activities. Ve will 
consider the different elements in this sytem one by one, 
beginning with the zamindars themselves.
The zamindar formed a unit of the district 
administration; his estate was part and parcel of the 
government's revenue structure. In a feudal set- up,
administrative control was necessarily privatised even if 
the government officials worked for the estates. The 
British endeavour was certainly towards saving the estates 
from disintegration. Some of the small estates were split 
up and eventually sold out for arrears of revenue, but the 
majority retained their integrity. (In the late half of the 
nineteenth century, too, as we shall see, a considerable 
number of sub-proprietors expanded their territory at the 
cost of superior zamindars) . The expansion of the number of 
proprietary estates in the late nineteenth century resulted 
mainly from the changing land legislation and extension of 
the settlement operations.^0 It hardly mattered whether the 
area of proprietary land expanded; there was created the 
jumble of minute proprietary interests including joint
pattidari estates and disputed estate,? which was 
characteristic of various parts of North Bihar. It
represented a process of change in the nature of local 
control and in relations between zamindar and raiyat. In the 
process, the proprietary right became an institution created 
or sanctioned and eventually consolidated by a well-defined 
body of laws, however much the dominance of caste
continued to help maintain its powers.
Nonetheless any change in the customary relationship
between zamindar and raiyat was regarded as improper by the
former. The zamindars expressed their displeasure over
legislative interference, and sometimes prevailed upon the
government for concessions. The government believed in
e-
giving a free choice to the zamindar in the managemnt of
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production, and refused to give absolute protection to the 
raiyats for fear of reducing the efficiency of production. 
This view (recorded by a Settlement officer of North Bihar, 
Stevenson-Moore) creates some doubts about the impact of 
law, if the overall production of the land and the 
traditional farming methods are considered carefully. 
Cultivation was an on-going process, performed by peasants, 
and controlled by the zamindars through their proprietary 
rights. The zamindars hardly contributed to or participated 
in production. They invested capital only in the later 
periods of the 19th century when the sugar industry, indigo, 
tobacco and other commercial crops became more profitable to 
them. Contrary to current beliefs, zamindars were not eager 
to add to their demesne lands, the only significant 
exceptions being the indigo planters. There was rarely a 
zamindar in Bihar who did not practise different indirect 
methods of exploitation. Generally zamindars received rent 
from the raiyats for demesne lands too. This was a fixed 
share of the produce; by custom, they did not change raiyats 
so frequently on these lands. The social behaviour and 
economic power of the zamindars was thus signified in their 
extraction of surplus from the separate production of the 
raiyats. This was also the basic principle adopted in law 
since the Permanent Settlement, and changed neither by the 
Bengal Tenancy Act 1885, nor at a stroke, by the survey and 
settlement operations. It was backed by a range of
zamindari rights: to the free sale and purchase of estates,
to the sub-division of estates among share holders, to the 
alienation of raiyati rights, and to the unfettered 
management of the estates. Any legislative measures
encroaching upon these interests was thus derogatory to the 
prestige of a zamindar in Bihar.
Partition of estates:- In the late nineteenth century, 
the sub-division of proprietary right as a result of 
partition of estates was enormous in the North Bihar 
districts. The process greatly increased the number of 
zamindari estates. During the survey and settlement
operations in the late nineteenth century it was detected 
that the partitions carried out before the Bengal Tenancy
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Act, 1885, on the basis of old records or when no record was 
maintained, provided no evidence of the protection of 
raiyat's right; on the contrary, given the enhancement of 
rent by zamindars, it seemed that partitions were designed 
to destroy the rights of occupancy raiyats. The tendency of 
the proprietors was always towards occuping more demesne 
land, its cultivation managed through the agents or leased 
out; the tendency was especially apparent after the Batwara 
Law of 1876. The interest of the government was confined to 
securing the revenue and covering administrative expenses,
The increase in the number of proprietors raised 
various problems for the raiyats; first of all, each tenant 
was likely to have been paying rent to two or more 
proprietors, as his holding was fragmented among 
proprietors. Rack renting and land disputes between
proprietors and raiyats increased. Moreover, undivided 
ownership tended to imply closer supervision. While
estimating the rents, the proprietors took regard of the 
quality of the soil of different plots, and assessed the 
annual value of market rates and nimaksair, and the produce 
of trees as well. When the sub-division of estates had been 
done several years before, no original rent rolls of the 
partitioned estates were provided by the proprietors, and 
enhanced rents were virtually always paid by the raiyats. 
Not only were raiyati rights set back, there was low 
productivity or problems with cultivation, because their 
holdings also shrank in size, and they were generally found 
in various places in one village or several villages.
The advantageous position of zamindars was thus 
maintained in many ways. No fixed principle of partition of 
estates by zamindars was adopted even after the Act of 1812. 
The Revenue Sale Law of 1859, and Partition Act of 1876 and 
simultaneously, Land Registration Act of the same year; 
inceased partitions on one hand and the sale of estates on 
the other. The reason appeared to be the non-payment of 
arrears of revenue and also the sub-division of estates 
among various members of the family. But they included 
trasnfer of proprietary rights in order to save the estate
4 8
and the zamindar's prestige in the society. By the later 
nineteenth century, the advantageous position of the 
zamindars was plain, in the high prices realised from the 
sale of estates* Prices amounted to 41 times the government 
revenue in Darbhanga, as compared with 30 times in 
Muzaffarpur and eight times in Saran.22 In this process 
some of the estates were absorbed into other estates and 
being sold due to arrears of rent; but most of the rich 
estates survived, and expanded in later periods.
The partition of estates in the North Bihar was of 
course a problem and not simply a boon for zamindars. Yet 
the number of estates partitioned and their increase in each 
year does indicate how proprietors were tending to prefer 
individual rather than collective ownership of landed 
property. The following tables show the growing number of 
estates between 1879 and 1900 in four districts of North 
Bihar, and the incidence of partition proceedings.
Table-2
Year Darbhanga Muzaffurpur Saran Champaran
1879 - 1880 8,257 13,001 4,069 1,006
1884 - 1885 9,315 15,696 4,230 1,060
1889 - 1890 10,813 17,501 4,559 1,105
1894 - 1895 12,329 19,016 5,023 1,189
1899 - 1900 13,457 20,191 5,345 1,232
Over 62X 55X 3IX 22X
Percentage of increase during the 20 years,
Sources; Survey and Settlement Operations in the district of Darbhanga 1896 - 1903, para
102
The average number of partitions had been found to be more in 
the districts of Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga than the disricts 
of Saran and Champaran.
Table-3-------------Average number of Partitions per annum
Districts 1866 - 67 to 
1875 - 76
1876 - 77 to 
1885 - 86
1886 - 87 to 
1895 - 96
1866 - 67 to 
1895 - 96
Saran 27 25 34 28
Champaran 7 5 7 6
Darbhanga ) 
Muzaffarpur)
134 253 105 204
Source - Survey and Settlement operations in the District of Champaran, p, 43,
The recorded increase was greatest in Darbhanga, the rate
being even greater there than in Muzaffarpur where petty
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proprietors were already very numerous. In Saran many 
estates were also partitioned but mostly privately with 
mutual consent. In Champaran the big zamindari estates and 
various types of tenure holders especially in the indigo
plantation areas, tended to keep the number of estates down.
This rate of increase shown in the table occur^d
despite government attempts to reduce the numbers. The
Estate Partition Act, VIII (BC) of 1876 forbade any
partition which would create a separate estate with a 
revenue assessment below Rs 10: (the previous limit had been
Re.l) any co-owner, whose share fell below the limit, could 
seek partition through the civil courts while remaining 
jointly responsible for the revenue.23 On the other hand for 
administrative convenience some measures actually sought to 
speed up batwara procedures. The applications by proprietors 
required full Jamabandis including details of the estate's 
area and the boundaries of plots. This restriction if 
strictly enforced, would have reduced the number of 
applications especially in the district of Darbhanga, but it 
was removed by the Commissioner of Patna in January 1884. 
Applications were received even if the above information was 
not complete. Moreover, a Special Deputy Collector was 
appointed to dispose of the batwara cases.
Thus, new applications for partition cases increased 
every month. The proprietors had ma-nlfold advantages after 
partitioning their estates. Their joint owners gained an 
independent land right, but mostly then belonged to the same 
caste or joint family. The partition as such did not 
necessarily reduce the group's local influence. Rather it 
could increase it. According to the Bengal Tenancy Act of 
1885, when an estate was partitioned, the relation of 
proprietor and tenant was exclusively established between 
the separate owner and each tenant. Besides, when a tenant 
who had paid rent to the proprietors of a joint estate, was 
wholly included within one of the separate estates created 
by partitiony such a tenant was only bound to pay rent to 
the one new proprietor.
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Naturally the co-sharers who partitioned their private 
estates, becoming several proprietors, each became entitled 
to rents from a particular area. The Estate Partition Act, 
V of 1897, attempting to remedy a hidden evil in the system, 
provided that no tenure or holding could be split up for the 
purpose of a partition unless it was necessary to do so in 
order to make the partition equitable (as between the 
proprietors). The Act also provided <5. 83)^ any land held at 
a fixed rent on a patni or other permanent tenure, should be 
assigned to one of the successor estates, or left unassigned 
and held by all the co-sharers of the parent estate 
proportionately. In practice, however, even after this Act, 
the tendency was for raiyati holdings to be partitioned 
almost as many times as the estate; in the minute and 
complex landholding pattern, the tenants were likely to have 
to pay rent to all the petty proprietors separately as a 
result of the partition of an estate.
The partition of estates was an excuse for enhancement 
of rent and an expression of the social and economic 
dominance of the co-sharers of the parent estates. There 
was much scope for such partition.
The survey and settlement reports of the late 
nineteenth century revealed that within each Khewat number, 
there could be several proprietors holding the estate 
jointly. Since the same proprietor appeared for various 
estates, the names were not repeated, but a record of them 
was maintained. After partition each proprietor formed new 
holdings and prepared a new rent roll; he fixed rent on the 
basis of old rates having consulted, if he wished, the old 
Jamabandi papers. The level of the rents lay within the 
power of the proprietor as provided by Tenancy Law. The 
sale of an ordinary raiyati tenancy for arrears of rent was 
also permissible under the rules; the enhancements of rent 
due to partition rather increased the ejection of raiyats 
from both occupancy and non-occupancy holdings, particularly 
those belonging to the lower castes.
Of course, there came a point when partition resulted 
in such small estates as to be counterproductive. But then
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they rather revealed the complexity of the situation than 
increased it. In Saran 21 percent of the total estates were 
partitioned, but the average number of proprietors in each 
privately partitAonedl estate was found to be 23. In
Muzaffarpur, it was 17. Moreover the Saran revenue roll 
showed that there were 5,398 estates (5,372 revenue paying 
and 25 revenue free), where the survey and settlement 
records showed that there were 12,114. The discrepancy was 
due to proprietors or estates having lands in more than one 
village. Partition could actually help rationalise this 
situation.
Here too we need to make a distinction between large 
and small estates. The largest estates were protected 
against sub-division from the later 19th century, but
smaller estates went on increasing in number. They were 
however part of the sub-proprietary interests which were 
also growing. There were at least ten kinds in Saran and 
six kinds in Muzaffarpur (though these figures were below 
the average for the Bengal Presidency as a whole). Thus the 
partitions which created a large number of petty
pr opr Ce-tors, could also increase the number of
intermediaries in the undivided areas of the great estates 
of Hathwa and Darbhanga. Such proprietary interests were 
much nearelTto the superior raiyats than the big zamindars. 
The holder of such an interest, locally known as a malik, 
was owner of a patti, a division of the estate. He worked 
as a village mahaj an, lent money to raiyats and offered 
mortgages on their land on a zerpesgi (usufructuary) basis 
or for a term with high rates of interest. He also exacted 
various types of abwabs apart from the rent, and arranged 
for thumb impressions from the ra.Cya.ts on pattas prepared by 
the zamindar's patwari in the village. As he then
controlled the pattas, he could, if he wished, conceal the 
exact amount and might collect at a higher rate or later 
claim interest for arrears. We will return to petty maliks 
of various kinds later. The point here is that partition 
increased their number or effectiveness.
Another long term reason for the proliferation of small 
estates was the resumption of (revenue free) land grants. In
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fact, before the Permanent Settlement and down to 1819, some 
revenue free lands were assessed, but the results were very 
incomplete. After Regulation 1819, however, lakhiraj grants 
were systematically resumed for revenue; these arrangements 
were not all finally regularised until 1895. Lakhiraj 
included hukmi grants by Rajas and big zamindars to small 
maliks and tenure holders. During the settlement operations 
in the late 19th century and also in the course of partition 
proceedings, further invalid lakhiraj areas were discovered 
and resumed with arrears of revenue.
The sub-division of proprietary interest had proved 
advantageous to the proprietors and their allies; it was 
undertaken, in short, when it suited the dominant local 
interests. Conversely, and for the same reason, it also 
happened at the same time that several estates were joined 
together, and joint estates or Shamilat tauzis resulted in 
most parts of Bihar. This could occur when proprietors 
acquired rights by purchase or otherwise in another estate 
in the same village or in other villages. The Jamabandis 
would be amalgamated, and one estate gradually absorbed into 
another, until no one could point out which lands originally
belonged to whom. The government's policy too favoured the
amalgamation where possible of petty estates under a single 
tauzi number, implying a single revenue demand. Such 
estates could be held Shamilat by a single proprietor or a 
set of proprietors. The official view was that it was
economically disastrous to go on partitioning estates and 
creating bands of petty proprietors. Kacpherson, the
Director of Land Records and Agriculture, even prefered the 
absorption of small estates into bigger ones. He felt that 
337 estates in Muzaffarpur could be recognised as 145 
estates. The Board of Revenue made a ruling in 1899 on 
Chitarzis portions of estates which were regarded as 
separate entities. There were limits, however, to the
amalgamation process, as to partition, when proprietors' 
interests were not served.
We have seen that the sub-division of proprietory 
interests endangered the rights of settled raiyats, 
especially those belonging to the lower castes. What was
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especially true of petty proprietors applied also on the 
great estates, though they remained undivided, because ofthe 
role played by those other maliks, the sub-proprietors and 
intermediaries who were involved in the estate management. 
In Saran, under the Hathwa and Bettiah Raj, villages had
been sub-divided by these petty sub-proprietors in various
branches, and they had also prepared separate rent rolls in 
different names. Bettiah Raj took the share of rent from 
the one original share-holder. Now a problem arose
regarding the entry and preparation of khatians for each of 
the new share-holders; who had many raiyats on their rolls 
who were not on the rent rolls of the Bettiah Raj. This way 
local transfers of holdings functioned successfully in 
Saran. The basic intention was to create problems in the 
way of providing a record of rights, and thus to prevent the 
raiyats from obtaining occupancy rights. Its basis was 
ultimately the absolute power inherited by and given in law 
to proprietors.
Raiyati Right by Proprietors
Another route to increasing proprietary power was the
acquisition of raiyati rights by proprietors,^_______ ^through
mortgages or purchase and at the expiry of tenures of
specified period. Litigation was also used, often in
fictitious civil or criminal cases using false witnesses. 
There was hardly any effective restriction on the 
proprietors even under the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 over 
the transfer of raiyati right. In Tirhut prior to 1885, 
there was little indication of the transfer of tenant rights 
by sale; but in Muzaffarpur after 1885, sale and mortgage 
proceedings were found in 76 percent of the villages. 
Collins, in his Final Report of the Experimental Survey, 
wrote that since the settlement, there had been increased 
sales of portions of holdings in settled villages, in matry 
cases without reference to the landlord. Many of these
were thus transfers to sub-proprietors and intermediaries. 
But there were also benami transfers of raiyati holdings by 
landlords, and the forceful acquisition of land of the
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raiyat under the protection of law. The review of the
collector of Muzaffarpur regarding customary practice of 
raiyati right to landlord confirmed that both in Darbhanga 
and Muzaffarpur districts the tendency of the landlord was 
towards permanent transfer of land. So^metimes landlords 
objected to transfer arguing that there was no such custom, 
and powerful zamindars such as Hathawa Raj contrived to 
check its sales lest they result in the growth of sub­
proprietors and mortgages, and shrink the zamindari 
influence over the rcttyats. However, land being a saleable 
commidity, in the late nineteenth century, its price shot up 
mainly becasue mahajans and rich peasants were investing in 
the purchase of raiyati rights. The price of land in Saran 
was the highest varying from Rs. 75 per acre in Gopalganj to 
Rs. 160 in Mashrakh. The highest rate for mortgages was Rs. 
138 in Manjhi and the lowest Rs. 47 in Mirganj . The
restrictions imposed by Hathwa Raj certainly reduced the
price of land in some cases, but generally, though big
landlords objected to the transfer of raiyati right without 
their consent, the custom was rapidly spreading over the 
North Bihar districts, and there was hardly any way to 
resist it.2e The reasons for the growth, reflected in the 
rising value of land, were the increase in rental pressure 
on raiyats and the rapid growth of intermediaries, tenure
holders and dominant peasants, as well as petty zamindars. 
There were certain implications involved in holding of 
raiyati rights by a proprietor. Where there were joint 
proprietors, the main proprietor's patti or principal share 
in a village was regarded as part of his estate, even if 
properly sub-divided into two fragments or transferred from 
a raiyat of a different village. Because of the joint- 
proprietary right and the fact that the leading share-holder 
paid revenue for the estate even if the patti was raiyati, 
it would merge with the proprietor's estate. Moreover, any 
proprietor could hold land as a tenure holder or as a 
raiyat: the same process would occur, unimpeded by the
Bengal Tenancy Act. Thirdly, land held on a thika lease by 
a farmer or ijaradar (mortgage-holder), especially in the 
tUdigo factories, also tended to be transferred away from the
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raiyats to the tenure holder or planters. In the indigo 
areas especially, the thikadars would hardly allow a weak 
or non-occupancy raiyat to hold any formal, raiyati rights 
on the land leased out on thika. Finally, the occupancy 
raiyats too could acquire rights over the lands of weaker 
cultivators:27 the well-to-do and secured raiyats were very 
dominant in the food-cropped areas.
In addition to such surreptitious encroachment, it was 
powbh-
also^ to move directly. The most important example was when 
joint proprietors or permanent tenure-holders purchased 
occupancy rights at an auction sale. One court case, 
Jawadul Haq v. Ram Das Saha (I.L.R. 24, Calcutta, 143),
provided a glaring example by a full bench decision that if 
an occupancy right was transferred to a person jointly
interested in the land as proprietor, the occupancy right 
ceased though the holding continued, meaning thereby that 
the tenancy should remain but divested of occupancy 
rights. 2e In such a case, the purchaser could not be sued 
either for arrears or for enhancement of rent. He would 
also not join in a suit against himself. Section 188 of the 
Bengal Tenancy Act would stand as a bar to all legal 
proceedings against him. An illustration of this, was found 
in Gaya where a co-Mukarraridar purchased an occupancy right 
over 1700 bighas of land which he leased to the cultivators 
holding occupancy rights in the village. At law the actual 
cultivators were declared to be undei— raiyats and the 
raiyati right was vested in the joint proprietor. Thus the 
rents of the actual cultivators were liable to be increased
on the terms for undei— raiyats and their lands could be
taken away at the pleasure of the proprietors. Such take­
over of rights needs to be seen in connection with the 
other powers of the zamindars. Stevenson-Jtoore, the
Settlement officer, observed, of the liberty given to the 
proprietors and money-lending peasant groups, that "were 
this device for breaking occupancy rights generally resorted 
to by unscrupulous landlords, much of the amelioration in
the condition of lower classes which dates from the passing 
of the Tenancy Act would be undone.
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Some of the additional pressure on raiyats was
associated with consolidations of proprietary rights as
well. The Director of Land Records and Agriculture made
enquiries regarding this matter in typical North Bihari
villages, during the survey and settlement operations. In
129 villages in Muzaffarpur, it was found that 14 percent
were affected by transfers. Stevenson-Moore attributed the
transfers to the embarrassed position of some proprietors;
a similar process was operating in the case of rich peasants
in relation to petty proprietors in Saran (where sales were
Itr t
also much more numerous^default of government dues).30 The
revenue demand was still the occasion for much of the
difficulty, though the indigo planters helped out the
proprietors in this regard: transfers were fewest in
Muzaffarpur, where the planters offered relief in the form
of loans, in comparison with Saran or also Ghazipur, Ballia
and Bctnares. The average area covered by each transaction
varied remarkably from district to district depending on the
requirements of the proprietor. Where the rent rate and land
prices were higher and no convenient source of credit was 
a
available, the enforced sale of proprietary rights was more 
frequent. The prices of such transferred lands were
certainly less than on an open market. Moreover, the 
occupancy land was found to be more valuable in free 
transfer than proprietary rights . In Muzaffarpur a
proprietor's land fetched between Rs 95 and 129 per acre; in 
Saran the figure was Rs. 50 in the case of proprietor's land 
and Rs. 118 in the case of an occupancy holding.31 C. H.
Macpherson, Director of Land Records and Agriculture,
rightly observed that the purchase of milkiyat or freehold 
property (private property of landlord) had a great 
importance in Bihar; the price of milkiyat varied greatly, 
the average being 20 to 25 years' purchase on the Jamabandi.
Forced, and increasingly, free sales of land favoured 
successful proprietors. They also encouraged individual 
ownership. Co-proprietorship posed a great difficulty in
some areas in preventing land from being sold for arrears of 
revenue demands. Such sales were especially numerous where 
minute proprietary shares were involved^ retained in order to
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maintain social status (such co-sharers could trouble a 
purchaser as he sought to take possession of an estate). The 
signs of this developing land market are apparent in the 
growth of land prices. The arguments advanced by Jacques 
Pouchepadass, are important here, suggesting a significant 
increase in the transfers of land by the close of the 
nineteenth century.32 In addition to successful land­
owners, it became easier for money-lenders and vakils 
(pleaders) to emerge as holders of proprietary interests. 
The men of capital had less and less difficulty in acquiring 
land - and with it the izzat of the zamindar.
Zirat Land;
Related to the question of the consolidation of landed 
interests - and indeed, taking into account partitions, of 
the polarization in land control— is the matter of the zirat 
land of the proprietor. An owner who had land in direct 
cultivation called such land true zirat or ordinary bakasht 
under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The zirat land was 
defined 05 such land held by superior landlord under his 
direct cultivation. The entry of such land made in the 
relevant column in the khasra called bakasht mal^ik and if 
claimed as zirat, the claim was defined as dawi zirat. It 
was also possible for a cultivator to be holding zirat land 
but in the record, this kind of zirat was treated as the 
raiyat's holding, though kept separate from his khatian. In 
the big zamindari estates, zirat land was classified in 
various ways. In Hathwa Raj , the raj classified this land 
as possession of servants of the raj , lands under 
cultivation by indigo factories as thikadars of the raj ; 
chaukidari chakran or' land granted to chaukidars under the 
chaukidari Act} waste land under cultivation in the terms of 
the Tenancy Act, either under thikadars or under raiyats; 
gyaribagh or lands previously recorded in the raj 
measurement papers as groves owned by the proprietor - this 
category was applied even when the land was in the actual 
possession of a raiyat, the trees having been cut - and 
finally bataibagh or lands previously recorded as groves and 
held on a produce rent, the trees having long since 
disappeared. Besides, those holdings abandoned by raiyats
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or which had lapsed to the landlord, for example due to 
raiyats' having no heir, were regarded as zirat, despite 
any occupancy rights or non-occupancy rights which might 
have applied. The raiyats were bound to give a share of the 
produce of trees (mangoes etc) to the proprietors; these 
shares might be valuable but were not regarded as rent.
The claims to zirat were very prominent in the big 
zamindari areas of North Bihar. A major reason was that the 
proprietors had much freedom in regard to such lands under 
the Bengal Tenancy Act. They were "entitled to bar the 
accrual of occupancy rights" in the private lands by special 
contract (Section 116), and no raiyat was entitled to 
occupancy rights by virtue of having held such lands under 
lease either for specific periods or under agreements from 
year to year.33 The advantage of zirat was, therefore, that 
the proprietor retained his rights. The proprietors had no 
problem in producing evidance in support of his claims. 
According to the Advocate General, if the Settlement officer 
was satisfied with such evidence the land would be recorded 
as zirat in spite of the fact that the landlord had not 
cultivated it for years. The incidence of such lands did 
vary. In Saran they were not extensive in comparison with 
the zirat land of Darbhanga and Champaran. In Saran a 
settled raiyat who had been cultivating zirat land for 
twelve years with a formal lease was recognised as an 
occupancy raiyat; this did not generally happen in other 
districts. In Saran, the reason was that the propTX^tor' s 
papers were arranged more systematically.
Another interesting point regarding zirat is that even 
where raiyati rights were acquired, the proprietor's 
superior right always remained in abeyance; the occupancy 
right could be revived only when the superior rights were 
removed.3-* It was thus difficult to ascertain the status of 
an intermediate or superior landholder who had sublet land. 
Generally he was treated as a tenure holder, and, in that 
case, there might seem to be an opportunity foT'the actual 
cultivators to secure their rights. But practically, such 
tenure holders played a double role, that is, as proprietor
5 9
and tenure holder. Being superior in caste, they could
enjoy all the facilities and few of the liabilities under
area under their direct cultivation, but also in the quality 
of their holdings, both those they occupied directly and 
those they indirectly controlled. There were indeed very few 
checks on zirat lands. It was recognised that for the sub­
let land the word 'zirat' should be recorded on the rent 
receipts, but in the majority of the cases this practice was 
not followed. Only after 1887 were the zirat lands let to 
the raiyats recorded. From the statistics provided,
proprietors' private land amounted to four percent of the 
agricultural land in Muzaffarpur with an average holding of 
1.63 acres (the equivalent of an ordinary occupancjf hoiding) . 
But it is known also that in the Darbhanga raj area, 
proprietors held over thirty times the area recorded as true 
zirat, covering more than ten percent of the occupied area. 
These lands were mostly accounted for in the property of the 
Maharaja in the hands of certain indigo factories. The big 
estates dominated the recorded area of their piMfktfciy 
zirat: in Saran the Hathwa raj occupied 6,398 acres our oi
9300 acres of the zirat measured at settlement. But these 
figures overlooked the larger areas of zirat belonging to 
the leaseholders and thikadars, especially in the indigo 
plantation areas (including Champaran), and above all the 
private lands held by almost every proprietor and sub­
proprietor all over Bihar not to say North India. Such
of various kinds. Such rights on private land were not
formalised under the Bengal Tenancy Act for want of
documentary evidence, but in practice they were claimed, and
always there were hopes of extending them. Thus there was 
also proprietors' land which was not true zirat but
land covered about another four or five percent of the North 
Bihar districts. The average size of the holdings on such 
lands was 4.34 acres. If all the lands claimed as zirat and 
bakasht malik are combined it will be found that some 15.5 
perlcent of the cultivated area was occupied by the
the rules. Thus dominance could be found not only in the
lands were leased to thikadars and raiyats
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proprietors and, in that case, the average size of the holdings 
of the proprietors is found to be 3.4 acres.
Thus true zirat - often leased out - contained small 
holdings, but bakasht malik holdings were larger. Larger still 
were the holdings undei- bakasht thikadar, that is, the land 
cultivated directly by tenure-holders. Then the average size 
of holding was 6.65 acres. The tenure-holders and indigo 
planters were not comparable in so far as the proprietary 
interest was concerned. The tenure -holders absorbed around 4 
per cent of the occupied areas whereas indigo plantations 
covered 10 percent of the total cultivated areas of north Bihar 
districts. But all these indigo planters, proprietors and 
tenure-holders were equally responsible for acquiring and 
extending zirat claims, and cultivating land through hired 
labourers or on leases. Often proprietors ejected their raiyats 
from the holdings in order to acquire their land as zirat. 
Examples were found in 30 to 40 percent of the estates in north 
Bihar.
Management of ^anrlndnri estates: The final area in which
zamindari power developed over the later 19th century was 
estate management. The zamindari estates in Bihar had certain 
distinctive features in management which could be observed from 
the Permccnent Settlement. A large majority of the zamindars 
were small proprietors,3B and indeed mostly joint proprietors 
or co-sharers. It was difficult or unnecessary for such 
proprietors to manage their estates with a hierarchy of 
officials. Moreover, there were small sub-proprietors in the 
big zamindari-estates who managed their lands independently. 
On these larger estates problems of management were always 
experienced by the proprietors unless helped by intermediary 
tenure-holders and government officials.
In the eighteenth century and even earlier, land rent was 
collected by the proprietors jointly on a co-sharing basis, 
depending on mutual good-will. But this system hardly
continued for long after the Permanent Settlement when the $ale 
of proprietary rights was the penalty for a failure to pay 
revenue promptly. Moreover, most of the big zamindars took
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little interest in their estates and assigned the management
to their officials. The Patta Regulations gave them
incentive to maintain records, and British system required
the regular collection of revenue. But it also encouraged
the physical absence of the zamindar from the vicinity of
the estates, a shift from village to district headquarters.
The running of the estate was assigned to a manager expert
in revenue matters. This replaced the closer management in
which the zamindar*s officials under a diwan, controlled
land rent, the assignment of land, the maintenance of rent
J'olls, and so on, with the help of patwaris, gomashtas,
chaukidars, fotadars, peyadas, duftaris and various
others.36 Instead this broader management was increasingly
consigned to intermediaries, leaving estate management to
concentrate on meeting the revenue. The growing burdeij of
population on land and the changing pattern of agriculture
(with the increase in commercial and cash crops)
exacerbated agrarian problems and landlord-tenant
relations. These changes too necessitated that the
zamindars seek the help of local intermediary groups,
thikadars, tenure-holders and sub-tenure holders. In the
longer term this threatened the disintegration of the big
zamandari estates of North Bihar, including Darbhanga,
Hathwa and Bettiah. After the 1860s, Court of Wards 
e-
managjment was needed to save these declining estates from 
rui n.
The main thrust of the government intervention was to 
preserve landlord-tenant relations through village agencies; 
the officials sought to provide, through kanungo s, 
patwaris, and Chaukidars, for the regular transaction of 
revenue business and maintenance of records, under the 
bureaucratic control of the estates officers. At least forty., 
two estates came under the Court of Wards about the 1860s in 
Bihar, the major portion in the North Bihar districts.3-7 The 
reasons for Court of Ward's control provide a list of the 
ills of the great estates: they included the lack of a male
heir or the incapacity of a minor, but also, more 
importantly, the fact that the estate was in debt and 
failing to remit arrears of the revenue to the government
62
and the prevalence of land disputes arising from the bad 
relations between landlords and tenants or between co­
proprietors. Above all, government involvement increased 
with its worries about the zamindar's over— all incompetence 
in managing the estates, for reasons including mental 
weakness and physical unfitness. The employment of the 
Court of Wards in the case of small estates was initiated by 
the judical decisions of the Courts, but followed the same 
pattern: it followed the investigations of indebtedness, or
of land disputes among the relatives of the zamindars.
In pursuing this policy, the district collectors were 
made chief guards of the affairs of each estate. An 
administrative link was established through them. But above 
all a formal management structure was set up for the big 
estates, a hierarchy centered upon the bureaucracy at the 
headquarters of the estate. The administration was based on 
the British system, with a gradation in rank (in executive 
function and salary) right from the Chief Manager to the 
peons and barahils. For example, in the administration of 
Darbhanga raj , were to be found circle managers, assistant 
managers, jeth raiyats, Patwaris, barahi Is, gomashtas, and 
lathials, all employed in order to deal with the raiyats and 
look after the regular collection of rent. However, most of 
these officials were hereditary and held rent free grants. 
Generally, too they were of the same high caste to which the 
maharaja and zamindars belonged. The impy-oved efficiency of 
the system from the estate's point of view thus rested on a 
continuing corruption among officials and high handedness 
or oppression of the raiyats thjough enhancement of rent, 
ejectment and collection of abwabs. In particular this was 
true of the local control of jeth raiyats and their devices 
for making their fortunes in alliance with officials of the 
estates. Instances were found even in Darbhanga where the 
administrative machinery was otherwise thoroughly 
bureaucratic. In the whole of Bihar, the influence of the 
elites led to nepotism, litigation and other measures:
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unless tenants had the support of the amla, the leading or 
rich peasants would see to it that their holdings were put 
to auction, and in such cases, the rich peasants, being 
agents of the zamindar, would get the holdings at a bargain 
price. Sometimes they would try to hold such lands benami 
in order to avoid rents.30 The rich peasants under the
This is not to deny the power of the landed gentry and
social and political influene was as the rulers of 'little 
Kingdoms' 3S. The methods of the malik were autocratic, as
imperial authority had been important in the region: the
right of succession to a position as ruler was important in
conditions strengthened the position of zamindar through the 
more efficient management of the estates. Manipulation of 
records in the cachari became an even more potent weapon 
against the tenants. In many ways, as P. J. Musgrave said, 
the management of estate was parallel in structure and 
methods with that of the government. Nonetheless kinship and 
caste played a major role in the estate's bureaucracy as 
indeed did factionalism in the official bureaucracy.1*0
The British officials knew the motives of the zamindars 
and the abuses of the patwaris, Kanungo^s and other 
managerial staff working for the estates. But they provided 
no real solution to such malpractices. Indeed, in the late 
nineteenth century, especially under the Court of Wards and 
during the Survey and Settlement operations, special 
measures were taken to stream^line the administration of 
proprietary estates. Thus, as with the idea of property, the 
British encouraged the private management of land in line 
with English practice, but they made hardly any change in 
zamindari estates in the dishonest and autocratic
Dartjjang Raj were thus the products of the bureaucracy of 
the Raj as well as of the long standing tenur^al structure.
their alliance with the British administration. Their
if building on the vestiges of the Mughal rulers. Indeed
strengthening the position of the zamindar. But even more 
importantly, the changing economic and demographic
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administration of the proprietors. Moreover, on large 
estates, the important elements who controlled the village 
remained the intermediary groups, the rich peasants, 
independent from any dominance except that of the zamindar, 
the tenure holders, and also of course the mahajans and 
village merchants. Together this class of the population 
dominated the majority of the raiyats and the cultivating 
labourers.
TntpriBPdiaries; Throughout this account intermediary 
leaseholders have repeatedly been equated with the 
proprietary interest, in this section we will concentrate 
on their role, and that of other middle groups. The 
Permanent Settlement did not change the tenure structure of 
rural society completely with its classification of 
landlords and tenants. But the handful of zamindars and 
their immediate allies grew in the course of time. Moreover, 
the changes in the law from the Permanent Settlement until 
the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, helped increase the number of 
rich peasants, especially among the khud-kasht raiyats. The 
growing value of commercial products also hastened the 
growth of the prosperous tenantry. After 1885 they involved 
themselves more and more in the purchase of occupancy 
rights, which benefited the well-to-do sections but helped 
the poor ones to decay.'*1 During the nineteenth century 
there was a general rise in the power of rich peasants, and 
of intermediary groups such as tenure holders, money- 
landers, mahajanst village merchants and the usurous class 
of people who controlled the village economy—the grain-trade 
and the supply of commercial goods as well as agricultural 
production.
Regulation VIII of 1819 which declared certain tenures
valid, meant that patni-talukdars (middlemen between
zamindars and raiyats) became very prevalent in Bengal and
parts of North eastern Bihar, especially in Purnea
(Kishan ganj and Dharampur parganas) . In North Bihar a
3
similar development was associated more with indigo
65
plantations, opium cultivation and sugarcane. As commercial 
crops became more prominent the intermediary groups who were 
rich in resources, the upper castes who were dominant in the 
social and economic order, took the opportunity to improve 
their position as tenure holders or lease holders. There 
was a development in the thikadari System of the North Bihar 
districts. The term used locally for this dominant group 
was malik: in the villages they were the immediate
controllers of production. To some extent such rich and 
independent tenants (who were certainly occupancy raiyats) 
positioned themselves in the fashion of a small zamindar, 
and collected rent from the subordinate raiyats (including 
some with occupancy rights) and share-croppers. They
themselves often paid a fixed rate of rent to the zamindars.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the
largest of these were lease holders who received land on
thika from the proprietors for their own cultivation. The
changes brought in the tenancy laws increased their power.
From the late eighteenth century and in the first four
decades of the nineteenth century, the farming out oi
villages on thika was wide-spread. Some of the holders of
or
such rights, thikadars and mukarrjd dars held them directly
from the zamindar. In addition there were rent-free tenure
holders who held an even more superior position, and there
were various officersjof the large estates who had privileges
to a greater or lesser degree. They included barahiIs,
goraits, birtdars, gomashtas, lathials, who may be counted
as similar if not always the equals of those called 
<*r
mukarrja dars, pat ni dars, darpatni dars, Sepatnidars, gatchdars 
and so on. 42 These were at least ten or twelve kinds of 
tenure-holders in Bihar.
In the proprietary estates of bakasht-mal iks, the 
intermediate tenure holding at fixed rates, between raiyat 
and proprietors, did not change greatly after the Permanent 
Settlement, though they were liable to pay enhanced rates of
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rent under Act X of 1859 and even under Act VIII of 1869 
(B.C.). Such dependent tenures dating from before 1793, 
hereditary in nature but not mukarrari, were in any case not 
numerous in North Bihar. But in the changing pattern of 
cultivation and the growth of commercial agriculture, 
especially in the indigo cultivated areas, fixed rates 
tenure did become more important. The tenure holders in 
modern times, developed in the form of rich peasants and a 
dominant usuijous class, at the instance of the superior 
zamindars. This operated both on great estates, and where 
partition was creating small zamindars. The big proprietors 
mostly preferred to lease out the collection of rents to the 
thlkadars. But also, in the areas where proprietary
interests were minute, the management of the land was 
sometimes transferred to a tenure holder by a host of co­
sharing small proprietors. In all such cases, especially in 
Saran and Muzaffarpur districts, there was a tendency for 
tenant rights to be absorbed by the tenure-holder although 
he was a kind of occupancy raiyat who dominated in the role 
of a proprietor. Sometimes the superior landlord would 
intervene to create such a system. The Maharaja of Hathwa 
delegated the right to control his land by creating tenures 
of three types: rent paying, rent free and under-tenures.
His motive was to secure the regular collection of rent 
through repressive control in the villages. Another origin 
for tenure holders was among those who survived ruin as a 
zamindar as a result of the sale laws and whose personal 
holdings had shrunk until they were equal to those of a rich 
peasant. Such persons also held thika and mukarrari
tenures.
For most of the nineteenth century intermediaries
differed in their security of tenure. There was for example, 
a certain category of intermediary who had acquired
occupancy rights at auction twelve or fifteen years before 
and settled the rents with cultivators who might have been 
holding this land ever since. The cultivator might thus have 
a secure tenancy in law. But what was the status of his
rent receiver ? He would not hold his tenure direct from his 
superior landlord and his rent would not be settled in
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perpetuity. On the other hand there was the status oi the 
mukarridar, who was more than an ordinary thikadar, because 
his right to hold land could not be terminated legally and
COUi<£-
nor^his rent receiving right  be challenged or altered.
Such tenures were common in the indigo plantation areas in 
the North Bihar districts. Thus any thikadar might have a 
free hand in occupying the lands of a raiyat under the big 
zamindari estates. Geddes, who submitted a report on the 
agrarian condition of North Bihar in 1876, said that the 
thikadars, who were generally rent speculators, exercised 
unlimited power of distraint, enhancement and eviction. But 
it was true that this sub-inf eudation functioned in
different forms in Bihar. By the later period of the 
nineteenth century, the domination of the tenure holders 
took the form of mukarrari tenures. The holders were middle 
class elites, and the "general tendency of this development 
was towards absentee landlordism" .43 However, there was also 
the bakasht thikadar who sprang up from the khud-kasht
raiyat and formed a superior class, irrespective of their 
being temporary or permanent lease holders. It was sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between them.
The tasks of the intermediaries included managing the 
2:\rat land of the proprietors, and collecting rent and 
revenue. They usually dealt with the civil and criminal 
cases arsing from the land disputes or non-payment of
arrears of rent. Through unlawful litigation and transfers 
oi raiyati holdings and physical violence, the tenure- 
holders precipitated communal and caste conflict. In fact, 
the dominant group of occupancy raiyats also posed as
zamindars, seeking profit by devices in which only secure 
tenants could afford to indulge. The predecessors of some 
tenure holders had of course been zamindars in the 18th 
century. The settlement operations added to their number.
It was therefore, ever since the Permanent SettleroentThot 
the proprietary power had been exercised through the tenure 
holders. Major portions of the estates (not less than &0/<?) 
were managed either by creating sub—tenures or by 
transferring the zamindari rights in various forms.
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This method, was particularly necessary where large
estates included scattered holdings or lands in other
districts. For example the Hathwa Raj villages in Shahabad
were managed by tenure holders and local rich peasants. By
e®-
the same token, the growing absentj^sm of zamindars also
increased the number of tenure holders. Thus tenure-holders
were most active in the big zamindari areas. The zamindari
link was emphasized too in the institution of bekh birt, a
h
maintenance grant of land, w£.ch was also much in vogue in 
the north Bihar district among tenure holders. The members 
of zamindari families also took thika tenures benami or 
sometimes indirectly in the name of others. For example, in 
1868 the Maharani of Bettiah leased out 54 villages benami, 
through one of her confidants, Pal luck 5inS^ 1* and earned a 
total rental of Rs. 65 , 836 . a . a . Such practices were found 
among small zamindars who generally leased out a number of 
villages to their relatives or friends. The management of 
zirat land and rental collection through the tenure holders 
was an important factor in maintaining the position of the 
zamindars. Sometimes the transfer of shares in the estate to 
a tenure holder could save the estate from division. The 
tenure-holder thus acted as a dejfacto zamindar.
Nonetheless, the rights of tenure-holders before the 
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 were not stable, and they were 
very dependent on the zamindar's good will. Intermediary 
tenures seem to have grown generally under the Permanent 
Settlement. The Raja of Bardwan, the saviour of proprietary 
interest in Bengal, had given much ii^ntive to the growth of 
tenure holders, and to a large extent his estate was divided 
into a confederation of patni-taluk. There was necessarily 
a tendency for large estates to be sub-divided into small 
sized holdings, capable of producing large rental income as 
well as repressive local control. ^ 5 It was this feature of 
tenure-holders which spread over the province of Bihar in 
later periods. But, as said, the intermediary interest were 
still directly linked with the proprietary interest, and, 
indeed, the practice of farming out proprietary land was 
quite an old practice in Bihar, one which, under the modern
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tenancy laws, grained in importance in the late nineteenth 
century.
A second, distinct kind of intermediary derived power 
from economic transactions. In the role of village mahajan 
could be found rich and upper caste peasants, knife' a (.So 
the money-lending castes such as baniya, tell, sonar' and 
koeri. Thus the rural credit market was another important 
source of local dominance. The people of these groups often 
did not form a separate class or entity in the village, but 
played a dual role as peasants or proprietors as well as 
mahaj ans and money-lenders. They mortgaged the lands of the 
raiyats, and transferred their lands forcibly. After 1860 
they began to consolidate their holdings on a large scale 
through purchase. Some were obtaining zamandari status. The 
growing value of land after 1885 and its registration in law 
both increased the barg^ning power of the money-lenders. 
The tenant who mortgaged his land, could lose his formal 
title but remain accountable in effect for its rental; he 
would generally be kept on the land as a share-cropper on 
very harsh terms. Many landlords made money by receiving 
salami, a traditional power, on granting their consent to 
the buyers of raiyati holdings. But usually they were very 
hostile to such transfers, while themselves making the most 
of rising land prices. ,a.e Often the purchasers were small, 
prosperous proprietors or intermediaries acting as money­
lenders; they played an active role in acquiring raiyati 
rights. Thus the relations of money lenders and debtors 
formed an on-going process in the changing conditions of 
agriculture^ one which could be independent of and
concealed from the landlord but which involved malpractices 
and exploitation.
The usual picture of a rural money-lender (irrespective 
of caste) was that of a baniya, whether he was a zamindar 
who lent money to his tenants, or a trader who dealt in 
grain. The motive was necessarily to earn profits and place 
the debtors under a repressive control. By extorting the 
maximum from him he was liable to reduce him to the level of 
a tenant-at-will. The 'prosperous tenants' were those who 
were independent of this control. The poorest, however, were
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those who were in debt, but who no longer had any credit in 
the rural market.
Therefore, in the rural scene we find on the one hand, 
the role of dominant peasants as money lenders, and on the 
other hand an increase in rural indebtedness. The Settlement 
Reports prepared at the end of the 19th century for the 
North Bihar districts, defend the proposition that rural 
indebtedness did not exist to any appreciable extent. This 
assessment was not based on minute case studies, only 
statistical data on the alienation of peasants' holdings and 
mortgages were considered in evidence. But the small number 
of mortgages and alienations hardly proves the absence of
rural indebtedness,47 It is significant that, according to 
P. C. Roychoudhury, most of the zamindars after the 
abolition of the zamindari took to the money lending 
business in the vi 1 lages. '4ti:: Their active role in money
lending was quite old. From small initial investment, the
money lender could tie up the peasant in a permanent 
servitude and thus pre-empt his production for all times to 
come.
By establishing some rights on a permanent footing, the
Tenancy Law in 1885, only complicated the agrarian problems
of the late nineteenth entury. Its definition of the term
'proprietor* was the 'owner of an estate* . Yet included
among the dominant classes of the society were many grades
of intermediary tenures controling the village economy. The
gradation of tenures and proprietary interests wetS revealed
under the Survey and Settlement operations in»1890s and in
tH Qsthe early period of^ twentieth century. In preparing the
record of rights, it was necessary to assess the extension
of cultivation and the occupation of uncultivated land, the 
holding of rent-free tenures, and above all the issue of who 
was whose proprietor and who was whose raiyat? But such a 
record did not make a basic difference to the nature of such 
complicated proprietary influence. Nor did it remove the 
impact of social power, for example, the bondage and beth
begari which were quite common especially, on behalf of high
caste land holders and at the expense of lower caste 
cultivators.
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Therefore, hierarchical control overland was created by 
a large number of intermediaries which grew up under the 
protection of law as well as under the canopy of the 
prosperous zamindari estates. This is similar to the sub­
infeudation of various kinds in the early social structure 
of India: •“■-"'a particular section of the village shared a 
larger portion of the production, and possessed more land 
than they could cultivate without the asistance of raiyats, 
hired labourers or share-croppers.
The exaction of rental income even by a rich peasant 
(independent from debt and rich in resources) and village 
mahajan, justified their claim to be the malik in a 
particular village. The size of their landed interest could 
vary between five and five hundred acres. The main concern 
was the recognition of a high status in the society. The 
result was the growing power of the intermediary interest 
which originated at the time of Permanent Settlement and 
further accelerated after 1859. These intermediaries, 
including dominant peasants, could easily be differentiated 
from the old zamindars and newly-created proprietors. From 
the 1870 onwards, the society looked to be headed by
varieties of proprietors, tenure holders, dominant peasants, 
waliks in each small villages and village officials; only 
this class of the population could deal in land, in the 
agricultural markets and in rural credit. It formed hardly 
twenty percent of the population. Their influence was
maintained through village politics in kucher^_ies and 
district headquarters through personal acquaintance with 
revenue officials and approach to the local thana in order 
to terrorise the raiyats.
Thus, partly because of the growth of usury, there was 
a dominant class in the north Bihar regions, which was quite 
near in status to the proprietors and small talukdars of
Bengal and Oudh in the later half of the nineteenth century.
The rental income of the intermediaries of this class was 
high in comparison with the revenue demand. Their position 
was parallel to the legal conversion of the zamindars into 
English landlords. The Tenancy Act of 1859 facilitated the 
creation of a band of rural maliks who could be held
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responsible for the indebtedness of the raiyats in the late 
nineteenth century. The small peaiant-farmer economy
started breaking up as a result of the growth of these 
maliks, whose influence in course of time was reflected in 
the growth in the number of non-occupancy raiyats.
The intermediaries began to establish ties with 
district headquarters and important towns in Bihar, as 
agricultural production became more valuable. Through their 
landed property and rental income they were provided with 
avenues for urban settlement. Competition for land among
peasants for the growing of valuable commercial crops 
further increased the rentals. Therefore, though overall
production hardly increased, wealth was extracted and 
accumulated by the classes of the population which had 
greatest access to landed proprty.
From this description of the rise and growth of landed 
power, it is evident that the ownership of land and the 
control of peasant production gradually became more 
effective but changed little in fundamentals. The grant of 
land to the landlords at the cost of both the King and the 
peasantry, had created the suzerain estate or the indepencjrnt 
'little Kingdom' of the landlord (as Bernard Cohn called 
the political structure of the eighteenth-century estate).so 
Under the Mughals, the zamindars had, of course, power to 
introduce new cultivation, and to settle raiyats in the 
villages, on the basis of a hereditary proprietary right and 
the collection of land tax.ei When the British
administrators confirmed their zamindari rights as 
ownership, as defined in the Permanent Setlement, the nature 
of the zamindar as ruler of a small taluka developed into a 
refined 'proprietary estate' , an absolute right to "control 
the land" and enjoy all the privileges which an English 
landlord could enjoy under the English law. Then the 
changing pattern of the economy, as well as demographic 
trends, also gave a new impetus to the old social hierarchy, 
already reinforced by the conferment of proprietary right, 
so that there emerged not only a class of superior 
zamindars, but also a host of petty proprietors,
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intermediaries, village mahajans; and an enlarged usurious 
class controlling the means of production and the surplus. 
Moreover, while many proprietary interests came to be ever more 
minute and larger landowners more likely to be absentee, the 
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 and further measures taken under the 
survey and settlement operations after 1892 assisted in the 
development oi a more prosperous class of rent receivers who 
ultimately formed in effect a class of landords over their sub­
tenants and dependents: these were the village maliks. Between
these two classes of prosperous land controllers and absentee 
landlords, the poorer raiyats and the labouring community 
suf fered.
The height of the power of zamindars can be measured from two 
points of view: the enhancement of rent and alienation of
raiyat's holdings. The law hardly opposed such alienation when 
rent arrears were the excuse. In the arbitrary ex^ercise of 
power by landlords, litigation became indeed one of the weapons 
against the raiyats, alongside the power of distraint, and some 
of the older privileges enjoyed by the zamindars, and also 
alongside intimidation and fraud. The exaction of abwabs, and 
the manipulation of rent and revenue records, were among the 
most important devices for accumulating wealth and power: they
backed up the zamindar's twin props of prestige and force.52 
But the relations based on trade and credit also gained in 
importance during the nineteenth century. The result was that 
proprietary and other kinds of dominance remained virtually 
absolute in North Bihar.
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CHAPTER III 
RAIYATS
Tenantry formed an important part of agrarian society 
in North Bihar in the nineteenth century. The term peasant 
signifies a person who cultivated the land he occupied,
although he may be subjected to the burden of taxation,
forced labour, payment of undefined taxes and cesses to the 
granter of the land. The important issue is whether he 
produces to satisfy his demands or those of the landlord or 
the market.
Under the British, the main classification of agrarian
society was made between zamindars (landlords) and raiyats 
(tenants and cultivators). But this classification was not 
useful for understanding the condition of the people in the 
broad social and agricultural perspectives when diverse 
groups of the village community lived in a hierarchy. For 
example, zamindars and most of the rajas lived on their home 
farms which they cultivated with the help of the hired 
labour of raiyats. Raiyats were those who were solely
dependent on cultivation; they paid cash on a share of the 
crop to another individual who in turn paid revenue to the 
government. According to the revenue records of the 19th 
century, a tenant was someone who was not entered in the 
jamabandi and who by custom and law was not considered to 
be a member of a corporate proprietary body as a pattidar or 
other sub-proprietor. Until the beginning of the 20th 
century, a 'tenant' was called assami, a cultivator, that 
is, one who was not a proprietor but a dependent. The 
assami was also one who was entered in the village record of 
rights. In Bihar, a raiyat was called assami before his 
malik.
If we go back to the origin and development of this 
class of cultivators, we find that in the early agricultural 
settlements, when the pastoral life of the Aryans changed to 
agrarian economy, especially into a dependence on cattle and 
agricultural production, a great change took place in the 
social hierarchy. The agricultural production was carried on 
by the vaisya community, and a labouring class of sudras. 
Apart from serving the upper 'Varna' of the society, sudras
were mainly confined to agriculture, and they helped Vais- 
yas in the production of crops. The extension of 
cultivation and emergence of social classes based on caste 
in the Indo Gangetic plain were marked by the use of iron 
implements from 1000 B.C. At this time too the needs of the 
village community gave birth to several artisan classes, 
such as potters, carpenters and weavers. These were various 
social groups whose main purpose was production and 
therefore, differentiation in function developed in the 
society.1 In this respect producer, mainly agriculturist, 
castes played an important role.
The development of agricultural production gradually 
formed a 'feudal' economy between the 4th and 6th century 
A. D. The land grants given to the upper Varnas of society, 
by the emperor or ruler turned them into feudal lords or 
malikst who shared political and administrative power and 
thus strengthened their economic position. The possession 
of fiscal and administrative power by the priestly classes 
and upper castes, necessarily increased the oppression of 
the peasantry and of those coming under their jurisdiction 
within the villages. The ejectment of tenants was quite 
common, and land was assigned to them on terms and 
conditions which left them few rights. They were made to 
provide labour, including domestic work, ploughing, sowing, 
harvesting, and caring for cattle2 - Although agricultural 
production was regarded as pure or unpolluting work, unlike 
other services, the practice was to secure it by force; so 
important was this in the society that even women from 
cultivator's families were required to work in filling the 
gra^naries of the village headman. In addition to these 
services, villages were required to pay taxes as a result of 
the power vested in the headman. Hence forced labour, the 
burden of taxation and the exploitation of the resources of 
villages by hereditary controllers were the important 
features of agrarian society before the beginning of the 
medieval period.
There is some question whether the agriculturists 
formed a subject peasantry3 or were independent land-owning 
cultivators* in the early medieral period. The deciding 
features must be the control of the means of production, and
its distribution. It is a fact that servility, begar 
services, payment of taxes, eviction of the old and 
introduction of the new cultivators, share cropping and so 
on, were all devices for controlling t h e .peasantry in order 
to deprive them of the major portion of the production 
resulting from their labour.e
In the pre-Mughal period, under the rulers of the Delhi 
Sultanate, private-ownership of property existed. There was 
peasant cultivation as well as the inheritance of 
landownership. This private property was subject to the 
control of community and State, a social structure based on 
payment of tax to the local controllers, including holders 
of revenue free-grants, who formed a military-cum-revenue 
machinery for the extraction of land revenue in the 
conquered territories. The Sultan emphasised the payment of 
kharaj by the agricultural communities as a condition of the 
retortion of their rights in land and other privileges. 
Before the Mughals, therefore, there were peasants owning 
hereditary land and peasant production was important. But 
there were also various other elements of society, such as 
chaudharis or muquddams forming a prosperous landed class of 
upper caste Hindu zamindars and rich peasants. The class 
differences in multi-caste villages were reinforced by the 
revenue system and its regressive features: upper caste
dominance was helped by concessions in revenue rates and the 
demand fell most heavily on peasants belonging to lower 
cadres of the society. The production of surplus was largely 
meant for the state; the major consumers were those who 
formed a part of kingship or revenue assignees. The market 
economy had already developed in the 14th century; 
therefore, peasants were required to pay revenue in cash at 
places where valuable crops such as wheat, sugarcane and 
other products were important."7 The production of valuable 
crops and payment of revenue fixed by the .5tate implied that 
some peasants were rich in resources. They rather tended to 
be the local controller as xnuqaddams (headmen) and 
proprietors of the villages, while hundreds of assamis or 
cultivators worked in their fields as hired labourer or 
cultivated land and paid revenue through the xnuqaddams. The
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muqaddams* power rested on their organization of 
cultivation, and their use of hired labourers for ploughing,
watering, sowing and reaping. Such power originated among
the resident cultivators as explained in the 17th and early 
18th century Mughal documents, that is, the khud-kasht riaya 
who owned the land they cultivated and the oxen and other 
means of cultivation who had resided for a long time in the 
village or rather in the zamindari, who could sell and 
transfer their landed property, and who could 'not be 
dispossessed of their land as long as they paid revenue.
Such peasants were distinguished from the pahi-kasht riaya 
who cultivated the land of a village where they did not 
reside.® As Ain explains it was the function of pahi kasht 
riaya to bring waste land under cultivation, so that no 
land should be left uncultivated in the village. A
cultivator might well have khud kashtkar right in his own 
village and pahi-kasht in another.10
The nature oftfaland right of tenants raises some 
intricate questions, for example comparing khud-kasht and 
pahi-kasht under the Mughals and in later periods under the 
British when land right and tenure-structure had been 
defined by law. In the first instance, the early assertions 
of European travellers to India estimated the position of 
j agirdars of the Mughal nobility as the natural countei—  
parts of the land-owning class of European aristocracy. The 
Mughal emperor was able to transfer the Jagirs at his will 
and assign the revenue collection responsibility to any of 
these nobles; it looked as if the right of nobility had been 
usurped by the emperor. On the other hand, the larger part 
of the cultivated areas was owned by peasant-cultivators and 
such areas were divided into raiyati and zamindari areas. 
Therefore, travellers could understand the agrarian society 
as divided into the two classes sharing the produce of the 
soil; the peasantry on the one hand, and the King and his 
Jagirdars or revenue assignees on the other.11 The peasant's 
proprietorship was never taken into account^ he was a 
'tenant' from whom the king and his nominee zamindar or 
jagirdar collected revenue. Only they shared power and 
privileges derived from the proprietary .State. The concepts
of property and ownership of land of India seemed to be the 
opposite of those in European society. The judgement of the 
jurists and administrators must have created 
misunderstanding and doubt as they took the paramount right 
of the state to imply its effective control of agrarian 
land. Thus instances have been found in the early British 
revenue documents interpreting the status of various 
categories of raiyats, especially in the Presidency of 
Bengal. The question most often asked was, "who was the 
owner of land - the ruler (Hakim) or the zamindar"? The 
question of the peasant did not arise. From such
discussions, there emerged the opinion that rajas and 
zamindars were ancient hereditary rulers who therefore 
should be entitled to the ownership of land. The Permanent 
Settlement was an outcome of this acceptance, developed from 
the 1760s, that whatever was elicited about the peasants or 
raiyats, the rajas and zamindars enjoyed hereditary rights 
in the soil.
Thus khud-kasht cultivators clearly had personal rights 
in land, but these were taken to be held from zamindari 
families, the chaudharis, muqaddams and others. But on 
their own account, the raiyats did not enjoy any official 
status, not even when there were the kin of the zamindar and 
muqaddami families^ and had a tradition of ■cLe.sceWiVi^  from the 
original developers of the land they occupied. 12 Moreover, 
the pahi-kasht raiyats though they cultivated land in 
another mauza or land belonging to another^ . also had full 
rights in holding land. The English rendering of the word 
pahi as non-resident, in opposition to the khud-kasht, or 
resident cultivator, created a misunderstanding. In the 
Mughal period, the pahi-kasht raiyat was subordinate to one 
zamindar but carried on cultivation in the mauza of another. 
Thus a very important distinction was determined in the 
interpretation of the basic difference in land rights of the 
various categories of raiyats preceeding the Permanent 
Settlement. In fact zamindari area covered the cultivated 
land of the dominant castes and clans. The cultivator's 
status depended not on different rights in land but on his 
relations with the zamindar. Thus if he cultivated land in
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another mauza belonging to the same zamindari, he was not 
regarded as pahi.13
Raiyats belonging to khud-kasht and pahi-kasht 
categories were in a large majority and took the main part 
in agricultural production; but there was also another class 
of cultivator who invested his labour in cultivation on the 
holdings of zamindars, muqaddams, and rich cultivators. In 
particular those belonging to upper castes would abstain 
from touching the plough, especially in Bihar and other 
parts of North East India. Thus although there was no
particular caste of share-cropper  it would have created a
major occupation - in fact share-cropping was practised on a 
large scale in the 18th and 19th centuries. It was much in 
evidence in the zamindari areas and among those peasant 
proprietors who received madad-mash (rent free land grant 
usually given from waste arable land of village) from the 
state to landlords, muqaddams and proprietors. The landless 
cultivating population was available to plough land, and in 
effect to hold it and pay revenue subject to the share of 
the produce paid to the mallk. Cultivators of this kind did 
not have their own seeds, ploughs, bullw ocks and other 
necessities for cultivation; these were provided or rented 
out by the maliks or rich peasants. The maliks took between 
one third and one half of the crop, the latter being the 
rule in less fertile areas. In practice the share-cropper 
received less than his supposed share of the produce. The 
owner (raiyat) of madad-mash lands was entitled a half of 
share under the Mughals, and was required at the same time 
to meet the demand of State, apart from tenant's share and 
expenditure incureed on maintenance of land, such as 
irrigation. The balance left in hand as malikana was his 
profit on the land rented to the tenant cultivator.1& 
Colebrooke's description refers to malpractices and high 
handedness of the landowners and the sufferings of the share 
croppers though, by that period, the confusion between a 
formal 'tenant' and the actual cultivator of the soil had 
already taken a legal form, and tenancy problems based on 
payment of rent at fixed rates in cash and kind had emerged 
as an important factor in the agrarian society.
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The distinction made between various categories of 
raiyats preceeding the Permanent Settlement must be 
understood before we can define the character and role of 
raiyats and their raiyati rights in 19th century Bihar. 
After the grant of Diwani to the East India Company in 1765 
the revenue documents, reports and memoranda presented by 
the English and local officials and their commentaries 
constituted a great debate on the property right as well as 
on the nature of land rights of zamindar and raiyat. Some 
of the experts generalised about the agrarian society of 
Eastern India and some traced the agrarian practices and 
land tenures back to the time of Akbar. The policy of the 
Company's officials from 1769 to the middle of the 
nineteenth century was directed not only towards taxation
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but^ towards the structure of the society. Land control and 
the distribution of the produce of land were and are 
central to social relations: they not only concern ownership
of land, rents and taxes, but are about kinship, marriage, 
ritual, status, prestige and power. Invisible to the
revenue records, with their valuable information about land 
tenure, were hundreds of under-tenants, and cultivators of a 
few acres of land. The British viewed Indian society from a 
legal point of view and had common economic goals for 
certain classes of people, but they did not allow them to 
function in a social group.1G Broad similarities can be 
found between English pre-capitalist and capitalist concepts 
of property and the pre-British Indian concept, but there 
were still great differences between the land laws of both 
countries. Henry Maine's ideas about movement from 'status 
to contract'17 would seem to be relevant; the British 
introduced an economic status through land policy which was 
intended to restructure the agrarian society.
In 1769 an effort was made to enter into a direct 
relation with the raiyats through the commissioners and 
supervisors ascertaining the rents paid, the cesses and 
arbitrary levies extracted, and the prevalence of rent 
documents. The supervisors also sought to convince the 
raiyats that the aim of investigation was not the increase 
of rents or^ accumulat ion^=demgaids, but the redress of their
8 1
grievances. But the kanungos had the responsibility of 
supplying details of the raiyati rights and safeguarding the 
interests against oppression; they had been record-keepers 
for the zamindars since Mughal times, and kept silent in 
league with the zamindars. By this time it seemed obvious 
to Warren Hastings that the Mughal system of land law and 
hereditary ownership of land by the khud-kasht raiyat were 
null and void. On this basis he dismissed the Indian 
officials in 1772, took over the management of the revenue, 
and started anew.
Convinced that the £tate was the supreme landlord,
Hastings at first ignored the zamindars' claims and farmed 
out the revenues by public auction. Later he realised that 
men of local influence could not be ignored and that 
entirely to deprive them might lead to all the evils of a 
divided authority.ie He therefore tried to settle with 
zamindars wherever possible for 5 years and farmed the land 
of occupied territories. On the other hand, the basic 
importance of the raiyats was not taken into consideration. 
Hastings regarded the status of khud-kasht raiyats as 
similar to that under the Mughals. According to him , those 
who resided in one fixed spot, where they had built
themselves substantial houses, or derived them by 
inheritance from their father, were a "valuable kind of 
riatt". He believed they would suffer greatly as they would 
become "vagrant riatt" if they were forced to q u i t . B u t  
this second category of raiyat was the pahi-kasht according 
to Warren Hastings. They were, as the Fifth Report later 
defined them: those who 'cultivated lands belonging to a
village where they do not reside; they are considered 
tenants-at-wi11 and they had casual interest in cultivation 
and land'.20 This interpretation distorted the prevailing 
circumstances. The representation of the khud-kasht and 
pahi-kasht raiyats as tenants-at-wi11, dependent on the 
zamindars, on the lines of the English law, was a great de­
construction by the administrators of the East India
Company. Even the pahi-kasht raiyat was never a tenant at 
will before the arrival of the British in the Presidency of
Bengal. Certainly there existed a class of agricultural 
labourers who worked on daily wages. Such labourers were 
bonded and servile and had to do various other services 
apart from cultivation. But such people were to be
distinguished even from pahi-kasht raiyats.
It has often been argued that, if we compare the Bengal 
zamindar with the Bihar zamindar, it is evident that there 
was in Bengal no kind of ownership which corresponded to 
that aggregate of rights known to English law. There hardly 
existed such ownership in any class in India as was given by 
the ownership in fee simple. 21 In particular the zamindars 
of Bihar did not possess so unlimited a power over the khud- 
kasht and pahi-kasht raiyat as the early English
administrators thought. As Harrington observed: "It is by
attempting to assimilate the complicated system which we 
found in the country with the simple principles of landlord 
and tenant in our order and specially in applying to the 
Indian system terms of appropriate and familiar 
signification which do not, without considerable limitation, 
properly belong to it, that much, if not all, of the 
perplexity ascribed to the subject has arisen".22 The real 
situation was too complex to be simplified according to land 
rights of some actual owners of the soil. Yet Hastings had 
readily asserted in 1775 that the farming of land largely 
depended on the zamindars and maliks of an area granting
leases for life or for a period of two joint lives either at
a rate fixed by the Company's government or on the best 
terms obtainable for the zamindars. Moreover, the zamindars 
were not liable to be compelled to pay more revenue without 
substantial reasons, nor were they to be dispossessed of 
their right to hold land. It was for this reason that in 
1777, the Court of Directors revoked the provisions whereby 
revenue could be farmed to the highest bidders: thus the
supremacy of the zamindars was recognised as the foundation 
of revenue settlement.
The administrators believed that 'vagrant Riatts' 
settled their rates with the zamindars, held land for a 
term, paid rent according to the agreement reached, and lost 
their rights if they deserted. But even these provisions
83
were not observed in law. The only concession thought to be
allowed was that if a 'vagrant' continued on the terms and
conditions mentioned above, he could hold land at a lower
than the established rate. The result was that hereditary
raiyats were bound to be subservient under the law to the
zamindars. On the other hand, agriculture was in a state of
decay at the time of the Decennial Settlement and it was
difficult to meet the demand for revenue as well as to
provide for the zamindars' income. Therefore, improvement
of land with the help of raiyats (khud-kasht and fiahi-kasht)
was necessary to ensure a permanent source of revenue from
agriculture. The root cause of the problems, or so
Cornwallis believed, was an unsatisfactory revenue system.
The rigid distinction made with regard to the distribution
of land right simplified the task of making a settlement
with the zamindars, and fixing terms and conditions upon
raiyats for holding land and paying rents at a rate fixed by
the zamindar. Cornwallis believed that raiyats as a class
would receive due encouragement from the zamindars for the
cultivation and improvement of the land. He held too that
it was in the interest of the .state, that landed property
should fall into the hands of the most frugal and thrifty
class of people who will improve their lands and protect the
ryots, and thereby promote the general prosperity of the
country.23 Cornwallis was optimistic in thinking that rent
would be fixed according to the value of land or produce,
and settled mutually between the zamindar and raiyat. He
was unrealistic too in supposing that no zamindar would levy
taxes or abwabs nor impose upon raiyats, and that raiyats
could not be dispossessed on flimsy grounds. Cornwallis
took it for granted that the relation of the zamindars and
yt
raiyats in the Company's provinces in Bengal would be similar 
to the relation between the English landlords and the 
English farmers.2,4 This illusion had some long-term 
consequences. For example, despite the supposedly absolute 
proprietary rights of the zamindars, it is a fact that 
contrary to the English situation but inforder to avoid 
arbitrary oppression of the raiyats, the government of the
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Company reserved its right to regulate the terms by which 
the zamindar was to let his lands. In practice however, 
this right was not exercised. The reason was that
Cornwallis was under the impression that the raiyats' status 
might be treated as derived from the landlord, as in 
England. The government began to intervene only later, when 
it came to the view that the raiyats actually had had 
proprietory rights which did not derive from an original 
theoretically-complete proprietary right in the zamindar. 
Under this revision of theory the term "actual proprietors" 
of the soil did not mean what might be supposed prima facia, 
but something less, taking into consideration the way the 
concept was used for the settlement.2® Thus, according to 
Phillip$ in his celebrated lectures on land tenure (published 
in 187^), the government gave nothing to the zamindar but the 
right to accent the assessment, and an absolute 
proprietorship in the matter of revenue. At the time 
however, as Phillips also accepted, the rights of the 
zamindars were recognised and secut&d under the Permanent 
Settlement, while those of the raiyats were left to take 
care of themselves. Moreover the zamindar, having acquired 
the government right in the revenue in perpetuity, was in an 
advantageous position for absorbing all other rights.
There were some gestures towards the raiyat in 
Cornwallis' regulations, suggestive of permanency of tenure 
and fixity of rent. Rents unaltered for twelve years prior 
to the settlement were declared to be fixed in perpetuity; 
otherwise rent was to be payable at pargana rates subject to 
the consolidation of abwabs and cesses levied in the past; 
patta (leases) were to be provided and renewed after every 
ten years; there was to be no right of eviction of resident 
raiyats. The government required zamindars to treat their 
under holders with good faith and moderation and reserved a 
general power to legislate in future. All disputes between 
zamindar and raiyats were to be referred to the District 
Courts. But other policies were designed to strengthen the 
zamindars' sense of security. The office of qanungos was 
abolished, and judicial and magisterial authority of the
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collectors was ended. Above all, the primacy of zamindar was 
recognised in law. One apparent check which actually enhanced 
the zamindars' status, required the maintenance in the 
collector's office of a register of holdings, transfers, rent 
rolls, payments and receipts and a quinquenial regiecer of all 
land tenures. But in so far as they were kept, such records 
secured the zamindar, eventually taking the place of the social 
and economic ties between the upper and lower strata of society 
as the basis of local control. The authority of zamindari 
recognised selected families and the subordination of raiyats 
overturn®«C the balance of rights, maintained since the time of 
the Mughals. In the agrarian economy of Bihar as of Bengal,
the zamindari right absorbed the raiyati rights.
The outcome was social disintegration. In the past the 
protection of the raiyats' position depended on economic 
considerations and customary obligations} indeed the religious 
obligation of the zamindars towards raiyats could not be 
ignored. These consideration were linked, even under the 
Mughals, with revenue-free land-grants and gifts given by 
'rajas' and big zamindars to priests and officials. This
practice was very prevalent, both among Hindu landed gentry as
well as among Muslim zamindars and J agi rdar-'s • The minhai 
register of these grants was maintained from an early period.
In 1795 it recorded about 18 kinds of revenue-free grants among 
Hindus, and 20 kinds among Muslims. Stevenson-Moore the
Settlement Officer, North Bihar records the remnants of these 
grants and attached much importance to their role before the 
Permanent Settlement in strength ening the ties between the 
middle and bottom levels of society (khud-kasht and hereditary 
rent payers).27 For example the Brahmottar grant given to 
Brahmanas for the encouragement of Sanskrit learning and the 
worship of gods^ had always been recognised as an act of piety 
by kings and noblemen in Bihar. In the North Bihar districts, 
charitable endowments on a small scale continued until the 
enactment of the Permanent Settlement, which however proclaimed 
that such grants would be reassessed,therisk being that they 
would be declared illegal and invalid, making the holders 
liable to pay revenue. Most of the 'tenure' holders, khud- 
kasht raiyats, and prosperous raiyats holding her^dit€try rights u}4-7t.
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affected by the ensuing resumption procedures. The revenue- 
free grants were of two categories: badshahi and hukumi. The
former were those granted by the Mughal Emperors direct, and 
the latter those derived from the officials of the Empire. 
Badshahi grants were recognised by the British as valid if 
the holder could prove his sanad and was in possession. 
Hukumi grants, though considered in their nature invalid, 
were accepted if dated prior to the grant of Diwani, 1765. 
All grants of subsequent date were invalid and zamindars 
were authorised to nullify their own grants under the 
provisions of the Permanent Settlement. In Bihar, according 
to the assessment made by Thomas Rumbolt in 1767, there had 
been a profusion of lakhiraj grants of various kinds - jigar 
altamgha, madad-mash, payi-baki, khalsa, sharifa and others. 
All were brought under resumption operations; two thirds of 
the total of invalid grants in the whole of Bengal (valued 
at Rs.66,21,144 lakhs) were accounted for by Bihar.2® 
The rent-free grants had increased the prosperity of raiyats 
and assisted the harmonious relation between zamindars, 
rajas and raiyats. The age — old moral and economic
obligations binding zamindars and raiyats together were 
loosened as a result of the Permanent Settlement.
The policy of the Company's government was directed to 
protecting the zamindars and the security of revenues ie.
jama muqarari or jama muqarari istamrari, both terns
denoting the fixed revenue to be realised from the raiyats. 
Hence the zamindars were invested with a power of ejectment 
over all raiyats, khud-kasht or pahi-kasht, whether or not 
they had a right of occupancy. Any raiyat who did not have 
a right of property or transferable possession, was liable 
to ejectment for arrears of rent even without recourse to 
law, (clause 7, sect. 5, Regulation VII of 1799). Moreover 
a power of distraint, not only of produce of land but of all 
personal property and cattle of the defaulting raiyat, was 
vested in zamindars. They were empowered to realize rent 
(arrears above Rs.500) from tenants and dependent talukdars 
by summary arrest and summary sale of the under—tenures 
(Sect. 9 and Reg. XXXV of 1795 and Sec. 14 and 15, ReJ. VII
of 1799). Only the plough and implements of a raiyat and
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cattle trained to the plough could not be distrained. In 
theory the khud-kasht kadimi or resident raiyat - and he 
alone - had a right of occupancy under the Permanent 
Settlement, but as the determination of rent according to 
the pargana rate was uncertain, it was in practice at the 
discretion of the zamindar, regulated either by custom or by 
competition. Moreover, the power held by zamindars of 
ejecting, enhancing the rents, and distraining the property 
of the defaulting raiyats increased litigation enormously 
between the two parties. But for the zamindar court cases 
were matters of social prestige as well as economics; the 
raiyat found it difficult and painful to attend the court: 
distance of the courts, the expenses of litigation, and, 
very often, ignorance of the regulations made the raiyats 
helpless.2® Worst of all perhaps was the inordinate delay in 
the disposal of cases. Some pending since 1794 were still 
uncompleted in 1800. This was a further harass^ment of the 
raiyats in rent disputes.
These results of the Permanent Settlement did not of 
course occur uniformly or all at once. The Permanent 
Settlement and its subsequent amendments were not fully 
introduced until 1833, in the North Bihar districts.
The raiyats never possessed absolute right of property 
in the soil, but by the time the Company assumed charge of 
the revenue administration, some of them had acquired legal 
rights. In theory at least the khud-kasht raiyats had a 
right to homestead land and the services of the village 
officials, and also to hold rights to pasture and forest 
lands, fisheries, reservoirs and irrigation channels as well 
as the produce from unoccupied lands. These rights did not 
rest on the written record, the patta which even Hastings 
treated as an important document. After the Permanent 
Settlement, however, the relation of landlord and tenant 
began to be governed as in English law. The pahi-kasht 
raiyats obtained temporary leases; the khud-kasht raiyats 
depended upon proof of long term occupancy. The lease 
acquired importance. Hence illiterate raiyats who had no 
patta and who did not receive rent-receipt on payment of 
their dues, were unable to free themselves of the leaden
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weight of arbitrary cesses.30 It was always difficult for 
the raiyats to conceal the extent of their holdings: the
patwaris were very careful, in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, as earlier, about each and every bigha 
of land in the possession of a raiyat. Landlords were able 
to narrow down the size of holdings to a subsiste.mce level 
for both the khud-kasht kadmi rai^yatsandpahi-kasht raiyats.
The result was not a revolution of agrarian production. 
The. b realized that revenue depended upon the raiyats or
immediate cultivators of the soil (.who were most helpless and 
needed government attention}, but Cornwallis had believed 
that zamindars in their own interest would seek to improve 
their estates and hence promote the welfare of the 
cultivators. In practice, one of the few facts on which 
Company servants were soon unanimous was the mediocrity and 
lack of character of most of the zamindars. A majority 
proved incapable of managing their estates and certainly 
under the new system they had no interest in protecting the 
raiyats. Yet the rights of the raiyats were held to be 
derived only from the documents forced upon them by the 
zamindars (until the law was changed in 1812). Also very 
disturbing to occupancy right was the amendment of the sales 
law in 1822 and the interpretation placed upon it by the 
Judical Committee of the Privy Council.
In the nineteenth century, the law adversely affected 
the servile and weaker section of the society, yet on the 
other hand some khud-kasht raiyats and cultivators who 
acquired more substantial rights on the eve of the Permanent 
Settlement were able to hold large areas of land from the 
zamindars at fixed rents, and then to farm them out to other 
small cultivators and pahi-kasht raiyats on a thika or 
contract or on a share-cropping basis. Over decades, there 
Emerged among the raiyats some who were not merely raiyats 
but practically tenure-holders; these were the Jeth raiyats, 
zamindari gomashtas and ashraf raiyats. They were generally 
men of high caste; who received rent-free grants or reduced 
rent demands from zamindars (Buchanan also mentions their 
existence). In the longer term a prosperous class of
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raiyats grew up in some zamindari areas inheriting property 
and proprietary rights at the instance of big zamindars, 
while other raiyats suffered under the disabilities which 
developed among the pahi-kasht raiyats, and under— tenants of 
various kinds.31 This increase in the power and local 
influence of rich peasants in the North Bihar districts 
operated by means of the extraction of produce rent of money 
lending in the role of vi 1 lage^mahaj an, and most important, 
of the transfer of raiyati holdings through mortgages and 
other wise. Such raiyats came to constitute what were 
effectively dominant peasants in Muzaffarpur, Saran and 
Darbhe^a.
This position depended in part on the law regarding the 
transfer of holdings under Regulation II of 1822; a raiyat 
possessing right of occupancy could transfer this holding to 
another raiyat only by custom. He could also contest the 
enhancement of rent by an auction purchaser of an estate or 
by a zamindar. But these provisions would only benefit the 
strong. Moreover, under the Bengal Regulations since 1793 
transfer was enforceable against raiyats who failed to pay 
rents. Again only rich peasants could benefit. The law 
provided in effect for transfer of raiyati holding and sale 
of raiyati rights at the discretion of landlords as recorded 
in construction No. 890, dated 11 July 1834 issued and 
explained by the Bengdl-t Sadar Diwani Adalat in a minute 
recorded on 5 December 1845. In 1855 too, another decision 
of th^Sadar Diwani Adalat left the rights and interests of 
raiyats at the mercy of the landlord; holding^could be sold 
in execution of a money decree. Regulation II of 1822 was 
meant for those who held hereditary rights of occupancy, but 
if they could be ejected under law at the instance of the 
zamindar, then they would be merely tenants-at-wi11. In 
general therefore, as Justice Trevor said, the position of 
khud-kasht raiyats was adversely affected between 1815 and 
1842, while (it was thought) pahi-kasht raiyats had never 
had any rights independent of the particular engagements 
under which they held land.33 Hence what might benefit the 
few was to the general disadvantage. District reports in 
1855-for example, from the joint magistrate and deputy
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collector of Champaran - claimed that the cultivator, though 
nominally protected by regulations of all sorts, had 
practically no right in the soil, that his rent was 
continually raised, that he was oppressed and worried by 
every successive thikadar, until he was in some cases 
actually forced out of his holding and driven to take 
shelter in the terai of Nepal.3*- In short, the first stage 
in any polarization among raiyats must have occurred under 
the full control of the landlord, while tenant rights in 
general were being changed and squeezed under the law.
Thus the transfer of peasant holdings^ enhancement of 
rent, and ejectment based partly on rural indebtedness were 
general grievances of the raiyats in Bihar. Moreover, a new 
pattern of agrarian relations was encouraged by the increase 
of cultivation: indigo and opium in particular required the
institutional framework of the landlord and tenants. The 
main fetter on the cultivators - and the means of ensuring 
agricultural production - were now the zamindars' sole 
proprietary right in land, the consolidation of their power, 
to extract surplus in the form of rent, and on the other 
hand, their indebtedness at the hands of money lenders.35
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, the raiyats were 
subject to rack renting, cesses and high-handed village 
mahajans. The zamindars dictated the terms of tenancy, 
failing to issue pattas, and having their patwaris alter the 
rent rolls at will. With the enactment of Act X 1859, 
however, the relation of landlord and tenant seemed to 
become a question of great debate among the British Indian 
government officials as well as among the liberal peasant 
supporters of the British Government in England. The object 
was to protect the occupancy tenants by legislative measures. 
It was feared that the development of capitalist 
agriculture , such as was already to be found in England, 
would be impeded if the relations of landlord and tenant in 
India worsened.36. The administrators were all aware of the 
shortcomings of the zamindars of Bengal Presidency, yet they 
intended to formulate the tenancy legislation on the lines 
of Irish legislation. The main purpose of Act X of 1859 was 
improve landlord tenant relations by defining the rights of
9 1  
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the raiyats and restraining the power of zamindars for 
enhancement of rent. Act X of 1859 was the beginning of 
jtegislation intended to strengthen the position of the 
tenants. It laid down that a raiyat was entitled to an 
occupancy right in a holding (not part of the zamindar's 
home farm) if he could prove 12 years' continuous 
possession. Rent was to be fair and equitable, and could be 
enhanced by zamindars only when it was found to be below the 
prevailing pargana rate, or there had been an increase in 
the cultivated area or in the value of the produce. 
Conversely if there had been any decrease in the area, or in 
the value of the produce, the raiyats could claim a 
reduction of rent. Those holding at fixed rents since the 
Permanent Settlement, were exempted from enhancement. Those 
whose rents had not been changed for twenty years, were 
entitled to a presumption in law that their rent too was 
fixed. For all occupancy tenants, it was provided that 
enhancement of rent and ejectment could be made only for 
specific reasons though judicial procedure. The lands under 
khamar or nij-jot - the sir lands of landlord or tenure- 
holders— were exempted from the rule. Indeed the law
provided that no raiyat could acquire occupancy rights on 
such land, which had been exproprietary tenants' land (the 
land right lost by a tenant) or from a tenant at fixed rate 
and land given as earned grant. The sir land was given 
occupancy right to tenant from the date he lost his 
proprietary right.37
One effect of the Act was further to subject land- 
rights to the law. Thus any tenant who held a lease for a 
period could not have occupancy rights (except by occupancy 
for twelve years after the term of lease had expired). It 
followed that unless and until a raiyat had cultivated the 
land of a zamindar or tenure holder for twelve years and 
paid rent regularly as fixed by him, he did not have any 
occupancy right. This Act finally obliterated the old 
distinction between the khud-kasht and pahi-kasht raiyats.33 
Henceforth, the only three categories of raiyats in law were 
clearly those holding at fixed rate, the occupancy raiyats 
and the non-occupancy raiyats. The Act also began
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to set out proper grounds for enhancement of rent, though it 
was not difficult for a zamindar or his officials to appear 
to meet them. Indeed any changes which made agrarian rights 
subject to judicial proof put most raiyats at a 
disadvantage. It was difficult for them to provide
documentary evidence of their possession of a particular 
holding for twelve years. Zamindars rarely issued rent 
receipts, and there was no properly maintained record of 
rights in zamindari offices. These disadvantages, like the 
frequent changing of the plots to prevent the gaining of 
rights under th twelve years' rule, affected the weaker 
sections of socCety disproportionately. By the same token 
the Act reinforced zamindari power. In regard to the 
transferability of raiyati holdings, for example, the 
landlord's consent remained the chief architect of judicial 
verdicts under Act X of 1859 •3S>
Under the Act, for all its appearance of balance 
between interests, the principles which were to govern the 
relations between zamindars and raiyats were still not 
clearly set-out. On the important question of rent 
enhancement, for example, the judicial means were 
complicated: in the absence of official price lists for
agricultural crops, even zamindars found it difficult to 
prove increases in the value of produce. Yet the Act was 
more than a codification. It was important that it did not 
provide protection for non-occupancy raiyats, or even set 
out whether land could be sub-let. Thus the protection for 
occupancy raiyats did not mean that the interests of the 
tiller of the soil were protected. One particular section 
of society, that of the landholders, was taken into account, 
and an incentive was given to rent receiving. It provided 
for a path through ownership of property to a secured 
position for the prosperous peasantry, while ignoring the 
rights of tenants-at-will who had once enjoyed rights in 
land, for example as pahi-kasht raiyats.
After the Act rural economic power was increasingly 
based not just on caste, the extraction of surplus, and 
control of the labour force, but also on the protection of 
laws, as for the collection of rent and its enhancement. In
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this context there gradually developed a competition between 
prosperous raiyats and intermediaries as a result of the 
increase in value of produce, and capital formation at the 
level of village markets. The small peasant economy was 
being commercialised due to the growth of indigo 
plantations, and foreign capital investment by planters in 
the North Bihar districts. These developments reinforced 
the ideas of the government at home in favour of a revision 
of rent law. Ever since the Charter Act of 1833, the ideal 
of laissez faire was the weapon with which the newborn 
western capitalism dismantled the relics of the feudal
economy at home and raised abroad its own edifice of
international economics. But after the incentives given by 
the Charter Act to European Settlement, and the development 
of important commercial enterprises to grow and process 
crops for the market, there was a more urgent need to adopt 
the land legislations but also to maintain landlord and 
tenant relations. Thus the Secretary of State's Despatch on 
the Charter Act expressed concern about the idea, 'rooted in 
an European mind of the relation between landlord and 
tenant' . It was thought that if such a European should 
purchase the interest of the zamindar, ^he will be apt to
conclude that he has acquired that of the Ryot also, and
that he may at once proceed to a course of ejectment. If 
too well instructed to be thus mistaken, yet he is little 
likely to form an accurate conception of the rights of the 
cultivator, or of his own, and may by ignorance alone be led 
to commit acts of injustice, against these evils some
7
provisions should be made. (Despatch No. 45, Charter Act 
1833).
Those ideas did not prevent a rapid growth in the 
indigo industry in Bihar and Bengal in the decades fallowing 
the Charter Act of 1833; cotton, tea, coffee and sugar 
became important products in other areas. Some argue that 
towards the middle of the nineteenth century British 
capitalism had attained its apogee - Sydney Webb asserted 
that British capitalist enterprise had spent itself by the 
middle of the 19th c e n t u r y . C e r t a i n l y  the accumulated 
capital of entrepreneur was invested rapidly in commercial
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agriculture in the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
in I n d i a . T h i s  was an era which saw the beginning of the 
capitalist enterprises in India, and at the same time a 
restoration of the purchasing power of the country-side: as
already remarked, capital formation in the localities helped 
the rural capitalists form their own networks. The zamindars 
of Bihar like those of Bengal invested their capital in land 
and agriculture to the extent of their profit m o t i v e . B u t  
merchants were not very enterprising except in the citiesj 
much of this deployment of capital was managed by planters 
and zamindars who largely controlled the rural economy in 
the later half of the nineteenth century. These changes 
could not but affect the purposes and character of land 
legislation during the period. The warnings of 1833
reappeared in a sharper perspective.
The government came to believe that peasants were after 
all the backbone of agriculture, and, if protected against 
oppression by the zamindars, could be more useful for 
agricultural production, a better source of revenue and more 
able to respond to market opportunities. Whatever the 
validity of the economics— its' belief in the inevitablity of 
a class of wage earners emerging in the agricultural sector,
in the aftermath of an industrial revolution such
structural change had not yet been exported to IndiA, even 
where the Indigo planters were dominant.
The Act of 1859 marked the beginnings of a modficatian 
of the policy of laissez-faire. But it soon came under 
criticism. The landlords' right of distraint, the criteria 
for enhancement of rent, and the distinction between 
occupancy and non-occupancy raiyats had increased both the 
landlords' power, and the amount of litigation. The critics, 
for example John Beames in 1861, when he was a joint 
Magistrate of Shahabad— began to report on oppressive 
treatment by zamindars towards raiyats. This was not at 
first taken seriously (in this case by the collector) 
because of rules which supported the zamindars' rights; but 
gradually it came to be thought that the law itself was at 
fault, and unsuitable to Indian conditions. Thus the 
raiyats' ignorance of law was also to an important factor in
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their exploitation. Generally only rent-receivers filed 
rent suits in the courts. Various indigo related
disturbances in Bengal and Bihar — the most celebrated in 
Pabna in East Bengal in 1873 - made the question seem more 
acute. From the early 1860s, therefore, the rent disputes 
between zamindars and raiyats and also planters and raiyats 
attracted a new kind of attention from the government.
Hitherto although the system of I'ndigo cultivation was known 
to be unrenumerative to the cultivators everywhere in Bihar 
as well as in Bengal, the government had followed a policy 
of non-intervention. But as the conduct of the indigo 
planters and zamindars became con^troversial, so the rent
question was more seriously raised. The courts did not
appear to have the answer, at least under the 1859 Act. 
Indeed, Sir Barnes Peacock's judgement in 1862, in a suit 
for recovery of arrears of rent at an enhanced rate on the 
plea of the growing value of production^ had the effect of 
removing all the protection which had apparently been 
intended for the raiyats in 1859, and the Great Rent Case of 
1865, which laid down that the old rent should bear to the 
enhanced rent the same propor^tion as the former value of 
the produce bore to its existing value, did not entirely 
remove the danger, though it mollified the executive 
officials for a time. After 1866, widespread discomfort and 
agitation among the raiyats of Darbhanga, MuzaffSypur and 
Champaran created great concern in government circles. The 
raiyats were opposing the zamindars' and planters' arbitrary 
methods of depriving them of their rights to the cultivation 
of land, and increasing their rents. John Beames, appointed 
Magistrate of Champaran in 1866, found a 'spirit' of quiet, 
determined opposition growing among the raiyats against 
their oppressors. A3 The Magistrate was able to calm down 
the situation and planters had to agree to increase the 
price paid the cultivators for indigo: and also to pay
fairer wages to the labourers. But the discontent
continued, for example in parts of Dabhanga. The rise on 
prices of other crops greatly reduced the relative 
attractiveness of indigo. Moreover the planters levied 
abwabs on the raiyats, which usually came to 60 to 100
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perfcent of the rent,4* and continued to do so even after the
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, infspite of the attempts made by
the government to stop the practice. Abwabs were regarded
as an ordinary incident of zamandari management,48 and the
planters, as thikadars and mu karraridarst held zamindari
rights. The raiyats were bound to be at their mercy in the
prevailing circumstances. Thus the growing discontent among
raiyats matched the slow progress of the cultivation of
indigo as a result of oppression by indigo planters and
zamindars. The government considered encouraging a change
on the basis of indigo cultivation from the assamiwar to the
$
zirat system. But though the raiyati or asjamiwar system was 
more oppressive, a z(rat system was only possible when the 
non-occupancy raiyats had surrendered their holdings-**8 Such 
a change would create yet more disontent among cultivators.
The outbreak of famine in 1866 and 1874, in Madhubani, 
Supaul and Sitamarhi and other parts of Darbhanga estate, 
also attracted the attention of the government. The Famine 
Commissioners attached more importance to the helpless 
condition of the raiyats than to the failure of the monsoon 
rains. The Famine Commission of 1881 accused the Raja of 
Darbhanga of enjoying all the proceeds of the estate's land, 
and plunging the agricultural community into destitution and 
poverty merely because of the failure of one crop.47 
Similar remarks could be made; about Bettiah Raj or Hathwa 
Raj. But the scarcity and oppression also occurred on small 
estates. The basis of the problem was on the one hand 
rising prices of food grain, and on the other the oppressive 
tenure system whether in indigo cultivation or in general 
landlord tenant relations-. The proprietary right of the 
zamindars was solidly opposed to any formation of tenant 
rights on the principle already drawn up in the Act of 1859. 
The growing power of zamindars and their allies to deal with 
recalcitrant tenants was evident in ever more frequent rent 
suits. Their impact on agrarian relations was apparantly 
increased by the transfer of rent suits from revenue offices 
to the Civil Courts in 1869. Certainly suits for
enhancement, ejectment and sale of raiyati holdings for non­
payment of rent tremendously increased in the 1870s.
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The pro-tenant trend in government was boosted when the 
Lieutenant Governor visited North Bihar in 1871-72, and 
instructed the zamindars under the Court of Wards, to stop 
issuing thikadari leases to planters; he also urged the 
planters to obtain indigo on "mercantile principles" from 
the peasants.*® But such pronouncements had little effect on 
the situation. It had already been argued in 1863 that the 
rent of an occupancy raiyat did not depend upon the actual 
capacity of the land and the excess value of the gross 
produce over the wages of the raiyats and the usual profit, 
but on local usage or practice,*9 Henry Maine, Law Member of 
government of India, Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State 
and Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy at that time had defended 
rights of the raiyats. Yet the economic situation and 
British legal assumptions remained both unfavourable. The 
judiciary was still not convinced about the need to provide 
for an occupancy right. By the same token, George Campbell 
believed in reformatory measures and doing away with the old 
policy of laissez-faire; he held up the example of the 
numerous problems which beset the relations between 
landlords and tenants in Ireland, as well as India, and
believed that relations were worsening in both places. But 
he also realised that any direct attempt to injure the 
landlords and protect the tenants would lead to serious 
problems for the government.
The main weakness of the British assumptions was the
belief in the intrinsic vitality of custom, and its ability
to withstand changes brought about by law and other
circumstances. The administration was bound to a policy of 
tenancy protection without having worked out the economics 
of it, &° The last Rent Act VIII of 1869, had clearly laid 
down the conditions on which the rent of occupancjy raiyats 
could be enhanced, but it did not prescribe any rule, nor 
even any principle, upon which the enhancement could be 
determined. Yet the actual settlement of rents was never
governed by objective and rational considerations. It was a 
matter of bargaining between landlord and tenant.
Thus by the time Sir Richard Temple took over the 
administration of Bengal, the agrarian tension - land 
disputes, rent questions and hostility between landlord and 
tenant— had increased. An additional disruption resulted 
from the imposition of the Road Cess Act. It was collected 
by the landlords from their tenants who were ignorant of the 
details of this law. Moreover, when instructions were given 
to the zamindars to maintain rent rolls, many landlords 
manipulated their records, enhanced the rents of the raiyats 
and consolidated the rent and other charges, before they 
came under government scrutiny. This brought about direct 
conflict with the raiyats. Here, again, there were 
shortcomings in official policy. Temple was very much 
concerned about the oppression of the raiyats of North Bihar 
and was in favour of legal support for occupancy rights, 
including protection (except for non-occupancy raiyats)
against enhancement of rent. But he believed that the 
'competitive rates of rent' which already existed should be 
the basis of the determination of the rent rates of the
occupancy raiyats.B1 His formula was that the tenant with 
occupancy right should pay 20 percent less rent than non­
occupancy raiyats. He suggested some flexibility around 
this figure, where the zamindars could claim a certain 
portion of the difference, 'subject to the length and 
character of the possession' of the occupancy r a i y a t . H e  
further envisaged a special law to assist the zamindars in 
the realisation of 'undisputed' arrears of rent: he was
convinced that 75% of the rent suits were viewed as genuine 
by the zamindars. Hence on the whole, Temple's views were 
not <xs favourable to the raiyats as to the zamindars. He
was influenced by the notion of the substantive law of the
landlord and tenant. The protection which he would offer 
the occupancy raiyats was feedom from eviction provided they 
% paid their rents, which should moreover be fair and 
equitable. He believed that the revenue officers could best 
settle land disputes, and also wanted to strengthen village 
agencies such as patwaris, and to secure the maintenance of
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a record of rights. His response to agrarian disturbances 
and rent disputes was thus to provide for the transfer of 
rent suits to the civil courts to the revenue officer's^  ^
in a new law - The Agrarian disputes Act of 1876 - which 
authorised the executive authorities to intervene in 
serious cases.
This measure was in some ways a landmarkj it kept the 
rent question and raiyati rights very much in the lime 
light. The focus of attention was also increasingly on 
Bihar. Sir Ashley Eden was more concerned with conditions 
there than with those in Bengal proper. He propounded the 
notion that Bihari peasants needed legal protection, but 
that the peasants of Bengal did not, since they were 
stronger than their counterparts. This doctrine deprived 
also from the Famine Commission of 1874 which had already 
directed attention to the miseries of the raiyats and poor 
cultivators and the arbitrary methods of the zamindars in 
Tirhut, Darbhanga and other parts of North Bihar. Similarly 
the reports of G. Geddes in 1876, on his survey of the 
condition of the peasantry in the North Bihar districts, 
established the view that famine affected Darbhanga and 
other parts, injspite of the fertile soil, because the 
peasants could not 'tide out vicissitudes by falling back on 
food reserves or on money resources' . Geddes tended, to blame 
the land tenure system which he considered left the 
peasantry in the precarious position of being scarcely able 
to subsist, neither on reserved grain, nor on borrowing.®'3 
This lack he blamed not on an absolute dearth of resources—  
help could have been available Irow rich farmers - but on the 
raiyats' lack of proprty: they had no tenant right in^real
sense of the term.
Such investigations, on top of the anxiety ■ about the 
indigo-planters' relations with raiyats, convinced the 
government that tenant rights, which they thought had once 
existed, were now being extinguished, and that therefore, 
the occupancy right needed legal reaffirmation. This view 
found its way into the Famine Commission of 1881, which 
proposed that occupancy raiyats everywhere were better fed,
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better clothed and generally in a far superior material 
condition than tenants-at-wi11. The protection of the law 
should therefore be extended to those who were losing rights 
in land. Of course, this did not include those whom the 
officials held to be originally Titm-
There can be no doubt that the government was correct, 
if not in its remedy, then in its perception that the 
raiyats of north Bihar were generally depressed. Even then 
the Darbhanga raj was under^ Court of VcCrds, between 1865 
and 1875, there were instances of illegal distraint, 
eviction and enhancement of rent; the period saw failures of 
crops, and brought enormous suffering to the people. During 
1874-5, destitute raiyats actually had to flee from the 
oppression of the raj officials; the number absconding was 
approximately 5,000 families or 20,000 people. Charles 
James O'Donnell, a Bengal civil servant, also found such 
descriptions in the Hathwa raj estates, when arbitrary 
enhancement of rent by the late Maharaja coincided with a 
time of scarcity. Again this situation continued even under 
the Court of W a r d s . I n  Champaran, too, frequent
desertions had taken place in the 1860s in the Nepali terai. 
An inquiry conducted by the Commissioner of Patna Division, 
E. W. Molony, convinced the government not only that the 
practice of levying cesses, exacting arbitrary enhanced 
rents and forcibly terminating occupancy rights was 
widespread throughout the North Bihar, but also that the 
growing pressure of population was compounding these 
problems and had caused famine among the r a i y a t s . H e  
suggested a record of rights and changes in the method of 
the collection of revenue. These ideas were not taken up at 
once, but the government was now ready to attempt an
effective reform. The Lieutenant-Governor constituted a 
Bihar Rent Committee in September 1878 with instructions to 
report on the problem and its remedy. It consisted of the 
Commissioner of Patna, the collectors of Saran, Muzaffarpur 
and Patna, two legal experts and five indigo planters. The 
Committee submited its report in March 1879. Its 
recommendations were not new, though in its extracts from 
the existing law under the Permanent Settlement, it
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redefined the situation so as to provide original legal 
rights to the tenants, rights which it proposed should be 
restored.
A Bengal Rent Bill was drafted in 1882. It took into 
account also,in regard to Bihar, the recommendations of the 
Famine Commission of 1881. Indeed, famine had been deeply 
influential on the government in its analysis of land tenure 
and rent law: it both proved and explained the poverty of
the mass of population. Naturally the Bihar Land Holders' 
Association vehemently opposed the tenancy bill, and its 
strenthening of occupancy rights, but this seemed merely to 
reinforce the diagnosis of the government of Bengal, as then 
supported by the government of India. Eden claimed that it 
was desirable above all, 'even at this late stage, to define 
and strengthen the position of the great mass of cultivators 
and giving landlords a reasonably cheap and effective 
procedure for regulating and revising rents and recovering 
their just dues! thus the reform would be in the interest of 
both the landlords and the agriculturists. St  It would not, 
he said, encroach upon the existing rights and emoluments of 
zamindar or other rent receivers, but rather was devised to 
help them in the punctual realization of their rents.
In the late nineteenth century, agrarian Bihar, 
specially the northern districts, underwent significant 
change in respect of landlord and tenant relations, 
production and distribution. The provisions of the 1885 Act 
provided occupancy rights to those who had held any plot for 
a period of twelve years. Contrary to the Act of 1859, a 
raiyat was not allowed to contract himself out of his 
rights; indeed raiyats were presumed to have occupancy 
unless proved not to. District headquarters were supposed 
to keep records of raiyats' and proprietors' interests. The 
central emphasis of the Act was on the possession of 
particular holdings and control over the production from 
them. The tenant was assumed to have the power to manage 
his agriculture, subject to the payment of a share of the 
produce as rent. Moreover, the law intervened more directly 
over rents. Zamindars could legally eject an occupancy 
raiyat for arrears of rent and sell his holding, only
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after a decree for rent in the courts. On the other hand 
there was hardly any change in the methods of enhancement of 
rent, which rested particularly on the increased value of 
produce, and was again subject to rent suits decided by the 
government. Any such enhancement was to be fixed for
fifteen years and could not exceedtio^Aand ahalf percent of
the existing rent. The Act had certain reservations about 
the free sale of raiyati holdings^ leaving it to ' local 
custom', and hence to be resolved by a raiyat's and 
zamindar's mutual agreement, or rather by the dominance of 
one over another.
The most significant contribution of the Act was in the 
survey and record of rights which in fact originated in 187S 
when a bill was introduced in the local council under Eden's 
government. The zamindars of Bengal prevailed upon the
government to provide them with enough power for the
realization of rent. Therefore, the local council's bill
tried to meet their demand, but 'the preparation of a record 
of rights was the executive principle underlying its
provisions'. However, the bill was withdrawn as the enquiry 
into the condition of the raiyats of North Bihar was in 
progress and mea^whi le^Bihar Rent Committee had also been 
constituted to submit reports on the condition of raiyats
and rent question in Bihar. In such inexpedient
circumstances, no concession could be made to the zamindars 
unless the entire rent issue had been examined. A draft of 
the bill was prepared by the Bengal Rent Law Commission in 
1882. Eventually, a new Act became law in 1885.
There appear to have emerged two contraditory issues 
regarding the rights of the zamindar on the one hand and the 
raiyat on the other, during 1878 and 1882. Zamindars wanted 
more power for the realization of rent and raiyats required 
relief from enhancements, illegal cesses and ejectment. 
Since it was necessary to take into account both the 
elements of the agrarian society, the only solution 
visualised by the government of Eden was the preparation
of record of rights. Stevenson-Moore correctly observes 
that the Bill was withdrawn, 'but it should be noticed how 
the opposite necessities of two extremes focussed their
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endeavours on a common object, viz, a record of rights'! 
Therefore, Eden's administrative zeal and far-sighted ideas in 
favour of a record of rights became a cardinal principle in the 
survey and settlement proceedings in the late nineteenth 
century under the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.
The first cadastral survey under the framework of the 
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, took place in the form of^Cadastral 
Survey in 1887 in the district of Muzaffarpur. It was a
landmark towards further measures to be adopted for survey and 
record of rights in the permanently settled areas of North 
Bihar districts.
The Bengal Adminiatrative Committee Report for 1885-86 held 
that the Tenancy Act was a compromise, and as a result, if less 
thorough and complete certainly more workable and practical
than it might have been. What this meant was that the
position of the zamindars and their followers remained little 
changed. In regard to occupancy rights, there was no parity in 
the society, even to the extent that there was in the law. A 
particular section of the society was favoured, but the actual 
cultivator was not taken into consideration. As in the case of 
tenure haldLers, defined by the size of their holdings, status 
yias given in line with a British system; generally the
categorizing was by landlord and tenetnt, rather than in terms 
of the village community of India society. But disparity was 
maintained nonetheless, and partly because the most important 
task for the law was thought to be the improvement of
agricultural production, and the maintenance of lanldlord and 
tenant relations, by means of the security offered to one 
class.
The greatest failure in the Act of 1855 was that non­
occupancy raiyats and tenants-at-wi11 were largely unprotected. 
They could be ejected by the malik with six months7 notice 
served on the expiry of the term of the lease. Their rent 
could be enhanced at any time and if they refused to pay the 
enhanced rent they could be ejected forthwith. In regard to 
tenctfits, the Act did however, help secure the larger or more 
powerful rent payers by regulating their relations with the 
land-holders. The criticial size of holding varied from area 
to area, and tenants of one area could not match the tenants of
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others. Prosperity also depended upon the value of land, and 
its productive capacity. Tenants holding land in homestead 
areas and producing variaties of crops were better placed than 
those holding land only in rice^- ^ cropped areas, although the 
rent rate was always fixed in rice. The degree of prosperity 
among raiyats of various regions depended in part upon the 
fertility o^ soil, as in^deed was the case with minute 
proprietary interests* Such factors were far more important 
than legal status in deciding prosperity. Caste was also 
crucial. Richer tenants were generaly j^oeris, Ifljrmis, or Qoala 
or of course Babhans and Rajputs. For these reasons, the 
tenancy legislation gave rise to a class of tenants nearer to 
petty proprietors in standing. Therefore, it also suppressed 
the non-occupancy raiyats and ten«(nts-at-wi 11, who were the 
real cultivators of the soil, and the agricultural or hired 
labourers who formed the bulk of the population. The Bengal 
Tenancy Act failed to protect the productive class which soon 
became 'superfluous' population. As we shall see, for some the 
only way out was migration. 6,0
In the original proposal of the Bengal Tenancy Bill 1882, 
the interest of tenants had been given priority. The Lieutenant 
Governor, as recorded in the Famine Commission's Report, 1881, 
said that the cultivators had a historical claim on the land 
they cultivated, and that they must be protected. The most 
important point kept in view was the establishment of occupancy 
tenure upon a broad and permament basis, to protect the raiyats 
against arbitrary eviction, and give them guidelines as to the 
payment of rent to be established under rules. In short it was 
proposed that no raiyat would be evicted on any ground save 
persistent failure to pay a fair and reasonable rent. Moreover, 
this right of occupancy was to be in the hands of only bonafide 
cultivators, and sub-letting by occupancy tenants was to be 
discouraged.if not altogether prevented. At this time, the main 
purpose of the government was to protect cultivators. But it 
was also to provide for a continued regulation of landlord- 
tenants relations. Rents were to be "open to author itOitiVt 
revision from time to time".ei It was thought that the rate of 
rent might vary in each district, otherwise than on the basis
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o-j- the quality of land, but the rate was to be subject to 
similar conditions in each segment of the district. On the 
one hand, working from existing rents, and subject to the 
changes in prices, the raiyats were to be ensured a margin 
of profit as well as an allowance for maintenance and the 
return of their outlay. On the other hand, an important 
issue was always the realization of arrears of rent from the 
raiyats in order to secure the landholding interest. The 
government thought it necessary to have a "modified system 
of distraint through the instrumentality of the courts" for 
the safe recovery of rent in ordinary years. This provided 
for a devolution of power to the zamindars in the filing of 
suits against tenants, subject only to prima-f acie.. proof 
that the rent demanded was the rent payable, either because 
it was the same as in previous years or, if a higher rent 
was claimed, because it had been accepted in writing by the 
tenants. Upon this basis the court would distrain the 
tenant's property against arrears of rent. The tenant would 
be given an opportunity to appeal and if this was upheld, 
the landlord could be penalised.
Despite the concern for cultivators, the government 
favoured those holding occupany rights in order to separate 
them from other people in rural society. The Lieutenant- 
Governor remarked that to hold occupancy rights was to be 
able to support one's family. They would encourage a 
situation in which "those who cannot find a living on the 
land are able to be take themselves to other employment." 
The class of cultivators with occupancy rights would 
prosper, and be saved from merging "in the crowd of rack- 
rented tenants—at—wi 11" . It was assumed that those who had 
no permanent connection with the land, also had no incentive 
to thrift or to make improvements. 62 Certainly, the 
Lieutenant Governer believed that tenants-at-wi11 should 
also be protected in their just rights, by any measure that 
may seem frwise and equitable". But above all the supremacy 
of the Jkhud—kasht raiyat was to be maintained.
Another important factor under the new law was the 
zamindars' claim to zirat on land not occupied by tenants;
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it was at the discretion of the zamindar to hold as much as 
he wished in his private possession. Khamar or Zirat was 
the waste or unclaimed land which a zamindar was permitted 
to hold and cultivate under the terms of his revenue 
contract with the government. Land settled with raiyats was 
to be declared as raiyati land. But of course much of the 
khamar or zirat land claimed by zamindars was arguably 
raiyati land. Ve shall return to this question below.
The main controversies over the Bengal Tenancy Bill 
concerned the providing of an occupancy right which was an 
improvement on Act X of 1859, the right to transfer raiyati 
land, and the laws restricting enhancement of rent. There 
was a long debate and several hundreds of reports and 
discussions over almost ten years. The Bengal Tenancy Act
of 1885 was thus to some extent an accommodation with the
determined opposition to the rights of tenants, from the 
proprietary interests, and also a few in the government. 
The Act bound tenants by law even when it provided occupancy 
rights, and the principle adopted was to maintain the
balance in the society by making the majority of the tenants 
subservient. The zamindars' enjoyment of their power was 
still assisted by the full authority of the state, even in 
regard to the enhancement of rent. The proposition of the 
state was that rent should be based neither on custom nor on 
competition but on state regulations based on the movement 
of prices in agricultural produce.63 But this was not quite 
clear to the tenants. Practically, they had to pay more 
than fifty per cent of the produce as rent including abwabs.
In effect the rent law empowered the collectors to fix 
rents in cases of dispute, after hearing both parties. The 
hope was that the local governments would thus have greater 
power to deal with the agrarian trouble which arose from 
rent disputes. Thus behind the 1885 Act there were also the 
worries about rent suits and raiyats who never came to 
terms with the zamindars. Most of the Commissioners wanted 
to give more power to collect’jrs, especially in Bengal and
parts of Bihar, in order to deal with truculent raiyats. 
Such raiyats existed only in areas where high-caste
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zamindars had minute interests, and their caste fellows held 
raiyats rights, or where proprietors held raiyati rights in 
another village. In Bihar, especially in Muzaffarpur and 
Darbhanga, such instances were found; there were also stray 
cases in Champaran. In Shahabad too,strong raiyats
sometimes created trouble over the payment of rent. In such 
circumstances, the law binding the raiyats even to hold at 
fair and equitable rents could suit the zamindars.
The main way in which the impact of the Tenancy Act 
was felt was through the organisation of work on the surveys and 
record of rights, which began in earnest in Muzaffarpur and 
Champaran after 1891. Sir A. P. Macdonnell, the officiating 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, was most closely responsible 
for introducing the survey in Bihar on the basis of E. V. 
Collins' experimental survey and record of rights begun 
earlier in the district of Muzaffarpur. The main intention, 
for MacDonnell as for Collins, was to protect the rights of 
the raiyats of Bihar. The survey operations included the 
assessment of land held under zamindars and tenants, and the 
realization of rents. They were directed at improving rural 
administration with the assistance of village officials. 
Above all though it was the status of the occupancy raiyat 
which mattered.
This was recorded broadly in two documents: the khewat
and the Khatian• The Khewat recorded the various types of 
proprietary interest in land: the khatian was the record of
all landholdings of proprietors, tenure holders, fixed rate 
raiyats, settled raiyats, occupancy raiyats, non-occupancy 
raiyats, rent-free raiyats and undei— raiyats. It also
recorded diara land and land let on thika under a tenure- 
holder. This classification was made in order to define the 
land in terms of immovable property. Undoubtedly, the 
effect, given the difference between occupancy under the new 
law and the existing structure of tenures, was to give legal 
protection to one class of the population. In actual 
practice such raiyati rights remained qualified by power and 
custom. Some raiyats gaining protection were really
proprietors or tenure holders who rented extra land. In 
law, when a tenure-holder 'merged' his raiyati and
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intermediary interests, or on expiry of athika lease, his 
holdings were declared non-occupancy. In practice the 
holding of thika leases by proprietors affected the raiyat's 
rights. So too, in theory, occupancy raiyats in indigo 
lands were not affected because they could acquire occupancy 
rights jointly being ijaradars or farmers.64 But in some 
cases the factory lands were cultivated as raiyati for seven 
years, and then taken on lease for another seven years, and 
again cultivated as rajyati: thus the twelve-year period was
never completed and the claim to occupancy right was kept in 
abeyance. By such devices the thika lease still could be 
used to deny the right of occupancy to a raiyat even if he 
had held land for twelve years. In effect such lands were 
being treated as having the character of zirat, in which the 
raiya^ts' rights were also denied quite legally.
By far the most important principles of law and equity 
however, were involved in cases where joint proprietors or 
permanent tenure holders purchased the occupany right of a 
raiyat at auction sale. The Tenancy Act provided that if an 
occupancy right was transferred to a person jointly 
interested in land as proprietor, the occupancy right would 
lapse but the holding would not. The Tenancy Act hardly 
gave any protection to raiyats in such cases. Instances 
occurred in Gaya where actual cultivators of the soil were 
declared under-tenants, and raiyati rights were transferred 
to joint proprietors. The rent was increased at the
pleasure of proprietors, and lands taken away from the
raiyats.6B Examples of such cases were found in areas where 
landlords were powerful, and survey operations were not
done thoroughly. There had been a tendency among the
landlords and proprietors to deny occupany rights to the
tenants and to end their superior status on the land. The 
record of rights was a device of the government to curtail 
this power of zamindars, and to establish clearly the size 
of holdings occupied by zamindars, raiyats and rent free 
holders and of uncultivated land.
For the raiyats the main problem started with rent free 
lands and 'zirat land' (Zamindars# private land) in
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ascertaining the real nature of the right of occupancy in 
the former case, and of the proprietary right in the latter. 
The right to hold zirat land (in whatever form) was most
important for the zamindar in order to extend the areas under
direct cultivation as well as to assure a good quantity of 
fertile land. The entry of zirat land in the khasra was 
called bakasht malik. Such land was also held by cultivators, 
though it was never recorded in the raiyat's kha^Jzian. The 
extension of zirat claimed by zamindars was a direct 
encroachment on the rights of cultivators. Such lands were 
also graded as waste land and grazing land, when mostly they 
were fertile lands held by zamindars. The zirat land was sublet 
to the cultivators and more rent was extracted from them.
The zirat claim was pressed much more in the Ha^hwa Raj 
area in Saran than in other parts of North Bihar, but the 
largest area covered was in Darbhanga. The area of zirat in 
Champaran and Muzaffarpur was smaller, and held in smaller
holdings; undoubtedly, the increase in the sub-division of
proprietary rights in the North Bihar districts tended to lead 
to direct cultivation of land by zamindars over extensive 
areas. Dn the other hand, the areas under the direct
occupation of landlords had increased by 180 per cent during 
the last sixty years of the 19th century, according to the 
Settlement Officer of Darbhanga, whereas the areas under 
occupancy raiyats increased by only 24 p e r c e n t . T h i s  
discrepancy is somewhat obscured by the great difficulty in 
ascertaining the actual size of the holdings of each class of 
proprietors especially petty proprietors and rich farmers when 
preparing the record of rights* The sharp tendency among 
zamindars for sub-division of estates^ and caste influence^ were 
always the twin props of the society, both destructive of the 
interests of raiyats6-^  In the district of Muzaffarpur, the 
cultivated area held by proprietors under direct cultivation 
or bakasht malik was 4,8 percent of the whole. This was not 
the same extent as zirat. The zamindars monopolised a further 
11.5 per cent of the settled agricultural area, their average 
holding being 4.34 acres. Thus in total 15.5 percent of the 
occupied area was under the direct cultivation of proprietors; 
the average size of their holding was 3.04 acres. 66 This
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shows the minute extent of the proprietors' interests, and the 
dominant castes tendency to become zamindars in their own
area, thus suppressing the rights of the tenants. In addition 
to these small proprietors, tenure holders and rent free
farmers formed a rent receiving class: the average percentage
of the cultivated area in their direct possession could be 
estimated altogether at around 25 percent.
The increase of the area under the occupation of the
landed class was also due to the fact that most of the waste
land and grazing fields were claimed by powerful proprietors;
they never allowed raiyats to cultivate such land unless on 
batai or lease. More important were the land disputes between 
raiyats and proprietors. In the late nineteenth century, they 
were often witnessed over the change from produce rents
(bhaoli) to money rents. There were also arguments when zirat 
was claimed on land which raiyats held under bhaoli rent, and 
when the zamindar was trying to extract more rent in cash on 
these occasions. It was ideal for the high caste proprietors 
arbitrarily impose more rent and cesses on zirat land. The 
record of right was the only means of checking this
malpractice, but under it there was hardly any control on the
high«» handedness of the zamindars, in their own holdings. It 
could not be denied that zirat land was given to a raiyat by 
his malik at his discretion. Moreover most often when two 
parties disputed the claim that the land was zirat, a third 
raiyat or a rival group would join hands with the malik
against his fellow in order to gain the land at a slightly
bi'^We.r' rent. In the areas of Muzaffarpur where tenants and 
proprietors of same caste generally fought, opportunist 
tenants took advantage to obtain zirat land for cultivation.
In this context the important questions with regard to 
the Bengal Terv^Tic^ Act of 1885 are: which class of raiyats was
intended to be favoured, and what was their status in reality. 
Obviously, the short answer to the first question is the 
occupancy raiyats. In the ten to fifteen years after the
Tenancy Act was passed, various methods were adopted to give 
them relief. However, a stronger position for any raiyats as 
defined in law was objectionable in the eyes of the zamindar. 
The fate of occupancy raiyat and fixed-rate raiyats slightly
112
differed as far as the nature of their tenure was
concerned. The reason was that the rent question was
continually under official consideration. The Tenancy Act in 
1898 which dealt with the remodelling of Chapter X, basically 
provided a more summary procedure for settling rents in cases 
where a settlement of land revenue was being made. The survey 
and settlement operations brought various new lapses to light. 
The amendment Act of 1907 therefore attempted to make the 
record more effective before the courts. Subject to these 
changes, the period between 1885 and 1907 was devoted to
guaranteeing the right of occupancy to tenants by means of the 
record of rights.
However, the reality was quite different. The settlement 
operations found that in the villages the abuse of power by 
the landlords had immensely increased despite the apparent
encroachment upon their power in the Tenancy Act. The legal 
provisions were generally circumvented by the landlords, and 
the benefits of the legislation to the tenants were marginal. 
The absence of fixed rents and definite tenant rights in 
practice provided the landlords with the opportunity to enhance 
rents and force the eviction of tenants from the lands 
occupied by them for generations.
It cannot be denied that there existed some superior 
tenants whom the law could assist. Often they were the
tenants called raiyats at fixed rates whose number varied from 
district to district, but who in any case did not hold more 
than 2.2 per cent of the total occupied area. The average 
size of their holding was 2.5 acres, or in Saran 3.4 acres, 
more than double the average size of other raiyati holdings.*-'3
They were numerousv_______ _ %.  in Muzaffarpur, and also held
mukarrari leases in Darbhanga. They were superior in status 
to the general raiyats. Therefore, in some respects fixed-rate 
raiyats were the match for the petty proprietors (whose 
private holdings were on average much smaller). Rent free 
holders and birtdars, barahils and goraits were quite near to 
fixed rate raiyats in status. These included Brahmins and 
other high-caste officials, as well as relatives of the 
zamindar. They were more important in Darbhanga than in any
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other district in North Bihar, occupying one-tenth of the 
cultivated area. But even in Muzaffarpur, Champaran and Saran 
they occupied more than 4 peijbnt of the total area. The most 
numerous rent-free tenures were those granted for religious 
purposes, which amounted to more than three quarters of the 
whole. Generally they were associated with the estates of the 
great rajas. Their status as rich ten«*nts, though in large 
part due to their occupancy tenure, really derived from the 
protection of the zamindar. Thus they enjoyed the best
possible raiyati right: they did not pay rent, but let out
their lands to small cultivators as batai or on lease.70 The 
average size of the holdings of such raiyats was tiny, only 
0.80 percent of an acre. This may be accounted for by the fact 
that most of the rent-free grants had been divided into nearly 
as many proprietors as the original grantee had descendants. 
The Settlement Officer of the North Bihar districts did not 
deny their raiyati rights. Rather they were categorised as 
tenure-holders when they did not cultivate their land, as 
happened in most of the cases in Darbhanga. Smaller holders of 
such rights were recognised as rent-free raiyats. Thus, after 
the record of rights, this class of raiyats was as dominant as 
ever in the guise of small propri tors and fixed-rate raiyats.
The position of the fixed-rate raiyats depended largely 
on their security of tenure and the fact that they paid rent 
at rates than any other class of raiyats. British laws
merely reinforced their advantages. The land-revenue tenure 
structure since the time of the Permanent Settlement had 
become so complicated that even the later Tenancy Acts could 
not remove all the anomalies of agrarian problems. The
revenue officers, when including rent free land in the record 
of right, and in other cases to fix rents according to the 
prevalent rate, usually failed to overturn the dominance of 
the zamindars. It was thus that rent-free holders were
declared tenure holders.71 It can be argued that the policy 
was intended to increase the number of more prosperous rent 
receivers, rather than provide an equal opportunity, under the 
occupancy right, to tenants in general.
The figures drawn by the Settlement reports show very 
high numbers of occupancy raiyats in North Bihar. It is
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necessary, however, to distinguish within this large category 
of superior raiyats. In addition to those already discussed, 
there were, for example, jeth raiyats regarded in the eyes of 
the law and who were in practice debased proprietors. Such 
elite groups, rather than being true raiyats, formed a 
different category of proprietors, often equal to those small 
zamindars and proprietors who were rent recivers and revenue 
payers to the government. In this way, tenure holders of 
various kinds also held the raiyati rights and were said to be 
raiyats. So too were debased proprietors both in the indigo 
areas and elsewhere. Many such peasant proprietors sprang up 
as a result of the batwara system: very numerous petty estates
had come into being by the 1880s. Such raiyats were quite 
rich in resources and superior in caste rank, absorbed the 
holdings of low caste raiyats and expanded their own. They
also expanded from single family groups into various branches 
and thus maintained a superiority over raiyats holding lesser 
areas of land. Practically, they oppressed their fellow 
raiyats who were inferior in caste and economic status: most
of these people were Rajput or Babhan or in stray cases Kurmi
and Goala\ there were also rich Muslim Jeth raiyats.
They were not, however, unified amongst themselves. They 
showed jealousy and interest in litigation, mostly over 
boundary disputes and the transfer of tenants - they all 
preferred weaker raiyats. In the late nineteenth century, 
during the time of survey operations, such disputes were found 
on a large scale in the North Bihar districts. They were not 
between rival peasant proprieors, but rather between peasant 
proprietors and raiyats, over such issues as non-payment of
rent. There was litigation resulting from blood-shed, and 
false witnesses in district courts. Indeed the level of civil 
and criminal proceedings at the instigation of big proprietors 
and share-holders puzzled the judges and collectors. One 
reason for their frequency was that they involved the prestige 
of particular castes and rich peasant proprietors. In such 
circumstances it was particularly unlikely that the Tenancy 
Law would guarantee that helpless and lowly raiyats would get
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justice in court. Verdicts were usually in favour of the 
proprietors or the rich, the village mahajans and thikadars.
Moreover, rich peasants were able to absorb the holdings 
of occupancy raiyats, and then let the land in such a way as 
to disallow the tenants any claim to it; they also frequently 
changed the tenants. Thus those peasants such as jeth raiyats 
or village mahajans and maliks were opposed to the real 
landlords. Nonetheless the immediate effect of their rise was 
on other raiyats and not on zamindars. In practice, they 
turned some of the occupancy raiyats into tenants-at-wi11.
Stevenson Moore, the Settlement Officer of North Bihar, 
said that in addition to areas in North Bihar held entirely by 
mahajans and big zamindars, there were larger areas held by 
tenants. They covered upto 90 percent of the area in
Muzaffarpur,72 and 79 percent and 85 perent in Saran and
Darbhanga respectively. These figures include fixed rate 
raiyats whose number was hardly 5 percent all over the
districts. On the other hand, Allen, the sub-Divisional 
officer of Hajipur in his Administrative Report for the year 
1881-82, said that petty maliks suppressed the raiyats; and 
that comparatively, such suppression was less severe where 
larger proprietors' interests were dominant - even compared 
with Darbhanga, where suppresion of tenants was extreme. Such 
arguments raise the suspicion that in reality the quasi 
proprietary interest of an occupancy raiyat in the hands of 
rich peasants, would result in a reduction of the number of 
raiyats holding occupancy right, while the number of non 
occupancy raiyats would increase. The Assistant Settlement 
officer, Babu Bhu^f>endra Nath Gupta, claimed that most of the 
villages were held by Khurdia maliks (in effect peasant 
proprietors) who were better off than ordinary raiyats. They 
held the major portion of the village in physical possession,
and paid rent to their co-sharers for any land held in excess
of their legal interest. Although they were notorious in the 
treatment of their raiyats, they were most industrious people 
who would not be bettered in their social status and economic 
power.
While analysing the nature of occupancy raiyats, maliks 
and jeth raiyats one can find differences not only in the size
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of their holdings but also in the justification of their claim 
to areas of cultivated land and rental income from their 
raiyats. The status of a rich peasant, though not that of the 
landlords, was practically equal to theirs. Whether they paid 
revenue to the State or not, or even if they paid for a certain 
area in certain village, they were not debarred from holding 
the effective status of a landlord, though in fact, they held 
occupancy rights on large holdings. They were num^tous nDt only 
in the one district where they were obvious from the revenue 
record, but in the whole of North Bihar, and in the districts 
of Shahabad, Patna, Bhagalphur, even in the zamindari areas of 
Darbhanga Raj to Purnea and Sahjrsa.
These rich peasants did not have any absolute power, but 
they were a kind of intermediary, who came into being due to 
social and economic changes. The Tenancy Law ignored this 
differentiation which was due to the increase of the market 
economy, commercial crops and the penetration of European 
planters in the North Bihar districts. The particular status of 
peasant proprietors grew up within the zamindari right at the 
expense of the ac^tual cultivators of the soil. In the late 
nineteenth century, the oppression of such raiyats increased, 
through high rents, cesses and subjection to court cases. Only 
the influential raiyats escaped those maliks and peasant 
proprietors who had the support of zamindars and big 
proprietors, and who belonged to high castes. Zamindars
preferred this class of peasants to cutivate ghair mazarua 
zamin and to occupy grazing and waste land with the assistance 
of agricultural labourers. Therefore the majority of the rich 
peasants farmed a basic unit of the zamindari system, based as 
it was on the principle of private property, and class 
differences in the form of caste.
Arguments have been advanced suggesting a disintegration73 
of the proprietary interests of rich peasants in the late 
-nineteenth century due to the mismanagement of estates, family 
disputes and non-payment of rents and revenue to co-share^ and 
government. Such instances were found in stray cases and were 
detected by the Settlement Officers in the district of 
Muzaffarpur, Saran and Darbhanga, especially in those areas
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where the holdings of such peasant-proprietors were no larger 
than those belonging to proprietors who were given proprietory 
rights at the time of the Permanent Settlement or who were 
hereditary zamindars. But the main concern was rather with the 
absorption of the right of occupancy of the raiyats in the 
quasi-proprietary holdings of the rich peasants; this 
paralleled the accumulation and expansion of the holdings in so 
called estates that had occurred since the Permanent 
Settlement. Practically, these rich raiyats were responsible 
for a further shrinking of the size of the holdings of the 
remainder of the raiyats, who were being squeezed out.
There developed a struggle and competition in society to 
maintain the stronghold of zamindari right on the one hand, and 
to protect the interest of the rich raiyats according to law on 
the other hand. The question arises, who was best able to 
protect his interest in society in relation to the law. The 
answer is the stable class of cultivators, strong in caste, 
size of holdings, security of tenure and freedom from debt; 
they formed a particular class of the peasantry, who can not be 
categorised merely as occupancy raiyats. They were above the 
rank of occupancy raiyats in general. Others were those who 
depended on their malik, paid rents regularly, held not more 
than three or four bighas to 3 acres of land, (it differed from 
district to district) and were ejected from their right for 
non-payment of rent, and above all, paid various kinds of 
cesses.
Of course a category of occupancy raiyat, in that sense, 
did exist - above tenants-at-wi11 and the non-occupancy raiyats 
who had no rights in land; it is possible to describe it in 
terms of averages which differed from district to district and 
area to area, depending upon local control, the fertility of 
the soil and the dominance of particular castes. In multi­
caste villages such occupancy raiyats depending on the size of 
their holdings and their status in regard to cultivating land, 
were very dependent upon the proprietors. Between each caste 
group, anxious to occupy more land, there was always 
competition. Each would vie to maximise production for the 
proprietor and thus become involved in petty politics. The 
tendency, with such competition, was generally for the raiyat
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to loose his rights and become a share-cropper or a lease 
holder on the zamindari land. There was always the prospect of 
having to pay more rent every year, not just by virtue of 
increasing agricru1tural prices, but through the dishonesty of 
patwaris and their manipulation of the rent rolls. The general 
sum of such raiyats had little or no legal protection. The 
Survey and Settlement operations found innumerable cases of 
failure to issue rent receipts. They revealed that the
amalgamation of holdings, and the removal of them from one 
raiyat to another were also quite common.
The weakness of the average raiyat was not simply in the 
average size of his holding, which was around 1.6 acres. After 
all, even the lowest raiyat could also hold land on batai, or 
from other estates. A more important point with regard to the 
size of holding is that even the smallest was often fragmented. 
There would be one fraction in one village, one far from the 
homestead land, one in chaur or a diara area. This diversity 
and fragmentation of land affected production as well as the
protection of the occupancy rights. In Saran, where the
proprietary interest was very minute and land was costlier and 
more valuable than in other parts of Bihar, a single raiyat 
would be under the control of three or four proprietors to whom 
he owed rent, paid cesses and so-on. Such a raiyat had in
effect to fufil the demands of the upper strata of society; his
occupancy right depended on it.
With regard to the size of holdings, one must distinguish 
between caste influence and geographical or demographic
factors. In the 1870s Hunter found that the size of
cultivating holdings in Tirhut varied from north to south. The 
southern parts were more fertile than the rice tracts of the
north, hence raiyatsf holdings were larger in northern parts. 
This did not in itself alter the differentiation between 
raiyats, but it certainly made for greater pressures in the
south. These holdings were supposed to range from four to 
thirty acres76 but in districts such as Saran some of the
holdings were much smaller, at least in the late nineteenth 
century. The movement of population was generally towards most 
fertile tracts, i.e. southern parts, and taking into account 
this pressure, the size of many holdings was certainly smal lertVifitvi
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the average estimated either by Hunter or by the settlement 
officers. The evidence of measures taken by the government in1W 
1880s and 1890s encouraged the migration of population from 
densely populated areas7,6 Finucane stressed the need for 
migration due to growing paucity of land'7'7 and this reinforced 
the impression of a scarcity of land for the raiyats. The 
fertile land was in the control of zamindars and rich 
peasants.
On the basis of Census Reports and figures, the 
settlement officer of Darbhanga, determined the average area 
in the cultivating possession of an ordinary agricultural 
family, as 3.62 acres. This estimate overlooked the
differences between the majority of population living on 
subsistence holdings. Moreover, there was hardly an occupancy 
raiyat in the southern part of north Bihar who held 3.62 acres 
in one single location. According to the Dufferin Report, the 
collector of Darbhanga said that in the villages examined by 
him, 60 percent of the raiyats held less than 4 Bihar bighas 
of land; he added that there was no doubt that more 
cultivators occupied 2 bighas or less than 2 to 4 bighas. 
Such small holdings (he believed) were sufficient for the 
support of a tenant's family if they were fertile.-77 In the 
southern parts, most of the land produced double crops due to 
the high fertility of the soil, but the value of land was also 
higher. In Saran, the rent rate was higher than in any other 
part of Bihar except Patna.
The Subsistence holdings can hardly be evaluated on the 
basis of area alone. The Dufferin Reports estimate that a 
cultivator family of five (two adults and three children) 
required 4 acres for a comfortable living, was also too vague. 
Above all, the question was not one of the man to land ratio; 
rather the question was in what proportion zamindars, 
proprietors and tenure holders, <m, indigo planters and the 
government^ held the cultivated part of their land in direct 
possession. The inequalities are clear in the caste wise 
distribution of land. Typical figures were provided by the
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Settlement OfficeT'of Saran district. On the basis of a survey 
of 100 typical villages selected all over the Saran district, 
the caste wise distribution of land has been dealt with in the 
following table. It shows which caste held land
exceeding an average of 2 acres. It also shows the number of 
cultivators and landless labourers as a percentage of the 
district population as given in the 1891 census. The
following table shows the caste-wise distribution of {and 
holding, the size of the average holding, and the percentage 
of the caste popultion holding more than 2 acres. The sample 
is selected from 100 village.
Table-4
Caste Size of average holding Percentage of the Castes Percentage of total 
acre Population holding more cultivated area
(under one landlord) than 2 acres
1 Brahmin 2 7 11.
2 Bhumihar 2 5 3
3 Rajput 3 11 24.
4 Kayastha 3 2 4.
5 Sayed 1 0.
6 Sheikh 2 3 4,
7 6oala 2 12 10.
8 Koeri 2 7 9,
9 Kurmi s
10 Bind 1 3,
11 Chamar 1 2.
12 Dhanuk 2 1 1,
13 Dusadh 1 2,
14 Ganedi 0 0
15 Kahar 1 0
16 Khatik 1 0
17 hushahar 1 0
18 Nunia 1 2
19 Tatwa 1 0
20 Turha 1 0
21 Atith 2 3
22 Mallah 0 0
23 Paithan 2 1
24 Jolaha 1 1
25 Kunjra 1 0
26 Others 1 17
Sources: Saran Settlement Reports, Paras 46, and 47
The following table shows the figures for the whole 
district of Saran extrapolated from the findings in the 100 
villages above. It gives the percentage of pure cultivating
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castes and of the cultivating^^_____________and landless castes
of the district's population.
Table-5
Cast®- Percentage of pure Percentage of cultivating Percentage of district 
cultivators and landless labourers population
1 6oala 15 15 12
2 Rajput 14 0 11
3 Brahmin 9 0 7
4 KoerT 6 13 7
5 Bhwnihar 7 0 5
6 Kayastha 2 0 2
7 Kurmi 6 7 5
8 Sheikh 3 4 3
9 JqIoIo. 3 9
10 Mallah 1 2
11 Dusadh 3 7
12 Chamftr 4 11
13 Turha 0 1
14 Bind 1 1
15 Ohanukh 0 1
16 Tatwa 0 0 1
\y\ Q-d-d' t tlo'Ti , Jdr jf'oru-'ncL^ _______that 56 percent of the total
population were pure cultivators and 27 percent labourers 
engaged in cultivation who had no land. Therefore, 83 percent 
of the total population of the district of Saran was engaged 
in or depended on agriculture. Of the other 17 percent, 9
percent was engaged in government jobs, the district 
administration and others were European indigo planters.The 
rest of the people were beggetrs, invalids and those who were 
not regarded as a productive force in the society.
If an analysis of this table is made on the pattern of 
the above survey the following conclusion can be drawn.
The following table shows the percentage of pure 
cultivators, cultivating and landless labourers and other 
callings in the 100 villages of the Saran district:
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Table-6
Castes Pure cultivators Percentage of
Peijientage cultivating and landless 
labourers
callings
1 Raj put 72 - 28
2 Brahmin 78 - 22
3 Bhumihar 75 - 25
4 Kayastha 67 - 32
5 Goala 68 32 28
6 Kurmi 64 36 22
7 Koeri 49 51 25
8 Sheikh 63 37 32
Source: S. R. Saran Paras 46-49 
It would seem that the upper castes^ Rajputs, Brahmins,
BhuYnihars and Kayasthds shared major portions of the
cultivators and others also matched comparatively as pure
cultivators. While, lower castes were both pure cultivators
as well as landless and engaged in agriculture for their
livelihood, upper castes were in village and district
administjat ion; and were engaged as revenue officials,
constables and armymen, as well as working in zamindari and
proprietary estates. Mostly people of other callings were
employed and earned good income. Those who held tenures and
thika leases also fell in this category. On the whole, the
Settlement officer's observation is quite clear that 64
percent of the pure cultivators, 20 percent of the landless
labourers and 16 percent of the population falling in other
callings and miscellaneous needed no further demonstration.
Therefore, 84 percent of the population depended on
agriculture in Saran. This model could be applied in the
whole of the North districts and an idea can be formulated
about the raiyats' fate in the agrarian society of North
Bi bar.
Throughout the North Bihar districts, the upper castes, 
especially Rajputs and Bhumihars, had the largest holdings. 
Then followed the important cultivating castes; kurmis, 
Qoalas, Koeris, and Muslim £heikhs who held individual 
holdings of an average of 2 acres. The major 11 castes whose 
size of holding was an average of 2 acres formed 55 percent of 
the population. Though these castes accounted for 55 percent 
of the total population, they occupied 74 percent of the 
district area. In Saran, according to the estimate of the 
Settlement Officer on the basis of the above Statement
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compiled from the Census Reports 1891, the pure cultivators 
formed 64 percent of the population <they comprised of 
occupancy and non-occupancy raiyats), cultivating and landless 
labourers depending on agriculture formed 20 percent and 
others 16 percent.79 Certainly occupancy raiyats primarily 
came from the 11 castes forming 55 percent of the district 
population but the exact percent of proprietors and village 
mahajans cannot be worked out unless size of holdings of each 
caste is minutely examined. The four major castes of Saran 
held 41% of the cultivated areas. This is a clear indication 
of the number of occupancy raiyats and village maliks holding 
proprietary right in a disproportionate manner. Moreover, 
such statistics underestimated the predominance of the rich 
peasants and proprietors.
The 'village notes' and Jamabandi' papers were hardly 
correct, based as they were on the information supplied by 
proprietors, and their servants, patwaris and qanungo^js. And 
even if they were genuine, they did not reveal individual 
holdings: the proprietary interest was so minutely divided
that even a raiyat holding two or three acres of land in one 
village could act as the proprietor or malik in another. The 
same situation applied both in the big zamindari estates and 
in small proprietary areas. The status of the lower castes 
was, on the whole, depressed as far as their tenure was 
concerned as it was in other respects. If they held a legal 
occupancy, it was not one which could be measured in practice 
on the same scale as that of the upper castes. There are 
various instances of enhancement of rent, evictions and 
transfer of landholdings of lower caste raiyats not only in 
one district, but in the whole of Bihar. For example, when 
the survey and 5ettlement operations in Shahabad in the 
Dumraon villages of Hathwa raj were made in 1901-3, it was 
discovered that no raiyat was recorded in the jamabandi 
holding at a fixed rate or having occupancy rights. All of 
them were called upon to prove their claim to status by 
producing receipts and showing uniform payment of rent for 
twenty years. Since the raiyats were not provided with 
receipts, this was impossible, some of
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them did not even attend the settlement camps as they were 
afraid of their proprietors. The report further revealed that 
rent had not been changed for twenty years in the Hathw^raj 
villages in Dumraon and Dumraon areas by the proprietors for 
40 years. But the proprietors put forward their claims that 
receipts were issued to the raiyats during the last twenty 
years and they got the rents fixed according to prevailing 
rates .eo
Another important issue affecting the position of raiyats 
was the transferability of holdings. In September 1894, the 
Director of Land Records and Agriculture issued an order for 
the compilation of statistics regarding the transfer of 
occupancy rights. The record was not to be limited, like 
those in regard to proprietary rights, to transactions which 
had already taken place in the 1880s; all the transactions 
which came up during the attestation period of the Survey and 
Settlement operations were to be registered. On the basis of 
village notes, it appeared that in 83 percent of the villages, 
there were cases in which tenants rights were transferred 
through mortgages or sale. Generally, the nature and extent 
of the transfers varied according to the strength of the 
zamindar and the economic condition of the raiyats. In
Muzaffarpur only 52% of the occupancy holdings were affected, 
though they covered all the thanas. But in this district, as 
also in Darbhanga, wherever zamindari dominance was greatest, 
the enforced selling or transferring of raiyati holdings was 
very prevalent. Population density was another factor. The 
average area affected by sale in Saran was less than an acre, 
but in Champaran it was 2V6 acres. On the other hand the area 
transferred by mortgage in Saran was more than double that in 
Champaran, and five times that in Muzaffarpur, Stevenson- 
Moore has shown throughout his final report on Champaran, that 
waste land was abundant there, that rent rates were low, 
holdings larger, and cultivators careless and improvident.
Qecause of the peculiar local circumstances, land sold outright 
in Champaran at a lower rate than it would fetch under a 
mortgage. In Saran the position was quite different. The 
competition for land was keen and holdings were smaller. A 
raiyat who needed money dared not sell his holding; he
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preferred to mortgage it« In such areas, fractions of
holdings were taken away by zamindars or rich peasants and the 
loss was greatly felt by poor raiyats. The average area 
affected by transfer of raiyati right was over half an acre in 
Saran, as against one acre in Muzaffarpur and more than two 
acres in Champaran. The average money secured by each
transfer was Rupees 53 in Saran, Rs. 60 in Muzaffrpur and Rs. 
75 in Champaran. ©2 It increased to Rs. 100 later.
But the most remarkable aspect of the transfer of raiyati 
rights was the extent of the raiyat's credit which enabled him 
to borrow without giving up physical possession of his holding 
or even of some part of it. One reason was the attitude of 
the zamindar. Thus, by contrast, in the Darbhanga Raj area, 
sales were more numerous and affected a larger area than 
mortgages. The reason was that in this estate, purchasers 
were given unrestricted recognition subject so the payment of 
a nominal salami or registration fee. Moreover, it was not 
difficult for a purchaser to ascertain the arrears of rent due 
from the holding of an occupancy raiyat from the Raj rent 
rolls which were quite systematically maintained. It is clear 
too that Darbhanga Raj used transfers for its own advantage. 
The greatest evidence of transfer was found in its area, 
especially in Madhubani sub-division, and in Alapur. When 
Finucane made his survey, he found that Phulpara thana was 
grieviously affected by the transfer of raiyati rights by the
proprietors of Darbhanga Raj . Nothing______ done by the
government, not even the settlement operations^ restricted 
this,S3
Who were involved in such transactions? In the districts 
of north Bihar, moneylenders grew up among the rich peasants 
and took advantage of the impoverishment of the cultivators to 
deprive them of their occupancy rights. The basis of this 
more active role of raiyati money-lenders as well as 
professional mahajans was the higher rate of rent being 
imposed and realized from the raiyats. Rents varied from Rs. 
4/5 in Saran to Rs. 7/8 in Patna - but were generally high in 
comparison with the raiyats' resources. &a . The money-lenders 
mostly provided mortgaging under the zerpesgi or usufractury 
system, whereby repayments were deducted from the produce of
126
the holding often at a rate of more than 50 percent, This was 
quite apart from any additional abwabs which could be 
extracted.
In most cases, the money obtained as a result of a sale 
was adjusted against rent arrears. The raiyat did not
benefit. In the case of mortgages much depended on the actual 
size of the holdings of a raiyat. For those with little
credit, the loan was a compulsion, arising from debts incurred 
fcT social and family obligations, or the payment of arrears of 
rent. These were also the important reasons behind a raiyat's 
loss of his holdings. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, in
which the transfer of occupancy right was allowed by custom, 
was not an effective way of dealing with the arbitrary
transfer of the holdings of raiyats. The officials pasted in 
sub-divisions during settlement operations observed that big 
maliks usually looked with jealous eyes on the exercise of the 
right to transfer and they tried to repress the custom; they 
profitted from the threat or reality of transfer under their 
own control, to fix enhanced rates of rent. In jfattidari 
villages, the propreitors were themselves purchasers of the 
occupancy rights of raiyats, and in most places, joint- 
proprietors purchased them too. Benami transactions were a 
common phenomenon, and maliks used to sell lands, before the 
Settlement operations, to rival raiyats, making use of their 
local influence.
The sale and mortgaging of land increased enormously by 
173 and 297 percent respectively over the late nineteenth 
century. These figures show the growing value of land. The 
registration procedure gave much incentive to the landlords 
and other purchasers in terms of security of title; but to 
small raiyats it gave hardly any benefit. Enhanced credit in 
rural market and the increasing value of the occupancy 
holding, merely assisted, in most cases, the concentration of 
land in the hands of proprietors and rich peasants. By sale 
or mortgages, the poor raiyat was often ruined and became a 
landless labourer. Money lending brought profits to a
particular class of the village population, and their direct 
or indirect holdings of land grew accordingly. The average
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size of occupancy holdings shrank, and the number of non­
occupancy raiyats and tenants-at-wi11 grew.
In the long history of raiyats, the man to land ratio
e-
injvitably influenced the occupancy right in land. But in the 
British period various debates proposed state intervention to 
regulate landlord-tenant relations and provide rights to 
tenants; they culminated in the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. 
Henceforth, a raiyat who had cultivated land for twelve years 
was entitled to an occupancy right to an equitable rent. In 
practice, however, legislation and even the cadastral surveys, 
could not alter the impact of social, demographic and economic 
conditions. In the late nineteenth cedntury, there was an 
unanswered demand for the relief of the population from the 
oppression of landlords, from illegal rents and arbitrary 
ejection. It is true that the record of rights claimed that 
80 to 90 percent of the raiyats held occupancy rights in the 
North Bihar districts. But^DufferimReport also suggested that 
40 percent of the population was landless.es The supposed 
preponderance of occupancy status is very puzzling in 
comparison with the known poverty of the area. Clearly the 
survey and settlement proceedings did not give a true picture 
of the agrarian society and the condition of the masses. One 
is led to believe that 15 to 20 percent of the population 
formed a class of landlords and rich intermediaries including 
tenure-holders. Evidently, the Settlement operations
overestimated the number of occupancy raiyats, in so far as
their actual rights in land ware concerned • The Collector of
Darbhanga reported in 1887 that raiyats in Bihar held less 
than 4 bighas on average, and that the majority of the 
population held small holdings which were insufficien^to 
support their family.ee The causes were said to be low wages 
and the social dominance of the upper classes. What is more, 
British records suggest that this situation was worsening, as 
raiyati holdings were wholly or partially transferred to rich 
peasants. The size of the holdings was decreasing through 
such transfers and because of population pressure. But, as 
the condition of the majority deteriorated, the rich peasants 
and zamindars, the jnahaJ ans and money-lenders, the village
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officials, pat^war is, and gomashtas, all made their
fortunes.ee
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CHAPTER IV 
LAND RENT
The agrarian society of Bihar was formed from the 
combination of the various types of land tenure ever since the 
Permanent Settlement. The rights of tenants and the terms and 
conditions of their claims as occupancy raiyats, non-occupancy 
raiyats as well as tenure holders, changed at various stages 
in the nineteenth century. But the land rent was determined 
in principle on the basis of the produce of land; though the 
method of determination varied from time to time. The
extraction of agricultural income by the landlord and the 
overall control of the state had been in vogue ever since 
ancient times, and the burden of taxation had always been on 
the peasantry.
'Manusmriti' says that one sixth of the gross produce of land 
has to be taxed and in emergency, such as war, the King has 
the discretion to raise the tax even upto one-fourth of the 
gross produce. Thus the village community was bound to pay 
the state. People had developed a concept of income, but 
agriculture was virtually the only source of wealth. Indeed 
the religious texts provided only for cesses on agriculture 
and agriculturists. Hence the royal share was accounted for 
mainly in a large number of customary taxes which could be 
derived from the land. Increases could only be achieved by 
new taxes on agriculture. Besides the regular bhaga (share; 
of one sixth of the produce, the royal income was derived from 
groups of villages in the form of a lump assessment known as 
pindakara which the village community paid. The peasants also 
paid irrigation tax (hiranya), royal army tax (senabhakta) , 
garden produce'fy(<^ a r a ) * and a religious tax known as ball. 
Apart from these customary cesses, the peasants were bound to 
raise second crops in order to supplement the income of the 
State. The nature of production on a pheasant's plot was 
determined as much by the needs of his own subsistence as by 
rent demands; and the major portion of the land was in the 
possession of the f ree-peasants who paid revenue to the state 
directly. But because they were subject to the imposition of
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taxes, besides having paid the fixed portion of their produce 
as regular revenue, their position as free peasants naturally 
depreciated. The economic power of the local officers and 
controllers gradually increased, more so when 'autonomous' 
corporate activities accelerated in business, and trade 
guilds, and through joint contracts, money deposits and 
various other revenue, judicial and executive functions • in
relation to the State's central administration also grew. All 
this was an indication of the growth of local control and the 
feudalisation of landed property, the growth of the power of 
landlords and of their monopoly in the village economy. Their 
privileges were enjoyed by means of landjgrants to the upper 
'varnas' of the society which the king or sovereign of the 
state offered to the stronger groups. Therefore, we notice 
the emergence a class with feudal property and with 
seigneurial rights.1
The above system remained operative so far as the 
customary practice of the society was concerned, but the 
growth of population, extension of cultivation and above all, 
political changes resulted in the assessment of land tax in a 
more scientific manner and in monetary terms. Before the 
Mughals, the King's share had not the characteristics of rent, 
if modern notions are to be taken into consideration. This 
was, firstly, because in the King's share, there was no
contract. The cultivator in the Indian context delivered the 
proportion of produce arbitrarily determined by the sovereign, 
and he did not lay claim to property in the land. The grain 
payments answered to the description of a tax, rather than to 
that of rent. However, the land tax was a land rent under the
Hindu rulers. The cultivators had to pay, over and above the
King's share, an additional share to the proprietary body.
There was no competition for the land and many culturabie 
lands were waste. There was no incentive to bring waste lands 
under improved agricultural production unless the peasants 
themselves took the initiative. The intermediate interest of 
the feudal landlords became very active due to the growth of 
the economy, but rack-renting was not as prevalent as in more 
modern times.
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The fixity of rent and revision of land tax after every 
ten years under the Mughals made the taxation of agriculture 
more profitable. Since the system could not continue
consistently, due to the fall of the Mughal empire, the 
zamindars, who were intermediaries and collected rent as well 
as enjoying a hereditary right to control the local 
production, subsequently were able to enjoy the major portion 
of agricultural output at the cost of the state and the 
raiyats. The absence of central power increased the power of 
the zamindar, therefore, and thus illegal cesses, 
mismanagement of land and the ejection of raiyats. One 
important development was the farming out of revenue villages 
which came into force after the decline of Mughal empire.
The system of land rent had three co Intending forces in 
the modern times; custom, competition ana legislation. The 
grant of i&.Di wani of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa 
in 1765 provided the East India Company's administration with 
the opportunity for the collection of land revenue. The 
raiyats under the Mughal government had suffered rack-renting 
and from the exaction of various kinds of a b w a b s .  During the 
decay of that power, and under the changed administration 
since the time of Murshid Quli khan, the payment of land tax 
and a b w a b s  remained almost at the demand of the zamindars. The 
Mughal system, having been almost restored after 1765, the 
English East India Company's first consideration was to raiseai 
large sums from the country, as could be collected through the 
a m i l s  posted in the various districts. Since the zamindari 
system was the only available source of land revenue, with the 
land rent to be collected from the raiyats, the zamindar's 
responsibility and position in the agrarian society was 
crucial in the eyes of the English administration; the raiyats 
were bound to be thought inferior. The maintenance of the 
zamindari system including the zamindar's overall right to 
manage agricultural production and control the raiyats, was 
thus provided under the tenancy legislation.
The Permanent Settlement, which provided "property rights 
in the soil", certainly deprived the raiyats of their 
hereditary rights over land. Regulation VIII of 1793
empowered the zamindars to realise rents, and also invested
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them with the power of distraint, not only over the produce of 
the land but also over all personal property and cattle of the 
defaulting raiyats. The k h u d - k a s h t  raiyats1 status was
recognised as better ^^,than that of p a i - k a s h t  raiyats, in
that the k h u d - k a s h t  raiyats* holdings were hereditary and 
could not be confiscated so long as the rent was paid. 2 
However, the zau^dar's formal power of ejecting defaulting 
raiyats applied also to those with occupancy rights.
The development in the la£t years of the 18th century, 
confirmed the Permanent Settlement Regulations, but made the 
resident raiyats liable to pay rent at the p a r g a n a  rate (which 
itself was uncertain); in effect the discretion of the
zamindar over the alteration of rents was absolute. The 
summary power of the zamindar remained in operation for the 
realization of rent; eviction was broadly recognised for non­
payment of rent; and the p a t t a  regulations, which might have 
given protection to the raiyats, were not properly 
implemented. Of course these remained, as well as many
customary sanctions which supported the zamindars' land 
control. Moreover, under regulations in 1819, the benefits of 
all waste land included within the ascertained boundaries of 
estates at the period of the decennial ettlement were
guaranteed to the proprietors, exclusive only of any 
advantages resulting from improvements.
The zamindars' power of enhancement based upon Regulation 
V of 1812, and the consequent miseries suffered by the raiyats 
from illegal enhancment and illegal cesses, in the absence of 
a record of rights, remained unchanged until Act X of 1859.
Even then, the legal changes in the tenure structure and the 
status of the raiyats, did not bring major improvements in the 
rent system. The loose system of zamindari accounts, the 
corruption of the village officials and oppression by the 
zamindari agents, and the unsatisfactory character of rent 
suits; all were unfavourable to the raiyats. Their weakness in 
the face of rent demands w<x5 apparent in the reports of the
collectors of the North Bihar districts, as reported by Geddes 
and Macdonnell in 1878.
From the mid-nineteenth century, the extension of 
cultivation and the pressures of population on the cultivated
133
areas, largely affected the rental demands of the zamindars. 
The growth of multiple and commercial crops, and the rise in
prices, were obvious pressures to increase the rental demand. 
The increase in the number of minute proprietary and of 
intermediary interests was another major factor. Clearly rent 
was influenced by the growth, in the agrarian society, of
varieties of landlords, and tenure-holders, intermediaries, 
village m a l i k s ,  m a h a j a n s , money-lenders, and j e t h  raiyats, as 
well as by the changing definitions of occupancy and non­
occupancy raiyats. On the other hand the rental relations 
left out the landless labourers who were the real productive 
force of agriculture. Because they were unproductive from the 
point of view of rental income, they formed a group of the
population which counted for nothing in the society.
The amount and conditions of rent payment helped determine 
the status of the raiyats. The non-occupancy raiyats, for
example, cultivated land as share croppers or on contract at 
the discretion of the m a l i k , and paid rent or a share of the 
produce as he pleased, largely irrespective of legal 
restrictions on rent and its enhancement. Any increase in the 
rent rate in the late nineteenth century must certainly have 
been a determinant factor in the poverty of raiyats, and the 
increase in the number of landless agricultural labourers. In 
rent too was expressed the dominate of the upper castes over 
the lower strata of society, despite the changing legal and 
economic environment under the British. Rent increases were 
equally important in the alienation of raiyati holdings and 
the deprivation of occupancy rights, which were general 
phenomena throughout Bihar in the nineteenth century.
First we shall discuss the rent rates of the raiyats in
the North Bihar districts. A considerable portion of rent was
paid by the cultivators from the sale of food grains3 at rates
which differed from place to place. Therefore, local food- 
o
grain production was divided into the subsistence food supply, 
the next season's seeds, and the grain which had to be sold 
for the payment of rent. The amounts in each category were 
largely at the discretion of the zamindar; commonly the rental 
represented 50 percent of output, apart from the a b w a b s .  The 
variation in rent rates depended on the gross cultivated area,
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the status of the raiyats and the average size of holdings, but 
also on the varieties of crops produced in different seasons. 
North Bihar produced b h a d o i  (autumn), a g h a n i  (winter) and r a b i  
( s p r i n g )  c r o p s * A g h a n i  rice was the chief food crop, but in 
addition wheat, millet, Indian maize, pulses, oilseeds, gram, 
potatos and sugarcane were grown. There were also non-food 
commercial crops-tobacco, poppy, indigo and cotton and various 
inferior crops eaten by the cultivators in times of scarcity. 
Rent was paid both in cash and in kind. Therefore cash rates 
varied acording to the crop. There was also double cropping 
on the fertile homestead-lands— *sometimes four crops a year. 
In such cases, land rent varied from Rs 8 to Rs 18 a b i g h a .  
Lands producing such cash crops as tobacco could fetch Rs 17 
per acre; high lands where poppy and tobacco were grown paid 
between Rs 3/12 and Rs 6/4, and other first class b h i t  lands 
between Rs 2/8 to Rs 6. First class rice land fetched between 
Rs 3/12 and Rs 7/8 per acre.-* Different rates were associated 
not just with suitable lands but with particular crops - thus 
Rs 2/4 per b i g h a  for sugarcane, or between that amount and Rs 
3/5 for opium (cultivated on a very large scale). In
Champaran, where the average rent was only Rs 2/10, opium 
lands would pay Rs 3/8 and sugarcane Rs 6 or 7. Rents for 
indigo were more complicated. The crop was increasingly 
prevalent in North Bihar, occupying 2te per cent of the 
cultivated land in Tirhut at the beginning of the 1670s--', and 
to 10 percent in the late nineteenth century. Land was 
generally let to the planters by the zamindars under the 
a s s a m i w a r  or n i z  systems. The raiyats executed agreements 
under the a s s a m i w a r  system to cultivate indigo on two to three 
k a t h a s  per b i g h a  (that is, on two or three twentieths of their 
holdings). Some factories demanded five or six k a t h a s .  In 
return, the rents on indigo lands were assessed well below the 
average for other lands of similar quality, at between Rs 4/8 
and Rs 5 per acre in the 1870s. The expenses were greater for 
indigo than food crops; on the other hand, the raiyats were 
not charged the extra cesses and s a l a m i s  usually levied by 
the native zamindars. t:-
Much valuable information on rent rates after the famine 
of 1873 - 74 was collected by A.P. Macdonnell for his
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enquiry into various p a r g a n a s  and t h a n a s  of North Bihar. 
Moreover, the Road Cess Valuation Act which had already 
started operating in the Bengal Presidency, also provided for 
a record of average rates of rent, assessed on the basis of 
the produce. These show average differences acording to use 
or land type, but the most startling variations between areas 
and holdings in respect of the same crop and quality of land. 
In a special enquiry made in 39 villages in Sitamarhl sub­
division of the Muzaffarpur district, the rent rates on rice 
land varied between Rs 1/10 and Rs 6/12 per acre, the average 
being about Rs 3/12. For the cultivated upland, the rates
ranged from 8 annas to Rs 5/12, with an average of about Rs 
3. z Moreover, the recorded rates might or might not have
included additional cesses. They did include them in some 
Court of Wards estates, but generally zamindars might collect 
extra amounts at will.
In 1875 the annual rental of the cultivated land in
Muzaffarpur was estimated at 51& lakhs of rupees (more than 
five million rupees); a similar amount was calculated for
Darbhanga. This rent was met in part from the sale of food 
grains, at a rate of Rs 31 lakhs in Muzaffarpur and Rs 38 
lakhs in Darbhanga. Similar patterns were fdund elsewhere, 
though Champaran had less cultivated land than the other 
districts, and rice ( b h a d o i  and a g h a n i )  was grown over a 
larger area in Darbhanga and Muzaraffarpur than in Saran, and 
least of all in Champaran. In Saran and Champaran other cash 
crops were relatively more prominent. The annual rental of 
the cultivated area in Champaran was Rs. 40 lakhs and the food 
grain sold was estimated at Rs 28 lakhs. Saran had even more 
the character of growing valuable non-food crops, mostly 
through double cropping. The rent rate was higher in Saran 
than in other districts with an average Rs 4/- per b i g h a .  The 
highest rentals were paid by the cultivating castes, such as 
k u r m i ,  g o a l a  a n d  k o e r i , rather than the upper caste raiyats 
who generally held the best land. The annual rental of Saran 
was Rs 48te lakhs, and the food grains sold amounted to Rs 25 
lakhs.
A further variable in rent-rates was caste. In^size of 
holding and rents, the lower caste raiyats differed from the
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upper castes; mostly they paid more rent. In 1872 Hunter
Oh
found that they paid Rs 5/7y^acre, for holdings which averaged
below 4^ acres. This vague estimate must be qualified
further: such a rate was likely on rice cropped areas but not
on the b h i t  a r e a s  where valuable crops were grown, and where
a
the dominance of the m a l i k s  resulted in higher rents:
The impact of rent varied too, according to the price 
received by the raiyats. In ordinary years raiyats sold 
varieties of grains for realising shares of gross rental: best
placed were those who could choose their time and their crop 
for sale. Wheat was dearer than rice, dearer than millets or 
maizfe the standard rate of rent was, however, always fixed 
according to the price of rice. In addition, cash crops, such 
as sugarcane, oilseeds and tobacco, were often sold to pay the 
rent. Clearly, an increasing and more regular rent - demand
encourag ed attempts to increase agricultural production, for 
example through double cropping or increased area: the d i a r a
lands also began to produce varieties of food crops. Various 
pulses <m u n g , u r i d ,  k u r t h i .>, linseed ( t i s i ) ,  seiTCT'O-l millets
( k o d o ,  m a r u a  c h i n a , s a w a n ) ,  sweet potato and some fruits,
grown in the d i a r a , became subsistence crops for the raiyats 
both in ordinary years, and in emergency when they had to pay 
their rent by selling their rice. If needed, they sold the 
above crops too.
Rent paid in cash was prevalent in the North Bihar
districts, though there were rents paid in kind in which 
zamindars took fifty percent of the produce. Since the
revenue was paid by the zamindar in money, even produce rents 
tended to be expressed in money terms at a fixed proportion to
q
the market rates* The raiyats obtained the necessary cash
either by the sale of their crops or by borrowing money from 
the vi 11 age m a h a j  a n  or m a l i k ,  just as at times they had to 
borrow grain. Repayment was made in both money and grain.
The government's initiatives on the question of rent 
began following representations by the zamindars, in the early 
1870s. Soon agrarian disturbances in Bengal districts also 
attracted ^ attention of government and measures began to be 
considerec to improve the conditions of the raiyats, to which 
attention had been drawn also by the famine of 1873-4. This
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was the case, though policy during periods of scarcity was 
towards providing relief from the scarcity of food, rather 
than towards altering rent rates —  indeed instances were found 
in the zamindari estates of North Bihar where raiyats were 
harshly treated over the payment of rent during (X grave fcod 
crisis. The government came to the conclusion, as S.C. Bailfe)^ 
Secretary to the government of Bengal^ said in 1877, that the 
greatest need not provided in the law was the means whereby 
the raiyats could resist illegal distraint, illegal 
enhancement and illegal cesses, and prove their rights, il 
which were obscured by corruption of the officials and 
zamindars' illegal claims during rent suits. Since a separate 
rent law could not be framed for the Bihari raiyats, an early 
proposal, while Ashley Eden was Lieutenant Governor, was for 
the appointment of rural sub-registrars with the power of 
m u n s i f s  to try rent suits and other criminal cases.
It was felt, however, that the law could not serve the 
raiyats as it stood. The p a  t t a -  ^ k a  b u l  i y a  t  system, for
example, was recognised by law but hardly observed in 
practice. Generally, it was beyond "the power of the raiyat 
to prove r ights of occupancy". ^  Only gradual improvement was 
promised by such measures as the reform in the system of 
keeping zamindarc accounts by p a t w a r i s ,  the encouragjment. of 
the exchange of p a t t a s  and k a b u l  l y a t s ,  the use of the 
counterfoil of rent receipts, and the discouragement of 
amalgamation of fresh lands with existing holdings. 
Meanwhile, the practice of illegal distraint was universal. 
In 1877 the Collector of Muzaffarpur recorded^ in regard to 
Hajipore sub-division, that "The Zamindars confess that they 
resort to private distraint in preference to distraint through 
the court, the latter involving expense which has to come on 
the ryot and diminishing his means of paying his legitimate 
dues, as well as leaving a sufficient balance for his own 
support." Even the courts could hardly refuse to recognise
the power of distraint Rested in the landlord, and the 
pressure from the landlords was all in favour of extending it. 
A meeting in Hajipore on 10 September, 1877, similarly 
proposed, that, because of the inconvenience when the raiyats 
deposited rents in the court, they should be required to give
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at least 15 days notice before such deposits, so that their 
zamindar*s agents could appear in the court to draw out the 
money. ' ^  In general it was difficult for the officials to
resist or disagree when allegations were made against the
raiyats over the non-payment of rent. And distraint after all 
was the system introduced by the British themselves.
Nonetheless the period between 1880 and 1900 was a great 
landmark for tenancy law and rent. The growth of commercial 
agriculture and trade necessarily increased the value of 
agriculture. Zamindars* income grew partly at the cost of the 
peasantry, and partly because by 1900, 70 percent of the gross
rental went to ■j.amindarS, and 30 percent to the government. It 
is difficult to gauge the increase to the gross rental itself. 
The Road Cess Act, 1871/ provided statistics suggesting a total 
rental of Rs. 16.8 crores by 1900-1*? But the total for 1793 
is mere guess work. One estimate is that the increase over
the period amounted to 360 per cent. ' It does seem that the 
rental income of the zamindars of Bihar was higher than that 
of their counterparts in Bengal. The highest rental income
was in the district of Darbhanga.
The records of the zamindars hardly provided sufficient 
information to the government to assess their rental income. 
The Road Cess statistics, available after 1876, were also 
found to be incorrect, because a considerable part of the 
rental income was not brought under assessment. The reasons 
were many. First, a large number of estates which came up in 
the later half of the nineteenth century were not included, 
they escaped the original assessment, Secondly, small estates 
paying less than Rs. 100^ revalued, while b a d s h a h i  and n o n -  
b a d s h a h i  estates included under l a k h i r a j  were not assessed* 
Zamindars generally concealed their documents on such estates 
or did not maintain a record of them. But above all various 
kinds of cesses, ii^pite of the warnings given by the 
government, were demanded jointly with the rent. But
zamindars did not consolidate this illegal income with the 
rent in the 1amabandi papers and the k h a t i y a n  of the 
zamindars. They could be said to be mostly forged documents 
which were placed before the officials for the assessment of 
the rental income.
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Henceforth the gross rental of the zamindars was a 
compound of the income from their raiyats' rent and also 
income derived from a b w a b s .  The zamindars who were always in 
the habit of revising their rent rates on newly occupied and 
cultivated lands, generally fixed higher rents. Sometimes, 
the transfer of a holding from one raiyat to another and from 
one lease-holder to another also extracted more rental demand. 
The big zamindari demands were always high and they expected 
higher rental income from the intermediaries who held sub­
proprietary rights from them. The tenure-holders in
such circumstances bound to raise more and more profit
for their overlords. ultimately the burden of rent fell on 
the raiyats. In Bengal, cases of passive resistance were 
found when repressive measures were adopted for the collection 
of high rents from the raiyats. In Bihar there were no such
incidents, except in the areas known for their truculent
in
raiyats, especially parts of Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga. The 
objections were to rent enhancement, or in some casesjof rent- 
free tenants, against resumption procedures. Though the Road 
Cess valuation did not reveal the full extent of zamindari 
demands, it did tend to curb some of the repressive measures 
for the collection of rent; the levying of illegal cesses on 
the raiyat also became more difficult on estates under the 
Court of Wards. On the other hand, the zamindars were given 
legal protection for the regular collection of rent and
assisted to improve the management of their estates. 
Moreover, there was hardly any concession made to the raiyats, 
for example for the failure in crops or during the famine
periods, and, though_____ ^agricultural prices were soaring in
the later periods of the nineteenth century, this was not of 
uniform benefit to the cultivators. The Tenancy Act of 188b 
brought several changes in landlord - tenant relations. The 
initiative was taken to provide occupancy rights to the
maximum numbers of tenants and to reduce the power of
zamindars over the enhancement of rent; for the first time, 
various categories of rent payers were specifically defined. 
There emerged prosperous occupancy raiyats, often paying rents 
of higher rates than other occupancy raiyats, and rent-free
holders cultivating either directly or indirectly. At the
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bottom were tenants at will who had also to work on daily
wages. The distinction between these groups widened. The
Co­
tenancy law tended towards the creation of^prosperous class of
tenantry which soon acquired the character of sub-proprietors.
The weaker tenants suffered, and the stronger intermediaries
became virtually a landed gentry, some having holdings of
hundreds of acres.
Th ere were several reasons why the law accelerated the 
rental income of the zamindars and the impoverishment of the 
bulk of the peasantry. On the one hand it was found that the 
natural resources of the peasantry, in the changing social and 
economic conditions since the Permanent Settlement, brought 
only marginal changes in their status, especially in the case 
of rent payers. On the other hand, the increase in the 
cultivated area and in the value of agricultural production 
brought (.at least initially) a marked growth in the rental 
income of the land-holders. Moreover, the growing intensity 
of cultivation, with commercial and multiple cropping, 
increased the economic power of the controllers of the
hfl-cL
agricultural market. By the.- time the government^embarked on 
the survey and settlement operations in the North Bihar 
districts, the pressure of population and the increase in 
production (as on former fallow lands) had already taken a 
firm root: the main beneficiaries were the land-holders and
rent receivers. According to Boserup, the frequency with 
which land is brought under cultivation is more important than 
the amounts of land cultivated or left uncultivated/^ More 
frequent cropping has various advantages which are enjoyed by 
the controller of production rather than by the cultivator.
Customarily, when the fertility of the soil increased or 
a greater area was brought under cultivation, the zamindar and 
raiyat came to an agreement about the settlement of the land 
tax. Rent rolls were revised and an additional amount was 
received in the treasury of the zamindar. The terms and 
conditions were also specified by the zamindar. While
obliging the raiyat, the zamindar would impose some extra 
cesses which the raiyat would pay, though they were quite 
illegal. Compromise was the unofficial practice in the
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villages, but it resulted in the increase in the zamindar's 
income; on the other hand, the legal binding of the tenants to 
pay regular rent on the different settled holdings under the 
clauses of the Tenancy Act, equally assisted the zamindar. 
B.B. Chaudhuri has explained the relation between agricultural 
change and the increases in the gross rental of the zamindars 
of Bakarganj, Dinajpur and Bhagalpur. In these areas the 
waste lands which came under cultivation first attracted the 
cultivators at low rates of rent. Waste land was abundant and 
the population was growing. In the second half of the
nineteenth century these rents were greatly increased, except 
when the zamindars were attracting the cultivators at the 
instance of the government. In some areas, the spread of 
cash crops, including winter rice; also attracted papulation; 
in this case too the rental demand later became increasingly 
high.i& Such tendencies were found in the North Bihar 
districts and other districts of Patna Division also. The 
rental demand was increased by altering the rent rolls, by 
giving incentive to double cropping and commercial crops 
including rice. In this process some population was diverted 
from densely settled tracts to those with fewer people; this 
also resulted in more production and greater rental income for 
the zamindars overall.
It might be thought that the record of rights provided to 
the raiyats under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and the fixing 
of rent according to terms and conditions or the quality of 
the soil, indicate that the raiyats' rental liabilities were 
reasonable. But the significance of the Bengal Tenancy Act 
lay rather in the fact that the zamindars' power was 
significantly increased for the enhancement of rent. As in 
the resumption of 'invalid* lands, the district^^yto-districr 
survey from the 1890s proved the raiyats' new legal rights; 
but also ensured the additional burden of a rental increase. 
The Settlement Officers' main decision was the 'fair' rent in 
disputed cases; the amount remained in practice at the 
discretion of the zamindar in the large proprietary estates. 
In the petty proprietary estates which abounded in
Muzaffarpur and Saran the m a l i k s '  already had the power to 
decide ■ boundary disputes and the enhancement of rent.
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The record of right was an important document which enabled 
the zamindar to keep an eye on the income of the tenants' 
holdings and then accordingly to justify the rental demand.
On the other hand, the provisions of the Rent law did put 
various restraints on repressive methods in terms of the
future imposition of a b w a b s  The existing a b w a b s  were mostly 
amalgamated with the rental demand and declared genuine in the 
settlement. But illegal cesses were still not ruled out. It 
was difficult for the law courts to decide whether a b w a b s  were 
a part of the rental demand. For example, quantities of g h e e ,  
(clarified butter), mangoes, and g u r  (sugar cane juice), were 
paid to the zamindars; they were the produce of the land but 
they were not regarded as rent. Such customary additional 
payment continued in the late nineteenth century and in the 
beginning of this century.
In the aftermath of the tenancy legislation, rent
questions became more complicated. But this was not
necessarily to the advantage of the raiyats. Their grievances 
were increasing but m a h a j  a n s  and money-lenders were also 
becoming more active in landholding. The sense of reaction 
over raiyati rights was gaining ground only amongst The 
prosperous class of tenants in Bihar. Other issues such as 
market control, agricultural prices and the political 
importance of agrarian relations became more and more
significant in deciding the outcome of the land question in
Bihar in later periods.
Three main issues are raised by the Tenancy Act of 1885, 
and the Survey and Settlement operations in the North Bihar 
districts: whether the rent had increased,^ by what means it
was enhanced, and whether the rental demand impoverished the 
raiyats. It would also be ulortk considering the government's 
outlook and that of the agrarian society towards the producing 
class and towards those enjoying power through the effective 
control of the village economy.
According to the Settlement Reports of the North Bihar 
districts, the average rate of rent of the, cultivators and the 
increase in rent in the late nineteenth century related to the 
pressure of papulation. The increased rents were not matched 
by the expansion of cultivation and related development;
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rather they were due to increased rent rates which varied from 
district to district. The Settlement Officers investigated 
the size and nature of increase in rent since the Permanent 
Settlement; not for the entire districts, but on the basis of 
the J a m a b a n d i s  of selected villages. The results of this
sample survey were extrapolated to the area as a whole. One 
way to gauge the increase in the rent rate is by examining the 
relative size of holdings of different castes, and different 
categories of cultivators, and the proportion who did not hold 
land though they were engaged in agriculture. This aspect has 
been examined in the previous chapter in regard to one 
district, Saran. Regardless of this variation, however, the 
highest rates of rent were paid by those with holdings of less 
than five acres. Comparing districts, however, the raiyats of 
Saran paid the highest rent, (Rs4/5 or more) because of their
19
producing more valuable crops, and also because Saran had 
the highest land prices in the late nineteenth century. The 
rental rates in the superior zamindari villages were high - Rs 
4/14 in the Hathwa raj even in 1870 - but the small zamindars 
had also increased rents unlawfully and often. As rents 
increased, they invariably pressed hardest on the weakest of
the raiyats. This category of raiyats was squeezed out, and 
gradully lost their holdings because of arrears of rent. They 
were sold or fell into the hands of village m a l i k s  or 
m a h a j  a n s .
Though rents were higher in Saran it was in the districts 
of Darbhanga and Muzaf iarpur that the increases in the rates 
were proportionately highest. This was the result of
arbitrary enhancement of rent at various levels at the
instance of the superior zamindars. The average rate of rent 
in Darbhanga was Rs 3/12. Moreover: "The rent rates of each
sub-division, varying from each other, were deduced from the 
rents recorded as payable and not from the rents claimed, and 
in some cases collected by the landlords, which were very much 
higher." j‘'-' Rent demands extended down through intermediaries 
as well. Thus there were rent-free holders in almost every
district, but the b i r t d a r s  in Darbhanga held a larger 
proportion of holdings, and were still adamant that they were
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not obliged to be paying rent. On the other hand they leased 
out their holdings and extracted illegal rents from the poor 
cu11i vators.
In the district of Muzaffarpur, upper caste proprietors 
were dominant in enjoying the higher rates of rental demands. 
They also held a larger acreage under their direct 
cultivation. The average rent rate recorded in 1885 in 
Muzaffarpur was Rs 3/10. Stevenson-Moore observed that rent 
rates had increased by 100 per cent in the past three quarters 
of the nineteenth century, especially in the resumed villages 
during the period 1821-1833 and in 1892-98 when the Settlement 
procedures were carried out. In the ninety three resumed 
villages, the study of the Settlement Officer showed fifteen 
villages with an increase of between 50 and 70 per cent; in 
the rest of the villages it was at least one hundred per cent. 
In forty six villages, the increase exceeded 150 per cent.-1-'* 
The Settlement Report of the district of Darbhanga also 
reveals that during the same period, in resumed villages,
the rent rate had increased by at least 170 per cent, and not 
less than 100 percent. -:-i- In Saran in the sixty-four resumed 
villages, the increase in rent rate was 97 per cent during 
almost the same period. -
Apart from resumption, the letting of z i r a t  land and the 
creation of small holdings to lease out to indigo factories 
also increased rental income. Moreover, in the districts of 
Muzaffarpur, the partition of estates and the sub-division of 
proprietary right among various p a t t i d a r s  became more common 
in the later period of the 19th century: in this case too the
right of occupancy of the weaker raiyats fell into danger. 
Mostly they either surrendered their holdings or were forced 
to leave them. Such holdings were either absorbed or re-let 
at higher rents.
The rent increase in Champaran was smaller than in the 
rest of the districts of the region. Stevenson-Moore had 
made a comparative survey and estimated that the first half of 
the nineteenth centry saw an enormous increase in the area 
under cultivation, followed by a slower increase in the later 
periods. The increase in rents in the resumed areas, during 
the period 1839 - 40 'to 1898 was about 58 per cent.-"'*
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Generally, once again, the increase in cultivated areas from 
the Permanent Settlement to the late nineteenth century 
amounted, in respect of raiyats* land, to 155 per cent, while 
the rental income increased by 168 per cent including a b w a b s .
The Settlement operations in the late nineteenth century 
uncovered various complications In the way of increasing the 
rate of rent. It was quite obvious that rent did not increase 
automatically. But one could hardly ignore the customary 
rights and privileges of the zamindar which grew markedly from 
the Permanent Settlement. The increase in rents before 1859 
was concealed in the rent rolls of the zamindars because of 
their mis-management by the village officials. Even the
supposed p a r g a n a  rate was no guarantee of stability. A
zamindar could use it to increase rents if land of a similar 
quality in the neighbourhood were assessed at a higher rate, 
though increases on these grounds were not very common. 
Neither were the other official grounds for enhancement much 
used', on the basis of value of the produce or the 
classification of the soil. But rent rises were not dependent 
on such devices, nor discouraged by official intervention.
It was taken for granted that even the investigators at 
the settlement failed to get correct information about the 
depressed condition of the raiyats. It remained at the
discretion of the zamindars, how to deal with the rent payers. 
Physical coercion, manipulation by village officials and
various other repressive methods were the main instruments of 
enhancement, alongside court cases or the threat of them. 
The zamindars of North Bihar enjoyed more freedom than their 
counterparts in Bengal.
It is also said that densely populated areas paid more 
. yrcoJtr
rent because of thelr^agricultural output. But this notion is 
untrue. The density of population is an indication of the 
scarcity of subsistence holdings and the burden on the soil. 
It was chiefly to the disadvantage of the poor, and this Coutfi 
beG|/reduced if more cultivated land distributed among those
who need it to support themselves. In Bihar it was the 
greatest disadvantage of the small raiyats and tenqnts-at- 
will. They depended greatly on labour or cultivating the land
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of rich farmers. They were rather dependent on the superior 
tenants and paid more than 50 per cent of the produce as rent.
It is a fact that the resumption of rent free land and 
'invalid' ( l a k k i r a j ) land holdings increased the cultivated 
areas, • but accordingly A-t also increased the rental demand; 
with arrears. This burden came on the raiyats. During the 
Settlement operation period, when a large number of new 
estates were found to have come into being, they appeared as a 
result of the incentives given by the government as the 
proprietors became rent receivers and revenue payers. The 
number of rent receivers increased and accordingly the 
fixation of rent rate in the newly created estates was also 
seen to be higher. Most of tenure-holders acted as small 
proprietors and also lent money. The capability of k h u d - k a s h t  
raiyats to pay the increased rent was more than p a i - k a s h t  
raiyats. Since the payment of rent was regular, no concession 
was given during scarcity and famine. The raiyats were bound 
to pay arrears with enhanced rate of rent if any. The rising 
prices affecting the life of raiyats did not provide restraint 
on the power of zamindar to increase the rent. A certain 
category of the raiyats, such as fixed rate and k h u d - k a s h t  
raiyats paid higher rent than others. Mostly, fixed rate 
raiyats were believed to have produced valuable crops and 
supposed to be prosperous; therefore, they paid high rate^ of 
rent* In the late nineteenth century their rents increased. 
They were prosperous tenants since the time of the Permanent 
Settlement and exercised zamindars' rights . The rental 
demand from the occupancy raiyat was always high due to the 
legal right of occupancy vested in them. The English
principle of landlord and tenenat did not prove to be 
beneficial to the tenants of Bihar. The non-occupancy raiyats 
and tenants-at-wi11 were dependent on the wishes of the 
mali k s . and one could hardly make a clear assessment about 
their prosperous condition. They were always in debt and 
mostly worked as daily wage labourers on other's fields, 
apart from cultivating their own land or working on b a t a i  
( m a l i k ) land.
147
The tenancy law clearly defined the category of landlord 
and tenants but did not look into the local norms of the 
society nor fix a reasonable principle for rent rates. There 
was hardly any correlation between law and society, or rents 
and productivity; and above all there was no control over the 
growing power of zamindar or impoverishment of the raiyats.
How was Rent Enhanced: methods, classes of tenants subjected
to such enhancement:
Before the enactmment of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, 
Eden, the Lieutenant  ^ - ^ Governor, while commenting on the 
reform in the Rent Bill, pointed out that in Bihar it was 
necessary to enable the raiyats to resist illegal distraint, 
illegal enhancement, illegal cesses and to prove and maintain 
occupancy rights. Apart from this he also remarked on the 
loose accounts of zamindars, their method of realisation of 
rent, and their arbitrary transfer of raiyati holdings. The 
enhancement of rent was common in all the districts of North 
Bihar inspire of the legal restrictions in certain cases. 
Also prevalent was the ejectment of raiyats for failure to pay 
arrears, and the forging of documents to claim enhanced rates. 
In the areas with big zamindaris, the valuation of rents was 
made at the time of the Permanent Settlement, mostly on the 
basis of J a m a b a n d i s  (rent rolls) in villages and by 
estimation. Until the 1870s, it was usually the practice that 
any increase of rent on account of excess area which exceeded 
100 per cent was made gradual and progressive, spread over a 
term of years. Generally it was found in practice that the 
discovery of excess land held by the raiyats resulted in heavy 
increases in rent. Although some objections were raised in 
1895, the judges also defended such enhancements. It was 
argued that the raiyats held excess lands in collusion with 
the landlords' servants and therefore were always bound to pay 
the additional rent assessed on the holding.
One theoretical justification for the true enhancement of 
rates was related to the principle that rents either in cash 
or kind were based on the "prevailing rate", with different 
rents for different soils. But nowhere were such principles 
followed, either on the great estates or by small proprietors. 
Vhere the raiyats contested an enhancement of rent made on the
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ground that it was below the prevailing rate of the village, 
and the landlord (as was almost invariably the case), failed 
to show that there were any village rates, the enhancement was 
disallowed.^1-' In Saran, especially in the Hathwa Raj areas 
during the settlment operations, it was detected that the 
rents settled for 15 years were not likely to be reduced at 
the end of that period, and the operations rather resulted in 
most substantial pecuniary benefit to the estate. Moreover, 
Stevenson-Moore remarked in his annual report for the year 
1897-98: "It must be admitted that the Hathwa Raj has had its
pound of flesh". The peculiarity of the assessment in the 
Hathwa Raj area was that mostly rents had been assessed on the 
J a m a b a n d i  areas instead of on the survey areas. Such was not 
the case with the Darbhanga and Bettiah estates, where rent 
rates were enhanced at an even higher rate before the
settlement operations, which did not give a clear idea to the
Settlement officers for the assessment of rent on the basis of 
the quality of the soil.
Different procedures were adopted at law in 1895[with 
regard to compromises on cases of enhancement, where it was 
shown that the raiyat’s existing rate was considerably below 
the average for the village, and there was no special reason 
for this, such as poverty of the soil. In such cases the 
landlord's claim for enhanced rent was allowed; and the
raiyats had to accept the new rate. But most claims to 
enhancement under the "prevailing rate" clause were disallowed 
where no soil rates were proved. On the other hand, very few 
such cases were brought to the notice of the court. The 
personal compulsion, social hierarchy and general dominance of 
the zamindars mostly meant that the raiyats accepted their 
c 1 a i m s .
Major enhancement^ of rents were found, in the Hathwa Raj 
territories, to be over 12 per cent, an increase of 1.5 per 
cent per annum in the late nineteenth century. From the 
records of the Raj, it was found that increase amounted to Rs. 
68,000 on its estates, whereas the total increase in the rest 
of Saran district was under Rs. 6000. In Saran the rate of
enhancement, after compromises, was higher than in Muzaffarpur 
and Darbhanga. A fixed rate of rent was generally prevalent
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in those areas where transfer of raiyati holding was not 
very frequent.
Another legal ground for the enhancement of rent 
adopted by the landlords was on the rise in agricultural 
prices and the market rate of staple food grain. Besides, 
the production of cash crops was taken into account for the 
enhancement of rent. The zamindari estates produced the 
price list of the food crops prepared by their raj officials 
under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, clause 39. These were 
supposed to cover ten years, but did not. The judges 
allowed increments at one anna per rupee on account of the 
rise in prices or even more. But again fraud by patwaris 
and qanungos, as well as the torture of raiyats frequently 
observed by revenue officials, were more common means of 
enhancement.
An interesting discussion occurred among the officials 
on the question of the enhancement of rent when a raiyat did 
not produce sufficient food crops to sell for the payment of 
increased rent. The raiyat who was paying rent out of the 
produce of non food crops such as opium, indigo, tobacco and 
others did not benefit from the rise in the price of food 
grains which was the criterion for the enhancement of rent. 
On the other hand he did benefit from cash crops, and 
therefore, should pay the enhanced rent. However, in the 
view of Macpherson, the Director of Land Records, the 
surplus produce remaining after the cost of production was 
too small to allow any room for rent increases in Saran 
where rent rate was already high. In such cases, he 
argued, no rent could be enhanced. This formula was adopted 
in principle in other parts of North Bihar, but as Saran had 
the highest rents and was thought a special case, it was not 
often fallowed in practice in other districts. Landlords 
who wished to increase the rent through law in the guise of 
doing justice to the raiyats, were usually able to do so on 
the evidence they produced before the court.
Another important reason for enhancement of rent in the 
North Bihar districts was the partition of estates. After
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partition each proprietor found^new structure of holdings, 
and therefore prepared new rent rolls. He fixed rents 
supposedly on the basis of^ old rates, but in many cases 
partitions were asked for with the deliberate intention of 
raising rent rates. This was a continuation of the earlier 
practices when a similar use was made of the sales 
procedure. In the earlier 19th century the sale of an 
estate for arrears of revenue was invariably followed by 
enhancements of rent, which the raiyats hardly resisted. In 
later periods in some villages, occupancy raiyats were 
ejected under this procedure, particularly those belonging 
to lower castes, and their holdings were occupied by the 
proprietors. In some cases, it was found that another 
raiyat was waiting to get the holding from the proprietor.
The proprietors in Muzaffarpur were found to have been 
partitioning revenue villages among various pattis or shares 
of the estate for enhancement of rent. Under the Partition 
Act, they had power to fix rents. After 1885, in most 
villages surveyed by the district collector, it was found 
that the rent had been increased by 17.62 per cent. There 
was no uniformity in the method of assessment or the amount 
of the enhancement. Partitioned villages suffered most and 
the maliks stood by the demand to enhance the rent rates in 
such areas. The "village notes" attested by the officers 
give clear evidence of this, and enable a comparison of 
partitioned and non-partitioned villages in all the 
districts. The Settlement officer provided evidence from 
the Attestation Officers’ record, for villages in 
Muzaffarpur, for example as follows:
(1) Village Baktauli, No. 347, thana Sitamarhi - "The
general rate seems to be about Rupees 5 a bigha, but there
~toare many rates. The maliks force the raiyats pay^as much as 
they can, and at the batwara of 1286 Fasli <1879), there was 
a general enhancement." In this village the rate of 
increase was from Re 1-0-3 in 1840 to Re. 4-6-6 in the 
1890s, or over 300 per cent.
(2) Sonepurwa, thana Belsand - Rents were enhanced at 
irregular intervals. No uniform standard was adopted. In
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this village, the rate increased from Rs. 2-1 anna and 6 
paise in 1833 to Rs 4 and annas 2 and paio 1 by 100 per 
cent.
(3) Bela Gopi Nath, No. 151, thana Katra - "A batwara was 
effected in the village about 25 years ago, and it led to an 
increase in the rent" . The increase in the rent rate was 
from Re. 1-11-4 in 1824 to Rs 3-11-2 or by 118 per cent.
(4) Banda, 899, thana Muzaffarpur - "Batwara made about 20 
years ago. The rate of increase was about 6 annas in the 
rupee." In this village the rate had gone from Re. 1-6-1 in 
1824 to Rs. 4-2-4, or a 200 per cent increase.
(5) Jalalpur No. 348, thana Mahua- "There is enhancement in 
it since the village is in thika (lease) to the factory". 
The increase had been from Rs 2-2-11 to Rs 4-15-1 per acre 
or 132 per cent since 1819.
(6) Ahurana Khargi No. 58, thana Muzaffarpur - "The entire 
village was leased out to the Kanti indigo concern in 1278 
F.S. (1870) and is still in the thika lease of the factory." 
No enhancement of rent had taken place in this area over the 
preceding 50 years. The reason was perhaps because for a 
European concern, indigo was more profitable than a marginal 
increase in rent: the factory's thikadari status was more 
important than any rent.
The proprietors of Muzaffarpur were generally able to
set rent rates at their pleasure. Supposedly perti (fallow)
lands paid the lowest rent as they were supposed to be
grazing lands; and gharari (homestead) lands which were
useful for tobacco and other cash crops paid the highest
rents. But the rates often bore little or no relation to
the quality of the soil. According to one circle
inspector, the rent rates varied from village to village and
they ranged from 4 annas to 20 rupees per bigha. In fact,
the average rent rate was from 3 to 4 rupees per bigha.
Above all the records underestimated the increases of
rent. Enhancement occured by transferring land to fictitious
■ft
names through fictijous Jamabafjdis, and also leasing out the 
land, where the proprietors were unable to collect rents or 
arrears, to litigious tenure holders, to mahaj ans, and 
thi^Jcadars, who collected high rates of rent from the
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raiyats. These exactions and those of some zamindars, were 
often concealed from outsiders. The Madhubani Babus and Rai 
Ganga Prasad, a prominent banker of Darbhanga became famous 
for their illegal enhancements of rents and collection of 
abwabs. The zamindars of Darbhanga patronised the birtdars 
and goraits, rent-free land-holders, who helped the raiyats 
even on the great estates. Thus illegal enhancement of rent 
was found to have increased since 1884 in the parts UTldLeT 
Darbhanga raj control, when they had been transferred away 
from the Court of Wards. Finucane found evidence of 
frequent changes of rent rolls by the officials of the raj, 
and of the fixing of rents, during his cadastral survey in 
1876-78. Even in later period such practices continued, and 
officials were amazed to find that the Maharaja of Darbhanga 
collected enhanced rents during the grave famines and
scarcities of the 1890s.
The pretence of the zamindars was that enhancement of 
rent was necessary for the improvement of agriculture. But 
in reality it was the outcome of zamindari power at a time 
of rising prices. The zamindars thought that the raiyats 
were quite capable of paying high rents, and took the
opportunity to increase their own profits. They were not
guided only by greed; it was also a matter of social 
prestige for a zamindar to charge higher rents. They were 
intended not only to pay for display and consumption 
appropriate to zamindari status, but also to keep the
raiyats subservient.
During the nineteenth century in addition to enhance­
ment, there were changes in the manner of rent payment.
Until the beginning of the century, payment in kind was
prevalent throughout the districts of Bihar, Buchanan-
Hamilton, in the early nineteenth century, described the
system in the districts of Patna, Shahabad and Gaya. The 
villages under bhaoli rentals looked to him to be less 
developed. In the North Bihar districts both produce rent 
and money rent operated depending on the productivity of the
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sail. Mostly zamindars profited from the produce rent as 
they shared the major portion of the produce, either in the 
field (by appraisement) or on the threshing floor. The 
value of a produce rental was naturally high when 
agricultural prices rose. But still it created poverty, 
leaving the farmers at the mercy of famine. Moreover, 
scarcity tended to extend the bhaaLC system: at such times
the rich cultivators who could afford to pay money rents 
might have to surrender his land to the zamindar who would 
impose a produce rent; others might have to enter into 
batai agreements with cultivators or intermediaries who 
could afford to pay the zamindar. Thus produce rents 
occurred quite generally in Bihar, though more commonly in 
the southern districts.
The legal provisions of the later nineteenth century, 
however, worked in the apposite direction. The government 
investigated the feasibility of setting definite criteria 
for the commutation of rent from produce to cash. The Rent 
Law Commission, 1880, had tried to draw up rent rates on the 
basis of the classes of soil but Finucane found that the 
rents had no clear connection with productive power. 
Instead rent reflected social (caste) status, mutual 
agreements between landholders and tenants, market rates, 
the relative strength of the raiyats, the capability to 
pay, and the attitude of zamindars. ::?'a These factors applied 
equally to money produce rents. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 
1885, however, brought major changes by facilitating 
commutation, especially in those areas where the danabandi 
(appraisement) system prevailed. Earlier raiyats had paid 
produce rent either in kind or in money to the value of the 
produce calculated at a certain rate. Such rents were 
prevalent in rice-growing areas, in North Bihar, as well as 
in the South. During the nineteenth century, however, money 
rent came to be preferred by the zamindars almost 
everywhere. The policy of the government was also towards 
this end. In certain areas, where grain dealers, such as 
village merchants and mahajans played a dual role of 
zamindar and trader, produce rent remain^ the practice; but
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such instances were ncr^ comparatively rare in the North 
Bihar districts.
The payment of produce rents in money or of cash rents 
was not favourable to raiyats who had no knowledge of 
agricultural priceS. They were subjected to coercion to grow
T'icC*'
particular crops, and in particular were bound to sell^ (in
which there was lively trade) and to eat inferior grains.
The demand and supply of rice in the agricultural market wens
ve-Ty cTU.cfal*~. The merchant and traders as well as
intermediaries took much interest in grain dealing in the
rural markets as the money rent was equated with valuable
crops. While the value of agricultural produce and land 
Ko^
pricesjsoared up since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
cash demand of rent as a result of the commercial policy of
A *the government^accelerated. Likewise the extension of cash 
crops also increased. Whether the increasing demand of 
revenue in cash affected the agricultural price or land 
price in the later half of the nineteenth century, the money 
rent was a result of the economic structure of the period. 
The land market was not so important before 1793 buX it 
became a dominant factor in the increase of rent and 
agricultural price in the late nineteenth century. The idea 
emerged from the monetisation of agricultural products and 
rental income, valued in cash amount.
In the original draft of the Rent Law no substantial 
details were provided on the enhancement of rent or the 
payment of money rent. The rise in agricultural prices and 
the survey and settlement operations provided detailed idea 
of the agricultural products in terms of cash amount^* The 
capability of a raiyat for payment of money rent was well 
measured. Any constraints imposed upon him were more 
repressive than constraints on the zamindars. The law made 
•YAOjor distinctions. A zamindar could not be elicited for 
enhancing the rent of raiyat. A raiyat could be charged 
under criminal proceedings for failure to pay an enhanced 
rent, if it was f ound^ genuine. But above all the zamindar 
could manipulate or choose to ignore the legal system. He 
could proceed by the falsification of patwarl ' papers or, if 
discovered, follow another method. Even in opposition to a
strang raiyat, a threat to go to court was often enough to 
enable the zamindar to enhance rents. The growing gulf 
between the zamindar and raiyat in later periods took the 
form of agrarian unrest.30
Most of the raiyats were poor in the districts of 
Bihar, and most of zamindars enhanced rent and oppressed the 
lower castes until most of them became in effect tenants-at- 
will. No particular solution to this problem was sorted out 
even after a century of legal battles. Rents were high, 
enhancement relatively easy, and additional cesses very 
common.
The determination of the rent of a raiyat was made by 
the zamindars on the basis of either the actual rent payable 
in cash or kind or of abwabs to be paid in kind and demanded 
in the most repressive and illegal manner. The payment of 
abwabs (illegal cesses) was as old as the social servitude 
of the lower classes. Sometimes they formed a part of the 
actual rent. In Tirhut (Darbhangha and Muzaffarpur),
raiyats were found who were parting with more than half of 
their produce in the 1870s as a result of abwabs included in 
the rent. The evils of abwabs|yere found also in the
i
complicated system of mankhap (a kind of produce rent) most 
prevalent in the rice-cropped areas in the early part of the 
nineteenth century. However, in the course of legal changes 
in regard to the payment of money rent, some changes also 
took place in the payment of abwabs.
First, where zamindars failed to enhance the legal rent 
of the raiyat, they often succ eded by the indirect method 
of imposing abwabs. The government was well aware of this 
manipulation^ a weapon of the zamindars for centuries. The 
officials tried to investigate and prevent it up to a point, 
but it was not possible or desirable from their point of 
view to break the long social and economic dominance of the 
zamindars over the raiyats; financially it was productive 
for the government as well as the zamindars. Even in 1872 
when it was realized that zamindars had confiscated and 
ignored very many rights of the raiyats supposedly 
guaranteed by the government, it was not thought prudent to 
intervene. By this time the British thought it too
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dangerous to distort the social relationships between the 
upper and lower classes in the society. Therefore, they 
offered no concrete solution to the problem of abwabs, 
in^pite of the legal provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 
1885. The abwabs were important reasons for rent disputes, 
the poverty of the raiyats, and the increase in the rental 
income of the zamindars which was not recorded in the rent 
rolls however.
The Settlement Officer of North Bihar, Stevenson-Koore, 
recorded thirteen types of abwabs payable by the raiyats in 
addition to their rents. Among these were: Tahir (writing
fees): Badarat ("miscellaneous charges at half to one anna); 
Beshi (excess enhancement, meaning the part of payment to be 
paid to the rent-collector) ; Kharcha (to meet the expenses 
of the collection of rent by the landlord); Salami (amount 
paid to the malik on the settlement of occupancy to 
cultivate lands); Dak-Berhj Batta or Batta Company (half or 
one anna paid to compensate for the short weight of the 
rupee introduced by the East India Company) . Clearly such 
demands, resting on custom rather than law, and still 
forming a major part of the rental income of the zamindars, 
were also vital for estate and village officials such as 
weighmen, watchmen, gomashtas and goraits, who were 
concerned with the collection of rent and the division of 
grain. The abwabs differed from region to region, but 
generally amounted to one fourth or one third of the annual 
rent. In some cases it could be more. When abwabs were 
consolidated with the rental income, the amount was reduced 
but the net rental demand naturally went up. The abwabs 
formed an important portion of the produce, and to meet them 
the higher qualities of grain were sold. The payments 
undoubtedly reduced what was available for consumption by 
the cultivators.
The growing bitterness between landlords and tenants 
after the 1890s, made some of the zamindars define the 
collection of abwabs through pattas. Obligations of the 
raiyats were recorded in regard to such payments as dak- 
kharcha made by the zamindar for district postage, or the
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income tax paid by the zamindars, for which additional 
payments by the raiyats were made obligatory.
Abwabs undoubtedly raised the intake from rents, but 
the next question to be examined is more complicated - the 
agricultural prices at different times in relation to 
increases in the rent rate. The Director of the Land 
Records and Agricultural was of the opinion that the rental 
demand was growing as a result of increases in staple food 
prices over the years. On the other hand one reason for the 
price rises was the increase in the acreage of commercial 
crops at the expense of the area under food crops. This 
exaggerated the impact of the rental demand on the 
subsistence of the raiyat. Practice and law nevertheless 
linked rent increases to the production of valuable crops.
One question therefore is how the enhancement of rent 
compared with the market rate for food crops, and also with 
the cultivated area in the tenants' holdings, taking single 
and double cropping into account. Another complication is 
the dominant peasants who were proprietors at one place and 
tenants at another. Yet another is the rental paid to 
intermediaries; the rent rates of the poor raiyats often 
could not be discussed by the Settlement Officers. The true 
rent payers were mostly those cultivating tenants who held 
up to one and half acres in the bhit lands and three to four 
acres in the rice cropped areas. The rich tenants paid rent 
to the zamindar but also extracted the maximum from sub­
tenants, the small cultivators.
This rental income, at the expense of the cultivating 
class, increased under the changing agricultural conditions, 
helped by local custom and the rent laws. This is clear 
first in regard to the cultivated areas. Part of the 
increase, especially in Champaran, was due to the extension 
of cultivation and to more valuable crops, especially rice, 
indigo, poppy and sugar. By the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century on the other hand, the scope for the 
extension of cultivation was marginal, except in Champaran, 
and rental increases were thus at the expense of the poor 
raiyats, in a growing population. The gross rental of the 
zamindar increased even during the famines and crop
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failures.31 Finally, an increase in double cropping was 
undoubtedly atjribut^able to rental demands; but this too 
caused hardship in the longer term by reducing the fertility 
of the soil.
Turning to prices, we find that the district officers 
of Saran and Muzaffarpur argued that they did not greatly 
affect the peasant economy, especially the small 
cultivators, because the largest part of the food grain was 
not marketed but consumed by the cultivators. Thus payments 
of rent depended upon the cash crops. To the extent that 
this was true, it was a problem for the rent payers: non-food
crops were never taken into consideration in dealing with 
claims for enhancement of rent on the ground of a rise in 
the agricultural prices; the law apparently permitted a 
raiyat*s rent to be enhanced on account of a rise in^prices 
which benefit ed him not at all. On the other hand, the law 
was also always in favour of increasing the rent when the 
raiyat produced cash crops. But, even more important,as the 
average size of the raiyat's holdings was decreasing, there 
was a gradually reducing likelihood that they would have any 
surplus to sell in the market3 .^ The pressure of population 
was important in this respect too. The reality was that the 
prices paid for indigo and opium remained low while food 
prices rose, and only a small proportion of the cultivated 
area was devoted to cash crops——  hardly six per cent for 
opium, and a maximum of ten per cent for indigo. Hence, 
despite the district officers' views, food crops did 
increasingly have to be sold to meet the rent. This change 
occurred while, as Stevenson-Moore showed, the average size 
of holdings had so diminished that, at 2V6 acres, it just 
sufficed to provide the necessary food for the support of 
the cultivators. It follows from this that the relation of 
food grain prices to rent which seemed equitable where there 
was a true surplus, was increasingly irrelevant to the 
pressure of the rent demand upon the raiyat. The
enhancement in rent naturally caused the greatest hardship 
to the raiyats who had small holdings which mayjbe called 
"subsistence" holdings33 and indeed the general reduction in
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the size of raiyats' holding was affected by the gradual 
increase in the rent rate, and the impoverishment of the
raiyats. Ve must also note the impact of famine on the 
ability to pay- The North Bihar districts suffered
repeatedly from famine, at least twice in 1890s. This
clearly further reduced the surplus available to pay rent
and to buy food grains. But it is difficult to work out the
actual figures. Since the prices of food grains varied from 
district to district, the effective rent rates also 
differed. The prices differed also at different levels-for 
the producers, middlemen and retailers. The rent rates 
differed also according to the crops sold in order to meet 
the demand of zamindars. We can assume that all these 
variables were most disadvantageous to the weakest of the 
raiyats. Still, some indication of changes over time can be 
gained from rice prices, on the assumption that rice was the 
crop most commonly sold for rent. A comparison with rent 
rates will nonetheless underestimate the severity of the 
latter, in that rice prices to the cultivator may be assumed 
to have risen more than the prices for other non-food cash 
crops.
M. Finucane, when Deputy Collector of Gaya, suggested 
that the rental in the North Bihar districts had grown since 
the time of the Permanent Settlement, by 3.9 times in 
Muzaffarpur, 4.8 times in Darbhanga, 3 times in Saran and 
3.4 times in Champaran. Accurate as these figures were, 
Finucane*s investigations provide a tremendous amount of 
information about some specific estates where rent had been 
increased enormously. In one of the estates in Darbhanga, 
he found that the rent had gone up by 136 per cent to 
1883.3  ^ Other f igures suggest that rents went up about 40 
per cent between 1890 and 1900, and between 137 and 192 per 
cent between 1840 and 1899. The rise in agricultural prices 
was 73 per cent during the same period.33 Collins' 
investigation also shows a similar rise in rents in some 
villages in Muzaffarpur between 1840 and 1886-7, which 
occured again by the time of Stevenson-Moore's survey 
between 1892 and 1899. The increase ranged between 115 and 
192 per cent.3t
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While considering the rent rates and agricultural prices 
we have suggested that non-food prices rose very slowly in 
comparison with food prices. This was an argument which 
applied to the amounts paid to cultivators for opium and 
indigo. Prices for some other cash crops went up very 
considerably between the 1870s and 1890s. For example, 
sugarcane was sold at Rs. 2-12 annas per maund in the 1870s, 
but, in the form of unrefined sugar or gur, at Rs. 3-10 
annas per maund in the 1890s. Tobacco which in the 1870s 
was under 11 annas per maund was Rs. 5 per maund in the 
1890s. The price of cleaned cotton, Rs. 7 a maund in 1870s, 
was Rs 16 a mokund in the 1890s. The increase in the area of 
such cash crops, and also jute in Bengal, permitted an 
increase in the rents in many areas. But the effect was 
different in Bihar, with the possible exception of areas 
where the acreage of cultivation under sugar increased. The 
mere extension of acreage under cash crops does not indicate 
general prosperity in the absence of other comparisons.
The rise in agricultural prices provided zamindars with 
a legal opportunity to enhance rents, and a means of 
coercing rights even without legal processes. At the same 
time, where money rents could not be so readily raised, the 
higher prices allowed the zamindar to benefit by reverting
to produce rents. The prices reduced the purchasing power
of the raiyats, and often forced them to rely for
subsistence on poorer, less nutritious grains. They ate
these - kodo, sawan, marua, jowar, khesari, and several 
other grains in order to save the ever more valuable crop of 
rice to pay their rents.
During famines even more marginal foods were consumed. 
There were in addition mi lk-products and fruits such as 
mangoes and 1icUifr which usually were not intended for sale 
but for subsistence. On the other hand the households could 
not avoid purchases such as salt, clothing and fuel. They 
also had obligations for religious functions and marriages, 
and the expense of illness. Thus they often had no
alternative but to approach the mahajan for loans, or 
mortgage their land. Therefore the problems which started 
with a high rent rate were endless.
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What was the size of population adversely affected by 
the rental demand? According to the Settlement Officers of 
North Bihar, the illegal enhancement of rent affected 92 per 
cent of the holdings of the lower castes, to judge from a 
small survey made in the late nineteenth century. Adding 
legal enhancement to the considerations, we find that 12 per 
cent of the holdings of the higher castes were affected, and 
88 per cent of those of the lower castes, 37 Thus the law 
allowed the enhancement of rent of the lower caste raiyats 
in particular, and reinforced the dominance of the upper 
castes. But it would also appear that the land-owners were 
not able to enhance the rent of higher castes to appreciable 
degree*. Especially in certain places in Muzaffarpur and 
Darbhanga, the landlords were unable to enhance rents on the 
holdings of upper castes due to powerful resistance and the 
tendency of the rich raiyats for litigation. But the 
majority were subsistence raiyats. If the rent rates of the 
high caste raiyats, already lower, were raised to a degree 
less than the average, then the pressure on the economically 
weak was even greater than it seemed in the statistics.
This discussion has revealed the implications involved 
in the increase of average rents during a hundred years of 
British rule. The officials thought the zamindars coercive 
and despotic. The zamindars used legal and customary rights 
to enhance rents or if necessary they demanded illegal 
abwabs. They pretended that the Tenancy Laws would reduce 
their authority, but they did not in fact detract from their 
ability to increase rents. B.B. Chaudhuri says that
persistent economic needs were a powerful motive for the
zamindars to increase rent.33 This was hardly so in North 
Bihar, where the zamindars were more free and more 
oppressive than elsewhere. The hereditary and customary
rights of zamindars were reinforced by legal powers. They 
were able to deny the occupancy right of raiyats. They did 
not issue rent receipts. They made forged rent rolls.
Dispossession of the raiyats was general. The private land 
of zamindars became more important. Tenants became
necessary not just as rent-payers but as agricultural
labourers due to the growing demand for labour for the
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production of cash crops. But the fact that rent was paid 
from the grain sold in the market increased the bargaining 
power of the rich peasants and zamindars, and brought
greater hardship to the poor. Labour became cheaper in real 
terms. The commercialisation of agriculture also improved 
the relative position of the rich. Even the preparation of 
the record of rights merely defined the rights of zamindars, 
and while it provided for an increasing rental demand under 
the law, it had little effect in curbing the rich peasant's 
and tenure-holder' s informal hold over the mass of the
cultivators. Because it ignored the real status of the 
small raiyats and under-tenants it did nothin to prevent the 
economic pressures which were creating a population of 
tenants-at-wi 11 in practice as well as in law. 39 The
provisions of the Act of 1885 meant to protect the rights of
raiyats but benefited only the rich peasants. One could 
agree with Stevenson-Moore that the tenantry of Bihar was a 
downtrodden body of men in complete subservience to their 
powerful zamindars.40
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CHAPTER V
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR
The study of this subject, the condition of 
agricultural labour and the lower classes of population 
under the colonial period^ has attracted the attention of 
historians in recent periods, basically, comparing the 
impoverished condition of the mass of population in 
contemporary period searching for livelihood and relief. In 
this context certain connotations, such as de­
peasant isat ion, deindustrialization, poverty and
unemployment and immigration and migration of labour from 
one area to another as a result of populationjpressure are 
given to be the ideas of main concern in the Indo-Gangetic 
area of North Bihar in the late nineteenth century. The 
causes and dominating factors could be investigated on the 
basis of existing economic and political issues as well as 
the demand and supply paradigm of British agrarian policy 
and industrial and commercial networks at home and abroad.
It is sometimes suggested that until recently 
agricultural labour did not form an important part of 
production in the agrarian society of Bihar. But the study 
of agricultural labour is linked with that of bondage and 
slavery, features with a long history in Indian society.
The social and economic problems arising in the vetrna 
mechanism of the society cannot be ignored. The social 
hierarchy, forces of production relation in agriculture and 
in the political economy need illustration in the historical 
setting of class differentiation. The landless labourers 
coming from^agricultural community formed the lower classes 
of the population. Their livelihood depended on bonding or 
wages, agricultural labour, domestic service and also 
cultivating a bit of land which they possessed either 
through inheritance or from their maliks in payment for 
services rendered to them. The main idea is to trace the 
rise and growth of such a class of population in the 
Gangetic area of North Bihar in the nineteenth century. The
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causes and dominating factors in this regard have to be 
investigated on the basis of literary and other evidence.
This chapter will discuss these continuities in the 
situation of labour, and then the changes which were 
occurring by the later half of the nineteenth century. It 
is sometimes suggested that the number of landless labourers 
increased as a result of the population increase. It is
difficult to know whether it was so. Detailed information 
is not available before the late nineteenth century. 
Estimates were made by Buchanan-Hami1ton early in^nineteenth 
century on the basis of his observations of Patna, Shahabad, 
Purnea, Bhagalpur and other areas of Bihar and Bengal. But 
the East India Company's administration did not, at this
stage, maintain a concrete record of the classes of the 
population who played no direct part in revenue or trade and 
who caused the Company's government no immediate problem.
An objective view of the various classes of population 
according to occupational distribution, access to land and 
so on — sufficient to provide a good idea of their condition 
and status-^did not appear before the various types of
enquiries and departmental investigations, which followed 
the Statistical Accounts compiled under V. V. Hunter in the 
1870s. From this period on fairly reliable information was 
collected by the district officers, district medical 
officers and jail superintendents. The Famine Commission 
Reports after 1867 also provided evidence on agricultural 
and social conditions. Some idea of the numbers having no 
land and suffering due to paucity of resources can be
gleaned from these sources and from the Census Reports after 
1871.
The increasing British attention was a by-product of 
other policies followed in the later half of the nineteenth 
century to meet agrarian problems. Then the Bengal Tenancy 
Act of 1885|attempted a classification of the population, 
though the changes it brought hardly concerned the interests 
of the landless. Most important, the British considered 
that the demand for more and improved agricultural 
production would be contradicted if a section of society was 
always indebted to the more prosperous. Hence the
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government was converted to the idea of investigating rural 
poverty, indebtedness and pauperization. Increasingly, the 
intti-CLive was taken to appoint committees to seek 
information relevant to trends in development and to the 
condition of the lower classes. In addition to the Famine 
Commission's Reports, there were special studies, notably 
Dufferin's Report in 1888 and the Memorandum on the Material 
Condition of the lower orders in Bengal between 1881 and 
1892. Besides that^the Report of the Bengal Labour Enquiry 
Commission <1896), and the Report on Labour in Bengal 
(1906), supplied valuable information about agricultural 
labourers and their migration to various sectors in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.
These studies reveal that the condition of labourers 
varied from region to region according to the land tenure 
system, the commercialization of agriculture, social and 
economic mobility, urban and industrial production 
relations, internal and external trade, and transport and 
communications. The level and growth of population were 
particularly important, as was migration. It is possible 
too that labour was affected, as a new class of landlord, 
and the development of usury both in village and town^ became 
more important in the later half of the nineteenth century 
due to the growth of the colonial economy cmdl the world 
market. In analysing these points this chapter will not 
only consider the fortunes of labour: it will sum up the
impact of legal and economic change on society - and 
especially the poor - in North Bihar.
The Early History of Labour and its continuity
The status of landless labourers and the lower classes 
of population under British rule in nineteenth century Bihar 
has an historical dimension. In ancient agrarian society, 
rich landlords or landowners controlled hundreds of acres of 
land extenting to several villages. They formed an upper 
class which was largely high caste - Brahmin, Kshatriya and 
others. References are found in the ancient Indian texts to
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villages conquered in war which were often put under 
cultivation by employed labourers. The supervision of such 
fields and asse ts was done by the owners themselves. 
According to patanjali, the landowners or rich peasants 
supervised the work of five ploughs. Such landowners were 
called gaamikas (those who commanded villages politically 
and economicaly) , and the labourers working for them were 
called bhatakas, karwakaras (servants) and dasas (slaves). 
Already therefore there was a system of domestic or personal 
servitude. Thus the transformation of sudras (lower castes) 
from the position of slaves and hired labourers into that of 
agriculturists was a great landmark in the rise of feudalism 
in agrarian society1.
In the early period, nonetheless, agricultural 
production was chiefly in the hand of the free peasants 
called vaisyas (a trading and cultivating community). It 
may seem that the dominant unit of production, therefore, 
was the small peasant family which controlled the necessary 
resources. But this method of control and enjoyment of 
surplus was also at the expense of artisans, hired labourers 
and agricultural domestic slaves belonging to the dasa 
community2 . This marked a historical trend and a setting 
for exploitation.
The social relationship between vaisyas and labour or 
artisans was based on the exchange of work for a share of 
grain. Moreover, the artisan class approximated in status 
to the agricultural labourers, who depended upon the menial 
jobs that were their caste occupation. They did not have 
economic power. Though the customary exchange of food for 
work always operated in the villages, the rich peasants, 
village headmen and zamindars were in control. They saw to 
it that artisans and the lower classes cultivated waste land 
even outside the village. The settlement of revenue was 
made by these people, and generally they collected the 
revenue and looked after agricultural production. Full 
authority belonged to the non-cultivating landw owner of the 
upper castes. Thus economic and social power worked
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together and the dominant authority in the village extracted 
the maximum surplus from the producers.
Taxation helped create and maintain this system, from 
the early periods of Indian society, under the dynamic rule 
of Hindu chiefs. They extracted sadabhaga, (one sixth of 
the produce) from the cultivators. In Bihar, as elsewhere 
revenue collection supported the ruling class who enjoyed 
this privilege on the basis of hereditary ownership of land. 
Under the Mughal rulers too there was a general extraction 
of taxes, tithes, and payment of various types of cesses and 
tributes to the dominant class of chiefs, rich peasants and 
maliks. These people still controlled agricultural
production. Landless labourers existed below the khud-kasht 
and pai-Kasht raiyats and formed the lowest category of 
society. They had no beneficial interest in land and crops. 
Their daily wages were paid in kind. In Bihar, the majority 
of the lower castes fell into this category (though the 
names of such castes varied from region to region)3 . It is 
certain that during the Mughal period between one fifth and 
one sixth of the population in rural areas were landless 
labourers belonging to these lower castes'*. The labourers 
were easily available to work for peasants who owned 
ploughs. They could not themselves hold sufficient 
cultiva^.ble land to endeavour to set themselves up as 
cultivating peasants. Therefore, over time the oppressor 
and the oppressed maintained the equilibrium of social and 
economic inequality.
Moreover, though the extraction of revenue was 
important, this imbalance could be maintained even without 
the interference of the state. The peasants and artisans, 
though they formed the major group of functionaries in the 
agrarian society, would not deviate from the work assigned 
to them, lest chaos befall the world3 . In the moral order 
in which they believed and to which they were subjected, 
they were bound to serve the Brahmins, Kashtriyas and other 
upper castes. The Mughal aristocracy would hardly break 
this custom and tradition. Indeed begar (forced labour) and 
hired labourers were found not only on the khas land
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of ^amindar^ and jagirdars but also on the khalisa land owned 
by the Emperor directly. Therefore, slavery was prevalent in 
Muslim society too.
Hence there was nothing peculiar about nineteenth 
century Bihar in regard to bonded labour. Studies show its 
long history and social basis in India. References occur in 
the work of Jolly, in the account of the Abbe Dubois and in 
Letourneau's study on bondage and slavery in ancient and
modern India. Anthropological and indological finding have
brought to light the stigma of labour in social practice and
the adaptation of Hindu Law to meet its existence and
status. R. Fick and Mrs. Rhys Davids in particular have 
emphasised the fact that the economic compulsion of labour 
by the dominant peasant and land owners was important for 
the purposes of agricultural production3 . Fick, writing of 
North East India, and the bondage of domestic servants, day 
agricultural labourers and slaves, claims that except in 
stray cases, their lot was miserable and they were often 
exposed to thrashing, imprisonment and bad food7.
The continuity of this system until the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, is attested to by the prevalence of 
references to bondage and slavery in literary texts, and in 
investigations into the condition of the lower classes. 
Buchanan-Hami1ton refers to the existence of bondage and 
slavery and the employment of agricultural labourers and 
domestic servants by the zamindars and rich peasants in 
Eastern India. His accounts describe the way of life of the 
landless without much comment on their condition, and reveal 
not only that slavery was well established, but that it was 
regarded as legitimate. The economy relied on the
compulsion of the weaker section of society by the strong.
The British did not at first forbid slavery in Bengal, 
but in 1794 the Governor General in Council prohibited the 
sale and transportation of slaves; the importation of slaves 
was also stopped in 1811. Slavery as such was abolished in 
the British Empire by an Act of Parliament in 1833. But in 
India it continued even after this period. Evidence of the 
sale and purchase of slaves is found in Bengali newspaper 
called ' Jnananvesan' of the early nineteenth century: -fb
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January 1840, a Zamindar bought a slave at the Bhagalpur 
slave bazar for forty rupees®. In India Slavery was
outlawed finally in 1843, after the efforts of Colebrooke 
and others, who concentrated on its prevalence in native 
states# The purchase and sale of slaves, including children^ 
in the streets of Calcutta and among the Brahmins in 
D arbhanga (Mithila area) and other parts of North Bihar, 
were also deplored by British officials and observers, such 
as Sir William Jones. Yet the law did not put an end to the 
practice. At best it diverted overt slavery into other forms 
of bondage, begari and the like. Poverty and misery for the 
bulk of the population continued. Since the practice of
using the services of slaves and bonded labour was dependent 
upon local influence, there was generally a lack of any 
unbonded labour force. People almost sold themselves when 
faced with the dire necessity for help, for example when 
they needed to pay for a daughter's marriage, or during 
grave circumstances. This slavery cannot be compared with 
slavery in western countries. The slaves were sold along 
with estates, but also regarded almost as members of their 
owners' household, entitled to food and clothes, and to be 
given gifts at certain Indian festivals. Given the
inequalities of the society, it was often better to be 
bonded than a hired labourer.
Labourers were not one organised class such as one may
find i-» modern census data. Hence one can only quantify
them, in the pre-British periods, on the basis of the caste
system and the occupational pattern of the various
communities who worked as agricultural labourers. In Bihar,
especially in the northern parts, both Hindu and Muslims were
divided by caste and occupation and a hierachy existed in
the society. In the southern parts, specially in the tribal
areas and parts of Bengal and Orissa too, tribal labour was
important, though in the course of time, these tribal people
ffie. t
were also incorporated into Hindu caste system. Some of 
this tribal labour migrated from the south to the northern 
parts.
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The estimates of the proportion of agricultural
labourers at the beginning of the nineteenth century relies
partly on census data from a much later time. Taking the 
data of 1872, we draw an inference from the occupational
pattern of the population and apply it to the pre-British 
period. A possible doubt about this procedure is that the 
proportion of landless labourers must have depended on the 
man:land ratio. This raises three questions: the size of
population, the system of tax extraction and the impact of 
caste dominance. Population was already high in much of 
north Bihar by the early nineteenth century, but certainly 
lower than at the end of the century. The average holding
was much larger in the earlier period. In theory, so long
as cultivators could get land for cultivation even on ghair- 
Jaini (where no revenue was demanded), the landless could
shift to unsettled or new lands. However, under both the
Mughals and the East India Company, the burden of taxation 
or land may be said to have been regressive, in that it fell 
most heavily on the small peasants.® Whether the land was
rented under the raiyati system or on the basis of share- 
cropping or batai, the assamis or cultivators were bound to 
pay tax to the Muquaddan (village headman). In turn, the 
hundreds of assamis engaged in cultivation worked with the 
help of hired labourers who were paid daily wages in cash or 
kind. The assamis were required to pay a heavy tax though 
they held a good part of the produce. Their obligations
imply that the mobility of the population had to be
restricted - labourers and cultivators were prevented from 
seeking new masters and the opening up of new lands was 
controlled by the headmen. The process of accumulation of a 
band of dependent agricultural labourers depended upon the 
cultivable land being mostly under the control of rich 
peasants and zamindars.
The lack of mobility was maintained, secondly, because 
most of the agricultural farm labour came from the lower
manual castes, who were engaged in ploughing, sowing, 
cutting and the carrying of crops, and from free non-
agricultural labourers, who tended cattle and looked after
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domestic work. These people formed a large bulk of the 
population in Bihar.
Only twenty five or thirty percent of the population 
were from agricultural castes; there were middle layers of 
society, such as weavers, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, potters, 
carpenters, malis (gardeners), and below them washermen,
sweepers, chamars, mal lahas, kahars, and hand-cart' and
bullock-cart drivers who came from the goalar, , dusadh or 
other castes. But virtually everyone was directly or 
indirectly engaged in agriculture^egardless of their caste
occupation. Very few were regarded traditionally as
labourers, but entire families of the lower classes worked 
for hire, the numbers varying only with the availability of 
cultivable land and the size of holdings. The reason was 
not necessarily that land was scarce, The reason was rather 
that agriculture, the managemnt of production and land, was 
customarily confined to dominant upper castes. Moeover, the 
agricultural labourers did not aspire to become the equal of 
the raiyat, the khud-kasht or peasant who owned cultivating 
plots. In this respect the traditional occupation was 
important. There appears to have been a close relation
between the proportion of agricultural castes on the one 
hand, and the proportion of the area under cultivation on
the other hand.
Population and Labour
The growth of population cannot be said to be the only 
reason j-of^ poverty in the North Bihar districts. There are 
various other factors such as local control, production and 
distribution j demand and supply^ andftt market price of 
agricultural products affecting the purchasing power of
labouring class during the time of scarcity. The density of
population is important in explaining poverty and
unemployment for a region like North Bihar. Population
growth is generally linked with recourses and the power of 
subsistence in agrarian society when people completely
depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In the North
Bihar districts, the growth of population can be said to be 
one of the factors of poverty and of the compulsive
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emigration of the labouring class by the late nineteenth 
century. Yet in Bihar cultivable land had long been scarce 
in proportion to the size of the population; and the 
distribution of land had also been unequal. Effective 
pressure of population on land was thus not a new phenomenon 
in the North Bihar districts in particular, or in much of 
India in general.
It is usually agreed that a considerable increase in 
population took place in Bihar from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Buchanan confirms this view. Taking 
into account a family size of five persons, the population 
would have doubled. However, we have no accurate figures; 
nor are there any systematic surveys except Buchanan's and 
the estimate by R. Montgomery Martin10; and there is no 
doubt that Buchanan's estimates are exaggerated. For more 
accurate information we have to wait for V. V. Hunter in the 
Statistical Account of Bengal, figures based on the census 
of 1872. Nonetheless, one can assume that there was 
population growth on the basis of certain principles. In 
the first place, one can argue that there is no marginal 
growth of population. Much of Bihar had suffered severe 
famine in the later half of eighteenth century resulting in 
heavy loss of life. It is valid to assume therefore, that 
early in the nineteenth century, when Buchanan's report was 
in preparation, there was a reduced and hardly growing 
population. But the Permanent Settlement was a landmark in 
the development of the landed aristocracy and the 
establishment of the modern zanindari system. This gave 
incentives to the zamindar to bring land under cultivation. 
Since the settlement was not made effective at a stroke in 
the north Bihar regions, the extension of cultivation took 
place over at least three to four decades. The consequent 
agricultural production allowed a gradual increase in 
population. This continued in different phases throughout 
the nineteenth century.
The indication^are, if one accepts the figures of 1872
as the first systematically compiled, that the population
grew from about 134 million in 1820 to 225 millions in 1871
ITin India. This increase occuned mainly during the period
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1844 to 1852. Between 1820 and 1844 there was a decline 
from 134 million to 131.8 millions as exhibited in the
British records. Between 1844 and 1852 the papulation
reached 151.9 millions, before rising to the figure given in 
1871. Thereafter the population grew more slowly until it 
was 281 million in 1901. Thus the estimated rate of
population growth in the province of Bihar can be said to be 
fifteen percent in the first half of the nineteenth century 
and ten percent in the second two decades if a moderate view 
about the growth of population is adopted.12
If we consider population as responding to natural 
calamities (famines and disease) and the level of
agricultural productivity, it seems that the periods between 
the last decades of the 18th century and the first three
decades of the nineteenth century were certainly
unfavourable. The period saw a decline in the cotton and
village handicraft industries. There are reports of the
material condition of the agricultural population declining 
for want of food. Crawford describes the diet of lower
caste labourers as quite unhealthy, and suggests that,
earning hardly more than rupees two to three rupees per 
family member before 1858, they could not afford to buy
sufficient food.13
In the Census Reports from 1872 to 1901, the variation 
of population suggests a similar period of decline. There
was a very heavy burden of papulation on the land in the 
North Bihar districts, but the reports indicate that there 
were also worsening conditions for the labouring classes.
The following table shows the variation of population 
in the north Bihar districts in different decades from 1872 
to 1901 in the districts of, Saran; Champaran, Muzaffarpur, 
Darbhanga, Bhagalpur, and Purnea.
T a bl e  7
North Bihar Area Population Density Variation of Population percentage 
Sq Miles
1872-1881 1881-91 1889-1901 1901-11
2 1 , 8 2 2  1 4 , 0 0 7 , 6 4 6  642 + 1 4 . 0  + 5 . 9  +.1 + 1 . 9
sources; Census Report 1921,
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Whether or not the underlying growth rate was truly as high 
as 14 percent (from 1872), the indication in these figures 
is that the expansion of cultivation and production was 
halted towards the end of the century. The period between 
1881-1900 was a period of scarcity, famine, plague and 
disease. There can be no doubt that malnutrition as a 
result of the failure of crops and the general rise in food 
prices affected the labouring classes. The growth of 
production was largely in commercial crops. Unemployed 
workers and tenants-at-wi11 were found to be leaving their 
village and taking up manual work either in indigo factories 
or in the cities. Within Bihar there were intricate 
patterns of population density. But a broad picture can 
also be seen. The regions to the north and south of the 
Ganges appear to be distinguishable in that 89.5 percent of 
the total area in the north Bihar region was cultivable at 
the close of the nineteenth century, whereas in the south 
the proportion was only 78.4 percent. The density of 
population in both the regions was highest in the area 
touching the Gangetic plain and diminished as one travelled 
away from the river. There is only one reason for this 
difference: the early settlement in the riparian tracts of
the Ganges valley related to the affluence of agricultural 
production, trade and commerce. 1 In course of time when 
cultivation increased and transport and communications 
became more convenient, the pressure of population increased 
also. This was found in the rice growing areas of North 
Bihar in the later parts of the nineteenth century. The 
tendency of people had always been to move towards more 
productive areas. Therefore with the increase of pojulation, 
more arable land had also been brought under cultivation.
If we consider the period between 1881 and 1891 and one 
of the most heavily populated districts of North Bihar, 
Saran, we find that the density of population increased from 
859 to 923 persons per square mile. But even in 1931, the 
density was only 927 per square mile. The Census Reports of 
1921 stated that the power of subsistence of the Saran 
agricultural land had reached its maximum extent years
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before. The fact was that after the period 1881 - 91, there
was little or no increase in population in Saran for forty
years. This implies that the emigration during this period
was merely a means of reducing the burden on the soil.
However, there were occasional heavy losses of population
due to malaria, plague and other epidemic diseases,
especially in the most densely populated areas. Therefore,
although the pressure of population was necessary for
emigration, the true reason for it was the lack of or the
cost of access to agricultural land. Such was the case in
Man;} hi, Chapra and Sonpur in Saran in 1891 where emigration 
r
occurred to other districts and to Bengal. The same tendency 
was found in Sitamarhi and Hajipur sub-divisions in the
districts of Muzaffarpur.
In 1891, the density of population was 1,251 persons 
per square mile of cultivated land in Hajipur and 1,089 
persons in the Sitamarhi sub-divisions. But the movements of 
population from these areas towards the north was due to the 
extension of cultivation there. The relatively low rates of 
rent attracted cultivators as well as labourers. But, 
taking into account all the shifts of population, it was
mostly the labouring class of people who moved. They went 
in search of livelihood. Indeed in the more southerly areas 
were to be found most of the rich zamindars and occupancy 
raiyats and most of the double cropping. The zamindars 
benefited from the high rent rates, but well-to-do 
cultivators also enjoyed better living conditions and better 
transport and communications. Farming methods were more 
developed. But the people who did not share these privileges 
were being squeezed out, and emigrated to other areas as 
labourers. Hence the degree of inequality in the society 
affected emigration; it increased because the inequality, 
and not just because the population,was growing.
One can put this another way. In Darbhanga the
concentration of population was much greater in the southern 
parts than the north and middle areas. The density of 
population had became intense, particularly in relation
to the scarcity of cultivable land. Samastipur had the
densest population, 1000 persons per square mile. But theba.Sic
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reason for this level of population was a concentration of 
land in the hands of zamindars and their failure to maximise 
the cultivated area. Raj Darbhanga took interest in the 
development of those areas which were covered in saline 
afflorescence and which grew nothing but long grass.
Finally, the fact that the py'-'ol? was more the
burden on the soil, did not reduce the misery of the 
population: it merely shifted it from one place to another.
There was exploitation and mismanagement in the areas which 
received the migrants, in the tea-gardens, in Bengal, in 
Burma, and in the Central Provinces. And as the number of 
immigrants was fairly small, they hardly mattered from the 
point of view of the long-run material welfare of the 
labourers.
Hence we can contrast the cases of Darbhanga and 
Champaran. In regard to Darbhanga and also Muzaffarpur, 
P.C. Tallent in the Census Report of 1921 commented that
population was at a maximum level, given the almost total
dependence on agriculture. Already at the close of the 
nineteenth century, 80 percent of the cultivable area had 
been brought under cultivation13. A P. Macdonnell made
almost the same estimate in 1875; and probably that level 
had been reached, at least for the southern parts, even in 
the first half of the century. Labourers were mostly under 
the control of tfii Darbhanga Raj and lesser ^amindars. There 
were Brahmins engaged in their profession as well as working 
as cooks and domestic servants in houses of rich farmers and 
zamindars. But the condition of the lower caste population 
was worse than in other districts, especially those with an 
even more dense populations. The effect was slavery in a
social form. The people of the district were not very 
adventurous, though some of the unskilled labourers went to 
work in transport and jute presses and mills in Bengal. But 
the underlying reason for the circumstances of the poor was 
the dominance of the zamindars, and the social customs and 
economic norms which they had developed. By contrast, 
Champaran was attractive to migrating labour because of the 
availability of employment in its south-eastern corner.
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Although the climate was unhealthy, people from Saran and 
Muzaffarpur sought seasonal employment, especially in the 
indigo industry. In addition, local tribal communities were 
mostly engaged in manual work, tilling, sowing seeds and 
harvesting. They worked as domestic servants as well, and 
also never aspired to go out of the district for employment. 
The density of population was only 507 persons per square 
mile in 1901, and natural conditions were favourable to the 
growth of population in the northern tracts of the district 
as a result of agricultural expansion. But the conditions 
for the labourers were little better in Champaran, where 
they were apparently in demand, than in Darbhanga, where 
they were plentiful.
Labour and the Expansion of Cultivation
There are some contradictions in the agrarian history 
of North Bihar in the nineteenth century. On one hand we 
find a decline of cultivation in most parts of the districts 
as a result of the decay of the river system, the lack of 
irrigation and the low incentive for the land — owning
classes. On the other hand the population was growing, and 
there was an extension of cash crop cultivation, especially 
of indigo, opium, tobacco, sugar and oilseeds. In some 
places, such as the northern parts of Champaran, with its 
recurring problem of fever, cultivation spread into
unsuitable areas. There is evidence of dislocation and of 
high migration. The number of emigrants and servants
supplied from Saran and other districts suggest that the 
landless class was increasing and becoming poorer while
agriculture became more commercial. The explanation lies in 
class differences.
The number of agricultural labourers and of the lower 
class of population in the North Bihar districts increased 
during the nineteenth century. At the same time, the area 
under cultivation expanded, and the demand for labour 
increased, both inside the districts and outside Bihar. 
But, various factors affected the demand and supply and the 
conditions of labour.
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Ve have noted that the second hall of the nineteenth 
century was a period of growth in agricultural productioon 
and in population. By the close of the century, there was
hardly any room for further increase in the cultivated area,
or, therefore, in population. The unskilled and unemployed 
labour force was being forced out from the agricultural 
sector to industrial and urban centres, in search of 
alternative employment, irrespective of caste-occupations.
The expansion of cultivation in the north Bihar 
districts varied from region to region during the period 
1872-1901, depending on the nature of soil, climate, and the 
system of land control, as well as the utilization of the
labour force. For example, the decade, 1872-81, saw rapid
growth in cultivation, the percentage varying between 23.1 
percent in the district of Darbhanga and 10.5 percent in the 
district of Saran. But in all districts, the percentage of 
the increase started to fall between 1881 and 1891, and in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, there was in 
most districts a decline in the area under cultivation. The 
following table shows the variation </* fttt, extension of 
cultivation in the districts of Patna Division during 1872 - 
1901:
Table.2
Years
Districts of Patna Division 1872-81 1881-91 1891-1901
Darbhanga + 23. 1 + 6.4 + 3.9
Champaran + 19.5 + 7.9 - 3.7
Muzaffapur + 14.9 + 5.0 -I- 1.5
Saran + 10.5 + 7.3 - 2.2
Patna + 12.6 + 0.9 - 8.4
Shahabad + 13.9 + 5.8 - 4.7
(Source: Census Report of India 1911, volume 4, p. 124)
The growth of population and the expansion of cultivation
were generally linked, but in some areas production
increased for other reasons. Boserup's distinction between
less and more frequently cropped rather than uncultivated
and cultivated land, can be appliedie\ When there was
incentive for cultivation with new techniques ocoJi double
fif
cropping^ and the growing^commercial crops increased, these 
were alternatives to the search for new arable lands and the 
movement of agricultural labour from one district to
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another. But in North Bihar these options were taken up 
largely to provide profits for the few, and none to a degree 
that matched the existing high levels of population, despite 
some movement from crowded to sparsely^ -  populated areas. 
In the North Bihar districts, there was less scope for new 
cultivation after 1891 anyway. In this respect it was 
unlike the Eastern Bengal districts where a large growth of 
population and thereby great scope for extension of 
cultivation was possible1-7.
In this situation two new factors affected the relative 
position of labour. One was the British concept of land 
tenure. In the first place, it might be seen that the 
incentive in the Permanent Settlement of 1793 to bring more 
land under cultivation and for clearance of jungle would 
accelerate agricultural production, and hence increase the 
demand for agricultural labour and the daily wages of manual 
workers. However, the wel 1^ — ^def i ned land-tenure also
institutionalised the rights of various types of 
landholders. Because zamindars and fixed^rate tenants were 
made secure, the position of labour was also fixed. The 
British made categorical distinctions between the privileged 
and non-pnvi leged classes. They divided society in terms 
of categories, and later into castes and tribes based on 
birth or race and occupation. Even the statistics collected 
by the officials on the economic condition and standard of 
living were often given shape by caste criteria. Caste was 
taken to justify the economic status of different categories 
of the population. The principle adopted in land legislation 
and administration as well as in distribution of land was 
thus hierarchical1®. This accelerated the exploitation of 
the poor, and reinforced the attitudes of the upper classes 
towards the lower. Moreover, the revenue system perpetuated 
the fact that the larger share of land holdings was in the 
hands of the upper castes: they were also made more able to
manage and control land. Thus such extension of cultivation 
as there was in the districts of North Bihar was initiated 
by the upper caste zamindars and rich peasants (as well as 
European planters). They employed lower caste labourers to 
increase production, but had no incentive to change their
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conditions. They first paid the high revenue demand, and
later increased their profits. There is no doubt that
agricultural labourers and lower classes of population were
those from non-occupancy raiyats and tendints-at-wi 11.
The British view of Indian society, caste and cultural 
differences, brought into practice in the administration as 
well as in land tenure, thus reinforced the existing 
structure from the late eighteenth century onwards. Caste-was 
influential at all social levels. Buchanan observed that 
the privileged class. of Brah^mins, Rajputs, Kayasthas,
Saiyads and Pathans occupied as a matter of right whatever 
land they needed for their houses and orchards free of rent. 
They were also given land for cultivation on reduced rents 
or even free. The second category of tenants, the trading 
community and money lenders, could lease small plots and 
cultivate with hired agricultural labourers. But they paid 
a very heavy rent. The third category were under-raiyats 
with an occupancy right. They worked as bataidar or share­
croppers. But finally, there was a category of under- 
raiyats who had no record of occupancy right and who rented 
land from tenants at high rents1®. The Permanent Settlement 
ensured that the privileged class of zamindar and land­
owners and rich tenants would extract rent from the lower 
classes of cultivators. It also ensured the employment of 
labour. These were both share croppers, and agricultural 
labourers working on daily wages having little or no land of 
their own. They farmed the real backbone of agricultural 
production.
The period between 1793 and 1859 was a transitional 
period with experiments of land legislation on the one hand, 
and on the other the existing hierarchical agrarian society 
struggling to adapt to the British system. There were some 
British attempts to reduce the power of zamindars and give 
rights to the tenants, but the growth of share croppers, the 
indebtedness of small tenetnts, and the exploitation of 
cultivators and lower classes by a powerful economic class 
were the most notable features of the period. They gave 
rise to concern in the 1870s, and thereafter it became clear 
to the government that there existed a class not only in
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Bihar but throughout India, which suffered from social and 
economic exploitation, even starvation, having insufficient 
means to support their families and hardly any right to hold 
land20. These people had no access to professional sources 
of rural credit or to commercial markets: they had no assets
on which to borrow except their labour. Moreover, the 
direct appropriation of agricultural surplus through the use 
of a cheap labour force reduced the pressure to maximise 
agricultural production. Therefore, agricultural output 
hardly sustained the growing population. Between 1800 and 
1850, the quality of land and agricultural production were 
neglected in areas of the Gangetic plain where there was 
pressure of papulation. The powerful landowners were
interested in their rent and the Company's government in the 
regular collection of revenue. The incentive was moreover 
towards indigo and opium production rather than agricultural 
crops. The immediate beneficiaries were the planters and 
rich landowners and zamindars. But the landowners had little 
incentive to improve methods of cultivation. The general 
practice was to allow crop to follow crop without 
intermission and without any initiative being taken by the 
zamindar or the government to increase the productivity of 
the soil or provide relief to the growing number of landless 
and poor agricultural labourers. Hence, as the population 
increased, the land produced diminishing returns, thus 
further reducing the condition of poor.
In England, during the same period, oppressive 
landlords also employed agricultural labourers part-time 
and at-will. Privatisation of the proprietary right was 
more dominant in England than India. Under English law a 
landlord was the real master of his property. In India other 
hereditary rights in land qualified this legal right in 
practice. But also the English landlords took the initiative 
in production as they gained a direct profit from it; 
therefore, they exploited the labour force to produce the 
maximum output. In India, however, social dominance was 
more prominent than legal rights. In Bihar only a few big 
zami ndari estates took much initiative for the extension of 
cultivation after 1793. Moreover, under the foreign power,
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while experiments for settling the land-tenure system and 
other latey* pol i tical changes were taking place, land owners 
were much more worried about their proprietary rights and 
their rent, and hardly cared for the productivity of land.
A second factor producing change for the agricultural 
labour force was the creation of the international economy. 
British economic policy was directed towards free and 
private trade. The Charter Act of 1813 put an end to the 
monopoly of the East India Company and free merchants were 
provided with special licence to trade lawfully. Under the 
Act of 1833, the freedom was provided to reside, hold land 
and trade without licence in the Presidencies of Bengal, 
Madras and Bombay (Charter Act, clauses 81 - 86). By this 
time there was a growing demand for raw material for the 
developing industrial revolution in England. The British 
money market had been growing steadily year by year, after 
the close of the Napoleonic war, in the Mediterranean 
countries and also in the USA. In India in general, and 
Bengal Presidency in particular, the situation was quite 
different from Britain from the point of view of the 
structure of society, but the existence of a large labour 
force in the first half of the nineteenth century favoured 
capitalistic agriculture. Apart from this, from 1857 to
\£bJ>0-
1865,ttiere ^  maj or movement of British capital towards India to 
transform the land with public works and investment of the 
rupee loans in subsequent war and annexations floated in 
Calcutta. Such investments were made by civil and military 
servants of the former East India Company for safe-keeping 
of their accumulations* As an independent mercantile 
establishment developed, the trade and exchange in banking 
were financed by the servants of the East India Company too. 
The capitalist class, in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, were in good possesion of wealth and plantation 
mortgages, shares in the mercantile and banking 
establishments and rupee loans, which had been brought from 
India from time to time by officials. These interests 
represented simply portions of the Indian spoils and revenue 
invested in India. They did not constitute an export of
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British capital but only the income from /JtT entered into
the commercial balances. By such revenues and profits,
England derived^  : r. . - an average annual income of
three or four million pounds from its Indian estate for
seventy years (from 1800 to 1870) with neither expense nor
trouble to itself21. Thus the annual economic drain from
India affected those who depended upon their labour, and the
growth of trade merely worsened their conditions, especially
in Bihar and the Bengal presidency, where there was hardly
any large-scale industry established during this period. The
labouring class became even more completely dependent upon
w
agriculture. Its comgrcialization merely ensured that they 
worked either in the European indigo lands or on the lands 
of rich farmers or zamindars.
Above all, the effect was to narrow the options of 
employment in the agricultural areas, especially for former 
artisans. The rapid growth of unemployment and the movement 
of agricultural labourers, unskilled and skilled, from one 
place to another in search of employment, especially in the 
district-towns and villages in the early years of nineteenth 
century, increased the burden on the land. One important 
factor was the decline of cottage industry, especially in 
Bihar, in the face of Manchester competition, and the
failure to develop alternatives within the region.
The Paradox of Labour Scarcity
To assess the importance of these legal and economic 
changes for the labour force, we must consider in more
detail the question of labour supply, and in particular the 
way that it both seemed to be scarce, and also was found to
be so much in surplus as to lead to famines and to
government intervention to assist emigration. Ve will
consider the suppoSe-d scarcity first.
Buchanan referred to the dearth of free non-
agricultural labour in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century. But he included merely: (1) those who
tended cattle; <2) those who served as coolies or porters; 
and (.3) domestic servants. He thought the agricultural
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labourers were broadly of "two classes — —  the regular 
ploughman and the ordinary day labourers. The ploughman 
generally cultivated the land of his 'master' on a share- 
cropping basis as in the later period. The day labourers 
were generally employed to weed, transplant, and water the 
plants, but especially for reaping which they received an 
allowance of 5 1/4 percent of the produce22. The regular
plough man in Bihar received higher wages than a day 
labourer, either three seers of grain a day during the 
ploughing seasons, or an equivalent in cash23. Women also 
worked as day-labourers for weeding and transplanting, 
earning about eight annas each. The non-agricultural
labourers earned a rupee or two, during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, for occasional work such as loading 
and unloading goods. A domestic servant earned one and a 
half rupee a month with food and clothing, or otherwise two 
to three rupees a month.
Two developments began in the early nineteenth century,
and related to these variations in the wages of various
categories of labourers. Onvthe one hand there was the rapid
ijt
decline in the cotton industry, which led^the unemployment 
of numerous industrial workers. On the other hand, in 
Eastern India as a whole, there was a large expansion 
between 1813 and 1833 in the production of raw silk, opium 
and indigo: it would be thought that, especially as it was
accompanied by some expansion of the cultivated area, this 
would have increased the demand for agricultural labour 2A. 
The demand was also increased by the growth of trade. There 
were even signs of shortages. Difficulties arose over 
transportation for the Company's supplies and private 
merchant's goods between parts of Bengal Presidency in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1803, the Magistrate 
of Patna wrote to the Bengal government that boatmen and 
coolies were not available to conduct boats laden with 
public stores for upper provinces. Therefore, assistance of 
other service men was sought to discharge the duty2S. 
Similar difficulties were faced by merchants, and by 
government servants during the 1820's in moving baggage from 
one place to another. The magistrate of Patna had to
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request the Army to provide porters, and use all his power 
and influence to obtain labour in Patna26. Moreover, 
advance payments had to be made before workers could be 
engaged.
One response was to employ convicts. Early in the 
nineteenth century, prisoners were used for the construction 
and repair of roads in Muzaffarpur and Hajipur— 110 of them 
according to the Magistrate of Tirhut. But this source of 
labour was restricted to the vicinity of jails: the
magistrate would not deploy the prisoners far from 
headquarters because of guarding and accommodating them27. 
Instances of convicts being employed on roads were also 
found in the Patna and Gaya districts. In 1815, the 
Magistrate of Bihar employed convicts at different places 
under military guard: another mflitary detachment was posted
in Gaya. 2e*
One explanation of the shortages of labour for 
government needs and for the low wages, especially for non- 
agricultural work, is the persistence of forced labour in 
Bihar. The norm for repairing roads and other building 
works was that raiyats were dragged to them from their 
fields. A second reason was that social conservatism
reduced competition. The displaced weavers>couId work in 
agriculture and as porters. But it was beneath their 
dignity to work as labourers: they were people who had
pursued an independent calling as manufacturers, or a semi- 
independent business as journeymen—weavers or cottonbeaters. 
Physically too, coming from sedentary occupation, weavers 
found load carrying and digging tiring and irksome. They 
were unused to working in public, and feared the danger of 
carrying luggage long distance. A third explanation was
migration of weaving population, specially those living near
roads. Most of the villages which had been famous for
cotton manufacture and as centres for weaving and handcrafts 
became practically depopulated.
Finally, one factor which kept down the wages of 
coolies so that they were less than those for journeymen 
weavers and agricultural labourers in the early years of the 
1830s was certainly the growing demand of commercial
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agriculture. The same pattern appeared in Bengal. Above 
all, the apparent incompatibility of an increasing demand 
for agricultural labour and a growing supply from other 
sectors, is explained by the manner of this agricultural 
expansion. The important question during this period was 
the production of commercial crops. It was at the initiative 
of a new market-oriented class, that is, European indigo 
planters, landlords and zamindars who were given priority in 
the north Bihar cultivated areas. These people showed the 
enterprise to invest capital (made from trade and commerce) 
in the production of new crops. This need for labour in both 
agricultural and non - agricultural sectors increased, but 
their social and economic control meant that they had no 
reason to appeal to market forces to secure labour which did 
not receive returns comparable to the value of output at 
least until the 1860s and 1870s. Only in the late
nineteenth century when labour was being sought by mills and 
commercial centres, was there some limited review of wages.
Gnvprntnppt Intervention and Emigration
Gradually in the late nineteenth century, the 
government came to believe there was a crisis D f  labour and 
subsistence, especially in areas such as Bihar. Their 
investigations became fuller as time went on. At first, ftS.M 
the report on the condition of the lower classes in 1871, 
the finding were obscure or inconclusive for want of 
evidence. The reports submitted by A. P. Macdonnell on -food 
Jrai n supply provided valuable information during the period
of scarcity o» measures to be adopted in this regard. But
certain facts were clear. The expansion of cultivation was 
slowing down. The tenure structure, as depicted by Hunter 
in the Statistical Accounts series in the early 1870s, was 
diverse, but a sizeable proportion of cultivators, raiyats 
holding land as share croppers and tenants-at-wi 11, had no 
legal rights in the eyes of zamindars due to the 
insufficient measures adopted by the government. The wages 
of agricultural labourers were still low: prices had risen,
rents including abwabs were high; food, dress and houses
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were inferior. Above all, the of 1866 and 1874 had
almost paralyzed life in the North Bihar districts. It was 
concluded that the productive power of the land was proving 
insufficient for the population23. The Famine Commission and 
the^ensus Reports of 1881 reinforced this fear, by providing 
full details of the scarcity and sufferings of the people.
The response of the government included further 
investigations into the supply of sufficient food grain?and 
the production of commercial and food crops, and also the 
appointment of the Bihar Rent Committee as part of the 
Bengal Rent Law Commission of 1880. Attention began to be 
paid to labour as well. Various measures were taken to 
encourage migration from densely populated areas.
Among the investigations was a survey and investigation
made by F. H. B, Skrine into the material condition of the
-Cower Orders in Bengal during the ten years from 1881 - 82 
to 1891 - 92. He provided detailed information about
agricultural production, tenure structure, pressure of 
population and the deteriorating condition of the lower 
orders of society in the North Bihar districts. Skrine 
found that the class of agricultural labourers was small, 
and their services were much needed. He thought that the 
spread of the railway had helped them a great deal by
allowing their movement from place to place30. On a large
scale, the Dufferin Report of 1888, investigated the 
material condition of the people and the policy of the 
government both inside India and abroad31.
One intention was to provide for adequate food supply 
during famine, but Dufferin's Report of 1888 and the Famine 
Report of 1888, studying typical districts of the B&ngal 
R-esidency, also went into details in ascertaining the 
following aspects: (i) the area of the holding of each
raiyat; (ii) the utensils used by him; (iii) the extent of 
his indebtedness, Civ) the value of ornaments worn by the 
females of his family; (v) estimates of the produce of land; 
<vi) the cost of cultivation; (vi) the cost of ordinary 
food; (viii) the cost of clothing; (ix) general subsistence 
(x) expenditure incurred on social coremonies; <xi) wages of 
the labouring classes; (xii) the degree of their
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independence; (xiii) and the amount of expenditure being 
incurred by them'32. These points matched the reports of the 
local governments when they were asked by the government of 
India, in August 1887, to submit their views on two major 
questions: <i) whether it was true that a large proportion
of the population of India had to live ordinarily on in­
sufficient food, and (ii) if so whether there was any remedy 
to be found.
The Government's public conclusion was that, in the 
agricultural tracts, the lower classes always lived from 
hand to mouth, and were therefore, vulnerable in the large 
areas where rain fall was scanty or liable to failure and 
where population was high.The poor in Bihar, for example, 
especially in the most overpopulated areas of the Ganges 
valley, were "in a state of degradation"33. The government's 
resolution recommended the emigration of population from 
densely-populated to thinly-populated areas, and the 
extension of transport and irrigation.The emigration of 
Bihart landless labourers to Burma was to be encouraged at a 
cost of thirty rupees per head.
From the organisation of the new department of 
agricu1ture, the resolution passed in 1881 and the report on 
the lower classes submitted in 1888, the policy was to seek 
a solution of the problem within the reach of the 
administration. The idea of emigration was derived partly 
from the example of Ireland earlier in the century. Sir 
Stuart Bayley had advanced such an idea in 1875, following a 
suggestion from A. P. Kacdonnell, then collector of 
Darhbanga. The emigration scheme to Burma from Bihar was 
introduced in 1882. The passage of each family was paid to 
Rangoon and on to the place at which they were to settle. 
The labourers were taken as indentured migrants for terras of 
one year to cultivate land under the supervision of 
proprietors in areas varying from ten to twenty acres. There 
was an exemption from land revenue for the first five years. 
In the beginning a band of fewer than one hundred men and
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women went to Burma. They did not adjust to the cliamte and 
conditions, although they worked as coolies on the railway 
lines. At last either they died while returning to India or 
survived to migrate again to Assam. The scheme failed 
because of bad planning and mismanagement. Moreover, it did 
not take into account the wishes of the settlers who did not 
want to leave their family and social relationships. Indeed, 
cultivators who had land and some hope of better prospects 
locally did not want to shift from their villages. Only 
landless labourers, who were 'useless as agricultural 
settlers, were induced to move1'3'*. This class of population 
was categorised as non-productive; the social and economic 
inequality had taken such a firm root in the eyes of the law 
and officials.
Nevertheless the people were important in agricultural 
production and building work in British colonies; they 
cleared the jungles and settled in waste lands. The agencies 
employed for attracting them promised better prospects 
overseas, specially where expanding sugar plantation 
increased the demand for labour. In practice the labourers 
faced problems in settlement, low wages, and physical 
harassment. It was, of course difficult for officials and 
agents to settle people in new places where they needed not 
just housing and medical care but adjustment to language, 
culture and climate. Moreover, as these problems were not 
solved, compulsion became an important factor in emigration 
in the era of indentured labour.
Thus people from Bihar emigrated via Calcutta to 
Burma,Mauritius, and the West Indies. In lower Burma, they 
brought 1500 acres under cultivation in Tannasserin 
Division, and introduced new staples and methods of 
agriculture. Yet another example was the initiative given to 
local capitalists in the Central Provinces to settle 
labourers from Bihar. Government provided assistance through 
advances of money and administrative help for the 
reclamation of waste land. This was effectively the same 
method as was adopted in Burma.
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The Government did learn some lesson^- Taking into 
account the heavy losses of life in the beginning, it tried 
to avoid the importation of immigrants in bad seasons when 
employment was not available. Areas were selected to receive 
migrants where they could readily survive. Nor were 
labourers allowed to settle as cultivators. Generally, 
also, labourers were advised not to be accompanied by their 
wives, though there was a general tendancy among people of 
Bihar who migrated to outside districts to go with some 
friends and relatives. The indentured labourers sent from 
East India to Vest India or any British colonies were, 
initially, to work on agricultural land or manufacturing 
purposes, females for three years and males for five years. 
They were given free passage if they stayed there and if 
they returned, no passage was given. Sometimes, destitute 
labourers who went to colonies, returned in the same 
condition and it was difficult to trace the families of 
such destitutes on their return. Such instances were found 
in Gaya3S. The indentured labourers were required to
work nine hours a day without extra renumeration. Able 
bodied youngsters above sixteen years were paid one shilling 
and half a penny, equivalent to twelve annas and six paise 
for each day and they were required to work for six days. 
The adults but not able bodied or minor and above ten years 
and under sixteen years of age were paid 8 pence, i.e. 8 
annas per day and for extra hours they were paid 
proportionately.3&
Why should Biharis have accepted these conditions? 
Emigration from areas where labourers were under the local 
control of maliks and landholders was discouraged by them. 
These labourers were looked upon as private property. There 
was growing compulsion among the agricultural labourers for 
outward migration as well as seasonal migration temporarily 
to the neighbouring districts.3"7 On the other hand growing 
demand for labour coupled with the pressure arising out of 
indebtedness and price rises certainly compelled people in 
Bihar to migrate. Indeed, quite apart from the outward
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migration, agricultural labourers and daily wage labourers 
moved about Bihar. They went for example to Shahabad,
Champaran, Patna and Muzaffarpur from the district of Saran.
Jo
Many labourers shifted^the east to the districts of Purnea 
and Bhagalpur. Further . Afield again they were found in 
Calcutta, Dacca and the adjoining districts of Bengal and 
Orissa. Eastern United Provinces and Western Bihar supplied 
much labour in the late nineteenth century to the province 
of Bengal,
In part, in the immediately adjoining districts of 
Bengal and Bihar, this was seasonal migration. It depended 
upon the demand for labour during the harvest period, 
especially for males during the cold weather.33 But in 
general, labour was needed during August and September for 
the bhadai harvest, during November and December for the 
aghani, and during March and April for the rabi. The 
transplantation of winter rice also created a demand in June 
and July. These were also the times when demand was highest 
in the home districts; only in Saran was demand largely 
fulfilled by the labour available locally. Therefore, taking 
the year as a whole, seasonal labour opportunities did not 
reduce the dependence of the labour force, even though the 
improvement in transport, railways and roads, facilitated 
migration. This was a different case from permanent 
migration, particularly to overseas colonies, from which it 
was unlikely that people would be allowed to come back. The 
number of permanent migrants was, however, much smaller.
In this situation some officials could see that far 
more elaborate efforts would be needed before emigration 
would greately change the conditions of the poor in Bihar. 
Thus, while considering the question of migration and 
emigration of labour from Bihar, Michael Finucane, the 
Director of Land Records and Agriculture, suggested a more 
active role for government in encouraging the demand for 
Bihari labour. Finucane thought Bihar a special case. While 
submitting a special report on the condition of^lower orders 
of the district of Muzaffarpur and generally in Bihar, he 
said; "It showed that the condition of the agricultural 
classes in that part of the country is at present far from
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satisfactory......My personal opinion is that the condition
of the agricultural classes in Bihar, including parts of 
Bhagalpur Divisjon, has deteriorated within the period of 
British rule, and that^is now deteriorating, while that of 
the population of the greater part of Bengal proper has 
improved; that no appreciable p^oftion of the rural classes 
in Bengal proper appear, as distinguished from Bihar, to be 
suffering from want of food. . . ."33 Finucane recognised that 
labourers had difficulties because of malaria and other 
diseases, in settling in the Sundarban and jungle areas 
where the extension of cultivation clearly needed their 
help. Hence he suggested other schemes for inter— provincial 
emigration,to the Central Provinces and elsewhere, whereby 
migrants would be settled on government and Wards' estates 
and with zamindars, he set out the terms and conditions on 
which they would be required to cultivate.He proposed that, 
landlords be asked if they were willing to accept surplus 
population from congested districts. The government would 
advance loans to the labourers and cultivators for seeds, 
implements and huts, through the Agricultural Department, in 
the case of government and Court of Wards estates. Zamindars 
would be responsible for this outlay on their estates.AO 
Finucane's proposal did not receive enthusiastic support 
from the district officers or zamindars. Officials did not 
generally submit exhaustive reports about the suffering of 
the people, or did so only after inordinate delay. No other 
agency could provide detailed information.
At the same time, government was doubtful whether 
migration alone could relieve the increasing pressure of 
population in the Ganges Valley: the land reserved in Burma
for the immigrants could absorb only one fifth of one year's 
increment in population. Therefore, the investigation of 
Dufferin and his colleagues had gone further. Measures for 
providing relief to the distressed people were to be based 
on reports from district officers and Famine Commissioners. 
They were to include the encouragement of cultivation - in 
new lands, because of improved security of property, and 
through better agricultural methods. Of these encourage­
ments, the second and third were the most important in
193
Bihar. The government wanted an extension of cultivation,
through the initiative of landlords or even at the
government's expense, both from the point of view of
revenue and giving of relief to the population. Every
effort was made to bring fallow land under cultivation in
the districts of North Bihar, but the opportunities were now
limited. Few lands were left uncultivated in the most
developed areas, such as in Saran and Muzaffarpur. In Saran
only 1.4 percent and in Muzaffarpur a little over 1 percent
of the land was left fallow.'*1 Hence the government mainly
designed tenancy legislation and Survey and Settlements to
Ysecure land to the producers. Disputes were occurring in 
Muzaffarpur over minor boundary marks, due to the scarcity 
of land and during this period land prices started 
increasing. Thus attempts to improve cultivation became a 
major activity of the government.
But these measures were not directly relevant to 
labourers. They arose out of a broad conception of the 
nature of the problem facing rural India, that it was a 
crisis of production and population as well as of 
inequality.*2 This view was encouraged by the vagueness of 
the estimates in current reports. It was believed that 
forty percent of the population was poor and suffering from 
scarcity. The estimate was made on the basis of Famine 
Commissioners' statements. No distinction was made between 
the poverty of peasant cultivators and that of the lowest 
classes. The estimate of forty percent thus put together 
those who suffered during scarcity with the number of poor 
people in general, and presented the result as the 
proportion of the population suffering from poverty. But 
in fact there were two aspects here: the numbers submitted
in reports during famine relief operations, and the findings 
of general investigations into the condition of the lower 
classes. There must have been a difference between the 
numbers experiencing scarcity of food at a particular time, 
and the band of poor people perpetually suffering poverty 
and social and economic oppression. In the case of North 
Bihar both these phenomena existed, at least for over a
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century before the Dufferin Report. During the famines (in
1770, 1865-6 and 1874 as also later in 1896-7) the whole of
the population suffered, largely irrespective of caste and
class, with the exception of rich peasants and propriators
who had increased in number in the late nineteenth century,
especially during the Survey and Settlement Operations
period. At times of scarcity forty percent of the population
could be regarded as genuinely near starvation in affected
areas. But it was an exaggeration to use this figure for
the numbers normally starving or suffering for serious want
of food. There was serious hardship among occupancy raiyats 
c
and non-occupancy raiyats who belonged to both agricultural 
as well as occupational castes of the middle category. A 
few poor among the high castes also suffered. But the 
majority of the destitutes were to be found among the lowest 
in social status, their number swelled by some of the old 
and sick, the orphans and beggars. F.H.B. Skrine concluded
for the period 1881 82 to 1891-33v ___that 20 percent of
the population was half fed in Patna Division,though 
indebtedness was nearly universal.*3 This may be a fair 
calculation for ordinary years, taking into account the 
region's capacity for subsistence, the employment 
opportunities, wages, and size of land holdings.
Nonetheless, despite the concentration on broader 
measures designed to benefit agricultural production, 
government had to pay some attention to the plight of the 
landless or semi-landless labourers. The realization by 
1881,that there was hardly any scope for extention of 
cultivation, and worries about food supplies, meant that the 
large dependent population could not be wholly ignored. 
Hence the government's interest in emigration. But this 
answer and the related development of trade and industry 
were changes which lay mainly outside affected regions such 
as North Bihar and left their social conditions largely 
untouched.
The late nineteenth century was indeed a crucial stage 
in terms of the demand for labour inside and outside the 
country. Supply was encouraged by improving transport and 
communication, railways and roads and even canals.** Ever
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since the 1830s and 1840s there had been arrangements to 
supply Indian labour to other British colonies. The 
resolution adopted in 1887 also included as a priority 
attempts to meet the labour demand from the Eastern United 
Provinces, Bihar and other areas of Bengal Presidency. As we 
have seen, there were greater official efforts to extend 
this migration in the late nineteenth century. At the same 
time, within those same parts of India, there was no 
effective challenge to the role of money lenders, mahajans, 
indigo planters, thikadars, maliks and zamindars: the
commercial revolution depended on a cheap labour force 
within India as well as abroad.
Whatever the situation earlier in the century, there 
was no doubt that by its end the demand for, and mobility of 
labour had increased. This view was supported by both the 
Report of the Bengal Labour Enquiry Commission in 1896, and 
the report submitted by B. Foley on Labour in Bengal in 
1906. The methods of labour recruitment and migration to 
various sectors varied from region to region. This increase 
in demand had many reasons, but particularly the expansion 
of cultivation after the gradual initiatives taken by the 
landholders who depended upon labour. Less important but 
still significant were the needs of tea plantations in the 
hill tracts and Assam, and, in Bengal and Bihar, the more 
intensive processing required for expanding commercial crops 
such as poppy, indigo, jute and sugar. There were also fully 
industrial demands, including coal-mining and the railways. 
Physically strong and well bodied persons were drawn from 
agricultural labourers for this work. In the last decades of 
the nineteenth century jute mills and other factories 
started to be established in the city of Calcutta and its 
suburbs. Besides, there was also a growing demand for labour 
on the railways, rivers and sea-ports for loading and 
unloading raw material and manufactured goods.*"'
Most of immigrant labour in Bengal came (as we have 
noted) from Saran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga and districts of 
Eastern United Provinces. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
was an important agency for monitoring this supply.
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According to the resolution passed on 6 January, 1906 on the 
demand faT labour by the Indian and Ceylon Chamber of 
Commerce, the labourers from the agricultural sector were 
found to be fit especially for work in jute mills, coal 
mines and the Calcutta port, and they were abundantly 
available throughout the year except the months of March, 
April and May. At these times they tended to go back to 
their respective villages for cutting rab±crops, sowing
I '
bhadoi crops and meeting social and family obligations. 
These agricultural labourers working in the industrial 
sector were paid less than those working as coolies,AS
Foley's report and Fremantle's on the districts of 
United Provinces, also reveal, on the basis of district 
officers' submissions, that it was people below the poverty 
line who were ready to emigrate temporarily to Bengal, or 
more permanently to the colonies as indentured labourers. 
The following table shows however, that (as already 
discussed) migration was not a simple matter of population 
density.
Table 9
Population Density and Emigration in Bihar and United
Provinces 1901:
Districts Population/ Sq mile Persons per 10,000 enumerated
in other districts
Muzaffarpur 917 264
Saran 901 791
Darbhanga 873 127
Ballia 790 857
Patna 777 479
Jaunpur 748 285
A^o.)tngarh 712 392
Bardbanki 692 19
Fyzabad 677 131
Benares 671 540
Basti 670 10
Ghazipur 656 761
Gorakhpur 629 233
Monghyr 527 409
Gonda 497 27
Gaya 457 466
Allahabad 469 286
Shahabad 449 696
Mirzapur 191 323
Source: Report on Labour in Bengal 1906.
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Clearly particular districts supplied more labour than others. 
Migration was most common from the adjacent districts of Ballia, 
Saran, Ghazipur and Shahabad, at the heart of the major labour- 
supplying areas of U P and Bihar. Hugh Tinker says that
emigration to colonies from Bihar, U.P. and other areas, 
especially to colonies was mainly from ovei— crowded 
agricultural districts during the period of scarcity, bad 
harvests and rise in price of food grains*7 . Nevertheless, the 
officials agreed that the migration of labour depended upon its 
being easily available at a cheap rate as was possible in these 
agricultural areas, and that it held out the prospect of easing 
the problems of land tenure and the supply of food during 
scarcity. Of course, given that landlessness could not have 
been relieved by a forced redistribution of land, under the 
existing set-up of agrarian society, emigration was certainly 
one way out for the government when labour was much in demand. 
But as a means of transforming the conditions of labour, it was 
a failure.
Wages and the Labour Market.
The Patna Commissioner's reports on the Division refer 
almost every year to the low rate of wages in Bihar. W. W.
Hunter also drew the conclusion on the basis of reports
received from various sources that the wages of agricultural 
labourers had not increased in comparison with the rise in the 
prices of food grain. If comparison can be made, the price of 
the commonest sort of rice sold in 1790 at 74 1/4 sers, wheat 
at 85 1/4, and janera (a kind of millet) at 135 sers per East
India Company's rupee*, in 1871 - 72 rice sold at 19 sers 8
chi tanks and in 1872 - 73 at 16 lers 6 chi tanks per rupee.
There was certainly a sharp rise of prices on the agricultural 
market, especially for rice which was the main medium for the 
payment of rent.
There were two kinds of wages. Coolies working in the 
fields were generally paid in grain, at an average rate of from 
3 to 4 sers a day plus 1/4 sers of peas or grain for the mid-
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day meal. Otherwise wages were generally paid in cash.
According to Collectors' returns the rates for unskilled 
labourers were 1V6 to 2 annas a day in the villages, and 2 annas 
in towns. Women earned one anna everywhere. The specialist 
nuniya labourers received three annas, for heavy work, and 
other skilled workers, such as bricklayers, carpenters and 
blacksmiths, also received three to four annas a day.*3 . Hence 
in Tirhut common wages ranged between one and three annas a 
day; this would often include one meal; consisting of 3 pounds 
of rice or satu (parched and milled gram, ie gram, maize etc. ). 
Hunter's estimate was that the wages of both skilled and 
unskilled labourers had risen little since 1794. The coolies 
were paid one anna 2 pai a day and carpenters about 2 annas per 
day in the Tirhut areas. In Saran the wages of domestic 
servants and agricultural labourers were almost the same as in 
1811, though watchmen, cart-dri vers, washermen and other menial 
castes living on manual labour received wages which were never 
more than one rupee and 8 annas a month.*3 In comparison with 
the rise in prices—perhaps fourfold since 1790 - the very small 
changes in wage rates imply that the standard of living of the 
lower classes of population had deteriorated by the 1870s.
In 1875, Stuart Bayley, the Commissioner of Patna, quoted 
the statement of a Deputy Magistrate of Bihar to the effect 
that it was a great pity that workers in Bihar were paid 3 to 4 
paise (1 anna) whereas those in East Bengal and Calcutta were 
paid 6 to 8 annas. The wages of porters, carpenters, weavers 
and masons were also comparatively low. If a carpenter got 2 
annas in Bihar, he got 4 to 6 annas in Burdwan and Dacca, and 
upto 12 annas a day in Calcutta.30. The Commissioner was 
astonished at such disparity in wage rates. He was also 
concerned that wages in kind were at a rate of only 2V6 sers of 
paddy or millet in Bihar. He considered indeed that the work 
performed in Bihar was of equal or greater value to that 
elsewhere. The Lieutenant Governor, Sir Richard Temple, in a 
minute prefixed to the Bengal Administration Report for 1875, 
also observed the poverty of the masses in Bihar.
In one sense, the differences persisted. A disparity in 
wages was apparent in the survey made by Dufferin's colleagues. 
There was still clear evidence of it in the Report of the
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Bengal Labour Enquiry Commission in 1896. In addition, that 
report reveals the differences in wages in industrial and 
agricultural sectors.
Tabla.-l.Q-
Statement showing monthly wages of unskilled 
labourers 1880-1894 in the major districts of Bengal, 
Bihar and U.P. supplying labourers81
ftble bodied agricultural labourers
District Year-1880 1885 1890 1894
Burdwan Rs, 9 Rs, 8 Rs, 8 Rs, 7
Patna Rs, 3 to 4 Rs, 4 to 5 Rs, 4 to 5 Rs, 4 to 5
Muzaffarpur Rs, 2 to 3 Rs, 3 to 4 Rs, 3 to 5 Rs, 3,75 to 5,62
Hazaribagh Rs, 4 Rs, 3,75 Rs, 4,5 Rs, 4 to 6
Kanpur Rs, 3,87 Rs, 3.5 Rs, 4,00 Rs, 4 to 5
Mirzapur Rs, 3,25 Rs, 3,5 Rs, 3,75 Rs, 4,00
Lucknow Rs, 3,00 Rs, 4,00 Rs, 4,00 Rs, 4,00
Sultanpur Rs, 3,00 Rs, 2,5 Rs, 3,75 Rs, 3,75
Source: Report on the Bengal Labour Enquiry Coniussion, 1896
The report also revealed the differences between the wages 
of skilled labourers in the districts best known for them.
Monthly wages of skilled labourer (masons, carpenters, 
blacksmiths and others) in the selected districts:e2.
Table.—11
Year Year Year Year
District 1880 1865 1890 1894
Calcutta Rs, 12 Rs, 15 Rs, 15 Rs, 15 to 16
Patna Rs, 12 Rs, 6 to 8 Rs, 6 to 8 Rs, 6to 7
Kanpur Rs, 7,5 Rs. 7 to 15 Rs, 10 Rs, 7,5 to 9,37
Fyzabad Rs, 8,44 Rs, 7 to 9,37 Rs, 7,5 to 9,37 Rs.7.5 to 9,37
Source; Report on the Bengal Labour Enquiry Comi s s i o n ,  
1896 Para, M
It was obvious that skilled wages were very much higher 
everywhere, and in roughly the same proportion to wages in 
agriculture* though possibly the margin between artisans and 
agricultural labourers was greater in Bihar than elsewhere 
in 1880,it had dropped markedly by 1894. More generally, 
agricultural wages seem to have risen more, or more 
consistently, than others. There is some evidence here too
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that wages were somewhat more even between districts outside 
Bengal by the 1890s. The explanation for these changes was 
partly the increasing demand for labour with more commercial 
agriculture in Eastern India, but the most striking thing 
was that, though wages related to the price of food, they 
had not greatly improved from the point of view of standard 
of living and powers of subst istence. Thus the rates 
ordinarily obtainable in the coal-mining districts might be 
taken as 50 percent above those obtainable in the North Vest 
Provinces and Oudh.S3 They were of course highest of all in 
Calcutta. But the conclusion drawn by the Commission was 
that the prices of staple foods were higher in the mining 
districts and mill areas around Calcutta. The result was
that after all unskilled labourers obtained in effect almost 
equal wages in the different areas in the 1890s. This may 
help explain the lack of impact of industrial wages on wage- 
rates in Bihar.
It was as a means of raising wages in Bihar that Bayley 
and Macdonnell had suggested emigration on the Irish pattern 
in 1875; Bayley had added the introduction of manufacturers 
as another possible remedy. Perhaps rightly, however, he did 
not entertain any great hopes of either.
Two factors affected the wages paid. On the one hand,
in the North Bihar districts, wages were higher during the
harvest period as labourers had to work hard over a limited 
time while crops were brought from field to threshing floor. 
When the aghani crop was to be reaped, they were given one 
sheaf out of every 12 or 16; they were given a sixth of the 
grain at the time of the bhadoi crop. These wages were 
perhaps twice those earned at other times, though the rates 
differed from place to place. In some parts, the
proportion of the harvest paid out as wages was as low as 
one-tenth. Nevertheless the grain wages were relatively 
advantageous; Hunter suggests that it was difficult to get 
workers at the ordinary cash rate during the harvests. 
Hence, wages were generally paid in kind at these times.
On the other hand, employment was not regular.
Ordinarily a male labourer did not find employment for more
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than eight months of a year. If he was paid 2 or 2V& sers, 
that is about annas per day. However, this implied an
average of only two rupees a month throughout the year, so 
that the annual earnings of an adult would come to about Rs 
24. His wife's earnings might be six rupees, giving a total 
of Rs. 30 for a family of two adults and perhaps two 
children, provided his wife worked. This or the equivalent 
in the coarsest grain was a typical income for a family of 
the labouring class in the 1880s. It was perhaps three 
times lower than that of unskilled labourers in East Bengal, 
and four times lower than in Calcutta. Some estimates for 
Bihar were higher. The Sub-Divisional Officer of Bihar 
estimated the earnings of the lower classes over eight 
months in the year, taking into account the employment 
opportunities at the harvests at 2 annas per diem, or four 
rupees per mensem. 66 This seems to be on the high side. In 
any case, employment was always uncertain, and because of 
the problem of unemployment, there was hardly any disparity 
in opinion about poverty in the North Bihar districts.
A third factor did not much influence wages, namely the 
value of local production. Some areas produced a good
amount of rice, especially Madhubani in Darbhanga and 
Sitamarhi in Muzaffarpur. Moreover, the value of the rabi 
crops was much greater in Saran than in other districts.
But these differences hardly increased the wages of the
labourers in these areas. This fact is related to the
failure of wages to reflect the increases in the prices of 
commodities. B7 It is true that figures available from the 
Bengal Administrative Reports (as well as in the tables 
given above) suggest that wages did start rising in the
agricultural sector after 1880 and in 1883, in Patna
Division, though they remained lower than in Bengal. For 
example, in Muzaffarpur, wages were 30 percent higher in 
1900 than in 1873; over the same period prices had gone up
by only 15 percent. By 1910, however, wages seem to have
fallen again to between 2 and 4 annas a day, while the 
prices of essential commodities had not shown any decrease.
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Xable 12
Table showing wages in cash and kind in various 
districts of North Bihar: Wage Census 1910
In annas and paisa 
Districts Cash Kind
Saran Anna 2 to 2 - 6 Anna 2 - 6 to 3 - 9
Champaran Anna 2 - 3  to 3 -0 Anna 2 - 3  to 3 - 0
Darbhanga Anna 2 to 2 - 6  Anna 2 - 6  to 3 - 9
Muzaffarpur Anna 2 - 6  to 3 - 6  Anna 3 - 6  to 4 - 3
Source: Bengal Revenue Proceedings May 1910,
Nos. 7 - 8 ,  wage census 1910 
Labour remained cheap in the North Bihar districts. 
Some of the forces ensuring this situation will be apparent 
already. At first the high rates of rent in force in Bihar 
and the arbitrary methods of enhancement, must have 
increased the burden on the occupancy raiyats. If their 
condition was weakened and they began to hold land at 
competitive rates, they were bound to pass on the pressure, 
brought on them partly through caste distinction, to those 
even lower than they were in the society. But the Bengal 
Tenancy Act of 1885, which promis^ed for the first time to 
preserve occupancy rights, was intended to prevent 
cultivators who held land from sinking to the lowest 
position. It was intended to preserve the distinction
between them and the landless. It contained no provisions 
to secure the rights of labourers and few in regard to 
tenants-at-wi 11. Accordingly .^record of rights, under the 
Survey and Settlement Operations in the 1890s and the 
beginning of 20th century and the later Revision Settlement 
Operations, looked only into the problems of raiyats in 
relation to the land owners, questions affecting rates and 
the land revenue. The same was true of the Tenancy Act 
Revision in 1907. These measures hardly made a major 
contribution to the amelioration of the condition of the 
lowest lajvf of agrarian society. Ve have noted too that the 
officials had no effective answer to the poverty of the 
lower classes, for all the anxiety that was expressed by the 
investigators. By the late nineteenth century the increased
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population was bound to create a demand for land 
on any terms. This was always a source of danger, not only 
to the poor but to the superior cultivators and the 
controlling class, and indeed to the law makers. But the 
officials helped only the better-off; the poor were left 
without special assistance, as they multiplied beyond the 
means of subsistence.
Moreover, according to the usual economic theories, 
cheap labour reduced the incentives for improved 
productivity. Certainly, indigenous methods of cultivation 
remained little changed, even though new crops were 
cultivated. Except for some reduction in the cost of 
irrigation from kuccha wells and from streams, technological 
development was not prompted by the production of cash 
crops. The Triveni Canal was the only innovation for the 
production of indigo and for the sugar industry which later 
spread over the North Bihar districts.
The major issue however, was the nature of the labour 
market in Bihar, or rather the effective lack of a market 
despite the rise of commercial crops and the distribution of 
the labour force between various sectors both inside and 
outside Bihar. Labour continued to be controlled by
zamindars, thikadars, indigo planters, and village mahajans. 
Outside Bihar too, the government was interested in the 
utilization of a cheap labour force for industrial and 
commercial centres in Bengal, and for the expansion of 
cultivation in the colonies. Social and demographic
influences ensured that such a labour force was available. 
In such a situation the market in labour was only marginal. 
In villages, when scarcity of labour was felt, a competitive 
market was created. It existed as we have seen, at harvest 
times and because the numbers of labourers differed from 
district to district. But in a society in which upper 
castes would never work in the field, caste dominance was a 
major determinant factor in utilizing the labour force. It 
is a fact that the additional seasonal demand was mostly 
satisfied by hired labour, as keeping permanent labour was 
not profitable to the cultivators or planters. In such
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circumstances wages were important. But otherwise people who
were effectively domestic servants sufficed to meet the need
for labour in big proprietary estates and in villages. There
were contractual labourers, both short term and long term, in
indigo areas. They were also utilized for harvesting.But on the
other hand, most labour was still controlled through social
subservience and this affected the condition of labour in
general. A wage labourer might work all day, and at the end
wait for his wages, only to find that he was not paid in full.
Slavery as such had almost disappeared, but instead the form
of bondage had changed. By the last decade of the nineteenth
century, half the labour force was tied through social custom
and tradition, and the other half, ostensibly free as casual
labour, was largely subject to the same social coercion. The
pressure of high caste influence thus reduced the competition
for labour in many areas. Labour was obtained through a
personal relationship. Begari was beginning to be challenged by
the end of nineteenth century, but zamindars, tenure holders
and rich peasants still thought that it was their customary
right. It was a kind of mutual social and family obligation to
some extent and was practi ed by the higher castes in order to
maintain social prestige. Most of the customary rights of the
zamindars and tenure holders had been 'absorbed in their legal
rights, some practices were declared null and void, in the eyes
of thejCo>»temporary law. But customary practices remained. Nor
did the British intervene in this matter: free service as begar
was not regarded as a crime. Very few instances can be found
in any court proceedings which took any notice of begar or when 
of
a labour^ approached the court for legal redress. . On the other 
hand, it came to be accepted that labourers were paid even if 
they worked under a begari relationship.
In nineteenth century Bihar there was then still less a 
competitive labour market than labour relations based on local 
influence and caste dominance; it was only slightly qualified 
by administrative control and seasonal demand or by the 
movement of labour from one district to another. At best, the 
rise in agricultural prices in comparison with wages and the 
government's policy in introducing new opportunities for labour
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may have begun to make the labourers realise that they had an 
important role to play in production.
The late nineteenth century:_rising d e m a n d  «Tiri c a p t i v e  l a b o u r
The British land system operated through a colonial view 
of hierarchy encouraging their property law and other 
administrative measures. Even in their measures to combat 
poverty, they did not really challenge the social hierarchy 
based on caste. Thus it was that the expansion of trade, while 
apparently offering new opportunities for labour, merely 
intensified its subordination and poverty. It was a case of 
rising demand and yet captive labour.
Under the impact of British rule and the developing
international economy, labour in Bihar thus became even more
coppressed, while demand injreased. It was true of course that 
new industrial employment in the later half of the nineteenth 
century did not provide opportunities to match the previous 
growth of population, but there was certainly overall a growing 
demand because commercial crops needed more agricultural 
labour. The effect was also a hardening of the control over 
labour, in this sense as a defence against change. Naturally, 
the external demand tended over time to become permanent rather 
than seasonal. People coming to industries from agriculture 
had to be trained. While rail building needed labourers on a 
temporary basis, transportation needed labourers throughout the 
year. To some extent the transition to permanent employment 
was encouraged because wages were higher than for manual 
labourers working in other sectors. Indentured labour also 
tended to be more or less permanent, involving as it did 
emigration to the Caribbean Islands, Mauritius or Africa. But 
it had been the relative cheapness of the labour from Bihar 
which made it attractive in these new situations, and thus it 
remained poorly paid even after migration.
The important factor in continuity to make the labour 
available was that so many had no power of subsistence, or 
needed to repay debts or meet obligations. The same was true 
for labour in regard to commercial crops in North Bihar. Ve 
will consider in particular the question of indigo. The fact
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■that labour in North Bihar was cheaper than in other areas 
of the Bengal Presidency kept alive the indigo industry of 
Bihar. Yet the thikadars and the agents of indigo planters 
complained about the scarcity of labour, especially in zirat 
land, in Champaran, Muzaffarpur and parts of Darbhanga. 
Foley, in his report, mentioning such complaints, considered 
that the work of the plantations suffered as a result. 68 
Why should such scarcity have arisen in Bihar but be met in 
Bengal by the importation of labour, from Bihar or 
Chotanagpur? The reason was that labour in Bihar was 
exploited by the thikadars and indigo planters, and that 
they could not conceive of the alternative of a market for 
labour. In this they were encouraged by the fact that there 
was no shortage of labour in reality. The planters had 
difficulties partly because of peak periods of demand and 
probably also because, given the low wages and the poor
returns from indigo cultivation^ tlie cultivators and their
labourers preferred if possible to devote their time to food 
crops.
The planters' agents cultivating the zirat might have 
to compete for labour against the demands of a rich peasant 
or malik. Certainly the indigo industry's demands for 
labour was considerable. The Settlement Office of
Muzaffarpur estimated that indigo needed over three times 
more labour than the rice crops; it needed 172 labourers per 
acre, in comparison with aghani rice which needed 36, or 
even tobacco C100), poppy (100) and sugar (80). In
addition, indigo was more expensive to manage. Its
establishment included a band of thikadars, chaukidars, 
muharrirs, -fokedars ^ ploughmen^ malis, badhais, masons, 
thatchers and grass cutters. Many of these employees were 
permanent, and in addition to the usual labourers needed at 
the time of sowing and harvesting.69
Indigo cultivation, therefore implied a level of 
investment far greater than that provided for food crops by 
jnaliks or rich peasants. But as an important commercial 
crop it was also given priority.
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The consequence of this situation was that the indigo 
planters found it easiest and safest to sacrifice the 
interests of the labourers. The existing social and
economic compulsion had made labour available at a cheap 
rate in the normal agricultural sector and advantage was 
taken of the same conditions to secure a cheap supply for 
indigo. Several factors perpetuated the subservience of 
labour. First, there was little idea among the labourers of 
leaving the food-producing sector and joining in commercial 
production. Any shifting of unskilled labour from one 
sector to another was under the control of thikadars. 
Secondly, there was a tendency for indigo to drive out other 
options. One cannot agree with the. notion, put forward by 
Stevenson-Moore, among others, that planters provided 
employment only during slack periods of the agricultural 
year.60 In a free situation, the answer to security and 
underdevelopment would have been to expand the double 
cropping of rabi and bhadoi crops. On the contrary the
t
planters deduced the subsistence support available from 
cultivator's lands, and this meant that they were bound to 
shift to indigo.
Why did the planters not try to attract labour by high 
wages? In the North Bihar region, indigo plantation was the 
only major manufacturing industry which competed with 
agriculture for labour. Though cultivated on a mere ten 
percent of village land, it diverted a far larger share of 
effort; at certain times of the year there was keen 
competition for labour.61 The alleged labour scarcities 
were felt during ploughing, sowing and harvesting when the 
needs of indigo clashed with those of the bhadoi or aghani 
crops^ generally that is, in February, June, September and 
October. Specifically, though the patterns differed between 
the northern and southern parts of the districts, wage 
labourers were much in demand in September and October for 
bhadoi crops, in December and January for aghani crops, and 
in February and March for rabi crops. Indigo thus competed 
with different staple foods. Rice needed labour first for 
transplanting and then for the harvest. In Muzaffarpur,
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Darbhanga and northern parts of Saran and Champaran 
transplanting occurred in June and July. In Darbhanga the 
rice crop was most important; in Saran and Champaran, the 
competition was more over the bhadoi crops which were more 
important for subsistence than rice, especially in the 
southern parts. In Muzaffarpur, where the bhadoi crops were 
less important, the demand for labour by thikadars and 
planters was greatest from October to December when the rabi 
crop was being prepared and ploughmen were needed. The 
conclusion is that in a normal year there were periods of 
intense activity and periods with little work, which 
differed from place to place. Thus preparatory work might 
provide much employment from May to October while the period 
between November and March offered little work other than 
some late harvesting of bhadoi crops, and then , in January 
and February, the cutting of the aghani crops.
The seasonal pattern thus made it more important for 
employers, indigo planters included, to maintain a hold over 
labour. In the north the indigo factories were able to 
maintain this hold by providing employment, from the 
beginning of its season, where three harvests persisted. In 
the more southerly tracts in Saran and Muzaffarpur, where 
the indigo demand was smaller, the management of labour was 
still in the hands of thikadars who kept wages low.
There were minimal obligations in such a system 
designed' to allow labour to survive. The indigo planters 
were said to provide relief during famines. The Collector 
of Champaran argued that labour survived because it was 
provided with land from the indigo zirat, when the season 
was unfavourable for the cultivation of indigo. In the same 
way the harvesting of indigo did provide employment before 
the second half of September when the bhadoi crops were 
ready. But the key feature was the bonding and exploitation 
of labour, which seasonal demand also helped. First, the 
labourers tended between harvest to take loans from village 
mahajans on the security of their future earnings. For such 
debtors, indigo work was often the only means of 
surviving. 62 Secondly, to the extent that it is true, as A. 
P. Macdonnell claims, that planters provided employment
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during slack periods, it was also true that planters could, 
therefore, get their labour at first without competition. 
They could begin the relationship in a situation of 
exploitation. 63 This is a quite different conclusion, 
though from similar observations, from the one implied by 
Foley when he claimed that planters utilized labour only 
when it was not being used for country crops.
Generally, there was the potential competition for 
labour between indigo and other agricultural production. 
For this reason the social and economic controls over
labour, as over the poor cultivators, were exploited 
competitively. Physical force was used, and the local 
influence of thikadars and jnaliks, and behind the whole 
system lay caste.
Housing and health as indicator of poverty
The general dwellings and houses of the agricultural 
labourers and cultivators in Bihar were built of thatched 
mud and with wood for roofing, covered with tollies, locally 
made by kumhars (potters). The architectural design was 
quite simple. The cost of construction was also low. The 
houses could be said to have been primitive. The rich 
farmers and proprietors built brick houses but still used
bamboo and jungle woods for roofing covered with tollies. 
The professional brick layers and thatchers were assisted by 
daily waged labourers drawn from agricultural workers; they 
helped with the building of houses at nominal wage rates 
fixed or prevalent in the villages.
The ordinary clothing for men was the dhoti and gamcha. 
Hand woven clothes including saris for women were used until
gradually superseded by milled clothes. The cost of a dhoti
was one rupee, almost the same as the price of a sari. In 
Bihar a rezai or quilt was added to the wardrobe for winter 
use. English piece goods were commonly used by those living 
in cities in the later nineteenth century, but the labouring 
community could not afford to buy them, or anything that was 
costly except needle5y the most essential item for sewing 
their torn clothes.
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The general food habits of the lower classes in the 
districts of North Bihar were equally simple. They ate 
makai (maize), marua, jowar, bajra, other millets, sweet 
potatoes, khesarl <a pulse), kurthi (another grain), and 
wheat bread, gram, varieties of vegetables and occasionally 
rice when they could afford it". The morning meal would
be parched grain - makai and gram or any ordinary food such 
as cooked sweet potatoes or roti left over from the previous 
night. At noon,^ ordinary labourer would be provided with 
bread made from different grains, preferably makai and sattu 
(well- parched grain ground in a domestic stone mill). 
Several grains and varieties of pulses which were also 
available locally were categorised as a superior quality of 
food which could be eaten with rice and wheat by richer 
cultivators. Only they (or their betters) could afford to 
ea t ghee, milk, meat, and fish. In ordinary years two 
meals a day were mostly available to the lower caste 
labourers, though British inquiries suggested that at least 
three meals a day were ordinarily required for the strength 
to carry out manual work. Moreover, the quality of the food 
of agricultural labourers was generally not good in 
comparison with those working in factories and mines. The 
diet of labourers as well as village artisans, was among the 
worst. Not only well-to-do cultivators, but prisoners and 
labourers on official allowance appear to have eaten more 
wholesome and nourishing food. There was some dispute over 
this. The Commissioner of Patna suggested that a poor 
labourer's food both in quantity and quality was above what 
was required for the official allowances. 65 But the jail 
medical superintendents in North Bihar mostly reported that 
the poor classes admitted into their jails had been underfed 
in their homes. Analysis of the figures and reports
submitted by them showed that in all 3857 cases chosen for 
investigation the prisoners were in a poor condition. Some 
of them were actually in a worse condition, especially those 
coming from the lower castes, than in previous years: the
standard of health among the prisoners at the time of 
imprisonment was gradually declining and the proportion in 
bad health was growing. Many other reports also indicated
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that the poor suffered from malnourishment and insufficiency 
of food. The jail records are not of course absolutely
conclusive. It may be that prisoners put on weight in jail
because they were eating better, especially given that 
prisoners had to work, but it might also be that weights 
often started unusually low because of physical harassment 
and mental anxiety before sentence. It was not uncommon for 
the lower classes of criminals to be physically tortured.
The scarcity of food for labourers in villages was always
felt and normally they ate such an ordinary food in normal 
years that there appear to have hardly any possibility of 
their getting good food in jails. After all they were taken 
as convicts, therefore, they were treated as criminals. It 
is impossible to know what the prisoners' normal condition 
was; and it was not quite satisfactory merely to compare the
admission weight of the poorer classes with a standard taken
from the admission weights of prisoners of the better 
classes. One can not thereby account for personal
characteristics, physical development due to special labour, 
and other influences at work. Yet the prison records do
carry conviction in conjunction with other impressions of 
the conditions of the poor. It is significant therefore, 
that the Bengal Inspector General of Jails, A. S. 
Lethbridge, considered that in Bihar in the worst districts, 
Muzaffarpur and Saran, and in parts of Darbhanga and 
Champaran, some people suffered from a constant 
insufficiency of food, especially those who earned their 
living by daily labour. 66 The under— nourishment and bad 
health of the lower strata of society appeared to be vital 
issues from the medical point of view.
British officials also approached this question in 
terms of the supply of food at the disposal of the lower 
classes, particularly between harvests. Here too there were 
some difficulties of analysis. It would have been simpler 
if the problem had been merely in the size of the population 
and the cultivated areas, that is, if the production had 
been distributed equally throughout the society. For
example the Commissioner of Patna Division made a scale to
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measure the comparative distribution of food between the
population of towns and villages. The assumption was that
the villages were areas producing food for their own
consumption and that towns were not. Hence the density of
the town population was thought to be irrelevant. But the
towns were not industrial in the 1880s or 1890s, especially
in Bihar. Those living in them included an urban middle
class and a lower class of artisans, office attendants and
domestic servants. Many still depended directly on
agricultural production as absentee landlords. Even the
educated classes were often connected with the villages and
dependent on agricultural production from their paternal
property. Hence the towns' call on the countryside for food
was different and even greater than was supposed. More than
this the towns underline the unequal distribution of food.
The city dwellers took a share of production not only
through their consumption but as income. By the same token
any calculation from the ratio of cultivated area to the
population drawing an average conclusion as to the comfort
of the people, would be misleading. Needless to say the
rich and poor lived in different styles. Yet the officials
made assumptions about food consumption in general; the
Commissioner of Patna said that the rich ate little more
<xry
food than the poor. But he did not say^about the quality of 
food consavned by them. Food grains were grown both for local 
consumption and for export outside the districts. The 
assumption made by the Commissioner seems to have been that 
grain which was not exported should not be measured as 
property. No doubt wealth was not gauged by the quantity of 
food which was eaten — provided one ignores the distinction 
between experiencing plenty and having barely enough to live 
on. But nor was it safe to assume that all grain which was 
not exported remained at the disposal of those who produced
it. To believe this is to fall into the error of assuming
that exports resulted only from surpluses grown by those who 
had larger than average holdings. On many of these, non­
food cash crops were grown, so that they produced less food 
grain than smaller holdings. But the smaller holdings were 
not thereby subsistence food producers. It has been
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remarked that grain was the major store of wealth in 
Bihar. yThe food grain which was not exported was not all 
retained by the agricultural classes and labourers who 
produced it. Much of it entered a local market economy 
being sold in village hats where prices were based on the 
rates for exports. Hence the quality and price of exported 
food grains affected wage earners directly. Much grain too 
was stored by rich farmers and maliks and paid out (or lent) 
to poor agriculturists and labourers.
Moreover, a major exchange, for the poor, was of high 
quality rice or other valuable crops, in return for inferior 
ones. As said, the lower classes, unlike the rich, ate 
mama, but they paid their rent and met other needs and 
obligations in cash by selling rice. Thus rice was exported 
both from those without any surplus and by those who 
produced more than enough to earn a profit. The rice which 
remained in the localities was not spread throughout the 
population who needed it for consumption. It is probable 
too that the spread of the market economy and of competition 
to the village level increased the extent of this 
inequality. It opened the way for village merchants,
baniyas, and rich peasants to store rice and other crops in 
order to sell them at high prices, for example during 
scarci ty.
It follows from this that the standard of living in an 
area could not be measured by comparing the population,
cultivated areas and exports. Large scale exports did not 
necessarily mean overfall prosperity, but nor did a 
favourable land; man ratio in the absence of exports. The 
exact number of households living in bad conditions could 
not be ascertained by these means. The export of food grain 
did not mean that food supplies were sufficient in the 
locality. It is well-known that instances had been found 
when food was exported in times of scarcity to other
countries, as well as the export of raw materials in
exchange of manufactured goods, since 1858. Such roles were 
facilitated by development of transport and communication, 
railway and opening of Suez Canal in 1869. The export of
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food grain and raw materials put pressure on the internal 
market economy of rural society and eventually a great 
strain on lower classes of population. ' Moreover, imperial 
trade interests would welcome a crop whose growers could be 
pushed by market forces to bear a heavier burden of periodic 
slumpsee>. Conversely even a large importation of food - 
such as the coarse grains drawn in from adjoining districts 
to areas experiencing scarcity— —did not prove that supplies 
were universally available. Much depended on methods of 
distribution (which was notoriously mismanaged), or on 
purchasing power. One could hardly expect justice to 
prevail in this respect in North Bihar.
These arguments qualify without removing the importance 
of demography, parallel to the suggestions already made on 
population and the condition of labour. The Commissioner of 
Patna tried to estimate an average outturn of food which 
would be available to a family for subsistence. His
examination was based on the method of A.P. Macdonnell's 
inquiry at the time of famine in the early 1870s, on the 
basis of population densities in different districts* 
Results are shown in the table 
Table..- 12
Distribution of persons per acre in the districts of Patna 
Division:
District Persons per
Saran 1.36
Muzaffarpur 1.3
Darbhanga 1.3
Patna . 91
Champaran .76
Shahabad .7
Gaya . 7
Sources: Dufferin Report
The purpose of such calculation was ostensibly to gauge the 
degree of hardship in different areas; by this measure. 
Saran experienced greater pressure of population than any
215
other district. A similar calculation, contained in the 
Duiferin Report was of the area of land needed to support a 
family. It was estimated at 4 acres for a family of six. 
The calculation was based on the estimate of the
Commissioner of Patna Division who followed the reports 
submitted by the district officers and other agencies. A 
formula could then be worked out from the di str i bu t io'h of
land and production according to the size of population, 
which purported to show the level of comfort among the 
people. What seems a sensible idea was, however, designed 
by the government to minimise the general idea of poverty 
among the masses. It did not reflect the reality in North 
Bihar, with its victims of natural calamity and local
tenurial conditions, under the land and the proprietors. The 
attitude of the government was £oW0>)roCs • ‘h*eu‘»t«dning the
disparity in the land tenure structure .
Another assumption was that two thirds of a seer of 
food (16 chitank= 1 seer; 2/3 a seer= 10 chitank) was 
required daily for each man, woman and child. It followed 
that the outturn of one acre (10 mdunds) was necessary to 
support a family for a year. As this estimate happened to 
be the average amount of cultivated land per person in Patna 
Division, it too was an ideal device for the government. 
But obviously no serious conclusion can be drawn from it, 
unless it is to emphasise yet again that the lack of access 
to land on the part of the lower classes was a major cause 
of poverty in Bihar.
Measuring the quantity and not the quality of food was 
another way in which realities were smoothed over. The 
reports of jail superintendents claimed that a labourer need 
one seer, four and half chitank of good food to maintain the 
ability to work; other officials' inquiries in the villages 
suggested a higher figure. But not only did the labouring 
classes often have insufficient food; the food they did eat 
was of poor nutritional value.
One official summed up the situation of the poor thus: 
'Their fare is of the very coarsest, consisting to a great 
extent of khesaridal, and the quantity is insufficient 
during a considerable part of the year. They can only take 
-ju.il I j " u y o • 0Lre. ^
Oo(cL • Jkt. Go-vO ^
216
those who support themselves entirely by labour is rather 
worse than that of the better class of petty cult^ivators1 6,9 
The description was of Patna district but applied generally 
in Bihar. It raises one further point: the distinctions
among the petty cultivators and between them and the 
labourers. Among the population there were differences of 
living standards as of status, just as there were between 
land holdings, and the differences reinforced other 
distinctions. There was a world of difference between four 
acres of poor dry land, and four acres fully irrigated with 
plenty of seed and manure. In a normal season the latter 
would be regarded as a rich source of agricultural 
production. Hence broad general categories and assumptions 
missed not only the extent of disadvantages, but also the 
ways in which poverty reduced opportunities as well as 
comfort. An illfed man, for example, was likely also to be 
weak or sick, with his earning power diminished. Official 
calculations about Bihar - unlike the officials'
observations - meant that definite conclusions could not be 
made about poverty: the exercise reduced the government's
sense of urgency.
Trends and comparisons.
In 1900 and subsequently, the lower classes of the 
population were still bonded to the higher in Bihar inspt te 
of the abolition of slavery by law. The basis and degree of 
subservience varied between different parts of Patna
Division. Was the situation in North Bihar worse than 
elsewhere? The general enquiry into the condition of the 
lower orders was based on a comparative estimate of the 
conditions in Bengal, in the seven districts of Patna 
Division, and in Monghyr and Bhagalpur. It was noted that 
the condition of the working class in Bihar was different 
from that in Bengal proper. There was chronic poverty in 
the Lower Provinces, especially in Bankura and Midnapore.
In these districts, the rate of daily wages was said to be 
three annas, with employment available locally for only six 
months of the year. "It is stated", the report went on,
"that about 10% of the population have only one meal a day,
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and although no great reliance can be placed on this 
estimate, it is probable that the condition of the people is 
decidedly inferior to the Bengalis generally". The poverty 
in Bihar often matched this, but whether it did or not, it 
may be seen to have been distinctive in character. In Bihar 
the gap was wider than in most of Bengal between the 
condition of the upper and middle classes and that of 
labourers and the smaller cultivators. There was very 
little waste land in Bihar, except in Shahabad and 
Champara70 But then in many parts of the Bengal Presidency, 
the smaller cultivators did not have sufficient land to 
support themselves comfortably. In Bihar however, it was 
found also that "renumerative employment was not readily 
found. .. for the time the ryots could spare from their own 
fields". Moreover, rents were comparatively high in Bihar 
and raiyats had less security of tenure. Looking eastwards 
from Bihar, one found areas where labour was more in demand, 
either because of towns and manufacturers, or because (as in
0*A-
Rangpur, Dinajpur and Purnea) endemic disease and^unhealthy 
climate kept the population low. In the latter areas, 
population did not rise to the point at which it would press 
unduly on the resources of the country. Looking 
from Bihar, one finds areas under rice cultivation which 
according to Foley, had a lower density of population, but 
also less subsistence power than the congested districts of 
Bihar.7"1 But in those areas, if one considers the land- 
tenure system, one finds that the cultivating community was 
often better off than the cultivators and labourers of 
Bihar. It may be also, as we have seen within North Bihar, 
that labour was more enterprising in some areas than others: 
the people of Ghazipur, Aza togarh, Ballia, Banareis, Jaunpur, 
Allahabad and Mirzapur were preferred for industrial work 
and mining in Bengal in the first instance over workers from 
Bihar, and comparatively those labourers seemed readier to 
take risks than the labourers of, say, Saran.
There is any case no doubt that the condition of the 
labouring classes in Bihar was among the worst in India, and 
there are some indications that it was deteriorating in
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North Bihar, even in ordinary years, in the later nineteenth 
century. Mr. Collins, the Settlement Officer of Bhagalpur, 
while making a micro-survey of two villages in Duphor 
pargana observed that there was no prosperity at all among 
the lower classes including the weaving class, that is, for 
25 percent of the entire population in those two villages. 
He further observed that there was little chance of 
improving their conditions. At least they themselves. means
rf\0 K
to improve it, for even if there was ^ scarcity, they had "no 
resources to fall back upon".72 The same picture was 
presented by Dr. G. A. Grierson, when he was collector of 
Gaya, though he considered the condition of lower classes 
more precarious in Gaya than other districts of Patna 
Division. His estimate was that forty per cent of the 
population was insufficiently fed.73 In fact, however, 
Grierson's lengthy and detailed report, (dated 2 June 1888) 
on the lower classes of pure cultivators, labourers, 
artisans, and those who lived on charity, revealed a 
situation which was more or less common to the districts of 
Bihar. Gaya could be taken as a model. It is true that a 
report by Bourdillon found people in Gaya, especially in 
Jahanabad sub-division, the poorest in Bihar.7A But, #n the
f'
other hand, when Griejpon's report stirred up a political 
storm — there was a debate on the issue on 6 June 1893 in 
the House of Commons— -and the Government of India was 
compelled to devise a reply, its basis was partly that Gaya 
was not worse than the other districts of Bihar. Stevenson- 
Moore's report submitted to M. D. Macpherson, the collector 
of Gaya, on 23 August 18977S argued those points, but it 
seems only to have been true at particular times—^or example 
when Gaya did not suffer more due to famine, than North 
Bihar in 1897. However, qualified by bureaucratic and 
political disclaimers, what Grierson's report revealed was 
that scarcity of food and a system of bondage were the main 
features of precarious condition of lower classes 
(especially Kamias in Gaya) in Patna Division. The
condition of people was bad not just because of famine and 
certain natural calamities, but because of the disparities 
in distribution of land and in social and economic control,
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and the lack of government initiatives to redress their 
grievances. Moreover, the evidence that the situation was 
worsening was supported by Stevenson-Moore himself in the 
Muzaffarpur Settlement report. His verdict on Gaya is 
after all a good summary on the position of the poor in 
Bihar: "the labouring classes, both in North Bihar and in
Gaya are miserably poor and the pity is that in Gaya a
hidebound custom has condemned the more degraded of them to
a poverty which could not exist under the operation of 
economic laws: for the demand for labour is very
considerable while the supply is not excessive; yet numbers 
for the sake of a few rupees sell themselves and their 
children into miserable bondage".7e
This debt bondage may have been the perpetuation of an 
old system in a new form. It may be that the later 
nineteenth century saw the beginning of a change of emphasis 
in the basis of the relationships. Grierson's view was 
that, in an ordinary year, most raiyats were unable to
support themselves and had to depend on borrowing. In some 
senses this had always been the case, from one harvest to 
another. But indebtedness was also increasing and involving 
wide sections of the community; it may have been becoming a 
more important element in the system than in the past. 
Borrowing from one harvest to the next continued even—  
perhaps especial1y—among those who did not have any source 
of income to pay off the debt. In a system by which, in 
normal agricultural seasons, cultivators received advances 
from mahajans for ploughing land and sowing seeds, any 
failure to pay their debts with interest would become a way 
of bringing the peasantry down to the lowest ebb and keep ing 
it there thus in effect swelling the number of poor, unfree 
labourers on the land.
The superfluous class of population grew for both 
sociological and demographic reasons. Population pressure 
was not the only factor; rather the changes in tenancy law 
and in the economic order created a situation in which 
agricultural labourers were ignored and the distinction 
between haves and have-nots was widened. The British were
2 2 0
partly responsible: they paid no serious attention to a large section 
of the population which played an important role in agricultural pro­
duction in Bihar. Thus from the mid-nineteenth century labour 
controllers took advantage of compulsion, whether economic 
or non-economic, to utilize the labour force for capitalist 
economic development.
The measures adopted by government in the late
nineteenth century were not systematic. Though remedies
were brought forward in the reports of various committees
and commissions, often the officials merely hoped that
industrial advancement would give relief to the agricultural
labourers. In general, the mounting pressure of population
on land, in the absence of industry and unaccompanied by any
change in the method of cultivation and social organisation,
made the land scarce and human beings superfluous.77 The
district officers were highly plausible in presenting the
evidence of poverty, but their essential explanation for it
was the burden of population on the soil. This image of
Bihar hardly sufficed. The population was dense (though
Hit.even in 1921 only one third ofj^present day population) , but 
the agriculture was highly developed, providing food for 
other areas during famines. The reason that the area seemed 
unable to support the needs of the masses was to be found in 
the hereditary extractors of surplus and the dominant social 
classes.
During the nineteenth century the English notion of 
social classes, focused on property and categorised at 
various levels in the tenancy laws, provided in the Indian 
context additional strength to the dominant class. The 
lowest strata of society had no assets recognised in this 
view of the world. These people were available locally, 
they could also be compelled to migrate in search of 
livelihood from one place to another. Thus, in this period, 
waste land was brought into cultivation in various districts 
and cultivation was intensified, but of course the landless 
labourers got no share of the land. When calamities struck, 
a majority of the agriculturists suffered, but the most
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grievously affected , were always the lowest class of
agricultural labourers who had no resources in reserve. And
not only were they under — pri vi leged and at risk, but they
were looked down upon and regarded as an unproductive
element, in current British and Bihari notions, because "they
held no land and paid no rent. Nor did they themselves
imagine that they could obtain the right to hold land.
These conditions were reinforced, not removed, by the
changes of the nineteenth century'—by the worsening man: land
ratio, by commercial agriculture, by the new agricultural
1KL v
settlements in more marginal lands^® and even by growing 
demand for labour in India and abroad.
The two phases of colonial rule; firstly the East India 
Company's monopoly, which came to an end in 1813, and 
secondly, the open-door policy of free trade under the
conditions of colonial control created an internal economic
network dominated by industrial capitalism. The
characteristic, a debatable phenomenon of under-development, 
implied that the industrial growth of the region was 
neglected on the pretence of thq inappropriateness of the 
existing social and climatic conditions.79 it was as if the 
impediments to industry were such factors as early marriage, 
low employment, the family system, and old traditions, and 
that these features explained the inability of local 
industry to match the increase of population.®0 Nonetheless 
in North Bihar possible effects of industrialization were 
over-shadowed by the actual results of the commercialization 
of agriculture and the development of revenue records. The 
economic evidence shows that the demand and value of 
agricultural production (including traditional crops) 
increased greatly, along with the growing population. But 
the benefits of this agricultural growth were unequally 
distributed in the society. Land, having become a private 
item of property, then became more and more valuable. The 
landless fell back even further from the prospect of gaining 
property rights. The existing features of under-privilage
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and domination, already reinforced by a growing population 
and unfavourable conditions both in society and in land, were 
further increased by recurrent effects of famine and by the 
augmentation of market forces. The increasing role of 
merchants, and money-lenders, and also of debt owed to 
social superiors within each village, reinforced the mise-ry 
of poor people and increased theit number in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.®1
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CHAPTER VT
CONCLUSION
The structural ch anges in economy and society give us 
a broad idea oi transformation viewed in the empirical 
context of the nineteenth century. The transformation in 
relations of production affected the rural structure and led 
to the expropriation of the peasants. It also clc.Celerated 
the incapacity of the majority of population dependent on 
agriculture, resulting in poverty, and their full dependence 
on the controllers. At the same time, we find lack of
infLY<-^t by the dominant class in^ _____ agricultural
development. Their involvement in the appropriation of rent 
and profit by means of money-lending and in investment in 
rural credit was a rather retrogressive force* It also 
brought down the level of improvement of technology cmd. 
productive capacity of the land. The growing rate of 
population could not sustain the burden of expropriation^ and 
agricultural unempl oyraentinftc-Ye.®- S&4.-
The emergence of a dominant class and its situation 
within a hierarchical order was not only an indication oi 
the development of landlordism, but also constituted a 
constructive and significant phase in the emergence of a 
capitalist class. The development of the market economy 
together with political, cultural and foreign rule brought 
about a transformation in the whole of agrarian society. 
These changes did not however result in the modernisation of 
society. Rather, the 'survival of the fittest' in society
continued. The notion of modern law and its application to 
traditional society, and the legal regulation of land 
resources were important in the history of nineteenth- 
century agrarian society. The concept of 'land to rule' and 
the idea of income which mainly concerned the Indian rulers 
was also in the minds of the British administrators. The 
ideas of legitimate authority and even of absolute right in 
land were very much present in the Indian villages, and just 
as the Mughal rulers had collaborations so too did the
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British. What the British did was to take the hereditary 
property right and absolute power which had emerged common to 
English and Indian zamindars, and recast them in a legal 
framework in the 19th century. The foundation was the
Permanent Settlement; but by the last decades of the century a 
band of intermediaries, maliks and rich peasants, tenure- 
holders and petty zamindars, was found to be growing. At the 
same time there was an acceleration of wage labour and 
landlessness among the poor, which resulted from the social 
hierarchy and tenancy laws. A distinct group of people was 
monopolising the fruits of production and controlling the 
reproduction of agriculture.
Two important aspects of production which need to be 
emphasised are the maximum extraction of surplus and the 
utilization of the labour force. It is necessary to
concentrate on the general mode of production in the colonial 
context with the relations and forces of production' to 
articulate them in the overall social structure and correlate 
them with agrarian policy. None the less it was social 
dominance which was most crucial for the understanding of the 
economy and of the depressed classes of the Bihari region. 
After all, as in the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
stressed by Maurice Dobb, the whole social structure naturally 
signified the trends of historical development.2
This thesis has tried to discuss the various aspects of 
landlord-tenant relations, their classification, and the role 
of various elements in agrarian society under the tenancy laws 
in the most productive of the North-Eastern regions -
North Bihar. Examination of the subject has been based on a 
perception of the pre-capitalist society and on the transition 
from the traditional caste --based feudal order to the 
capitalist economic order of the era of British rule. The 
pre-capitalist economic formations were characterised by 
systems of hierarchy or *varna* (ranking) and based on the 
direct appropriation of surplus, on coercion and servitude. 
The development of the capitalist system, meaning the growth 
of the market economy,3 the commercialisation of agriculture, 
and ni nteenth — cent ury law, merely made the existing caste-
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based society more intricate. The pre-eminence of the
landlord was not wholly a product of the colonial ruler's 
tenurial structures and their persistent pressures upon the 
tenantry, but it was assisted by his vested interest in the 
expansion and commercialization of the economy in the later 
half of the nineteenth century. The competition for new 
markets and the production of commercial crops, and even the 
growth of transport and communications, all helped to 
reinforce the position of the zamindars. /J It has not been the 
intention of this thesis to fully discuss the
commercialisation of agriculture, but it has been concerned to 
assesyits influence in relation to each group of the producing 
classes, to the existence of the majority of 'subsistence' 
farmers, and to the incessant growth of the number of 
agricultural and landless labourers. The lower classes were 
linked in their origin with their servile status in the caste 
hierarchy. In a capitalist and commercial mode of
productionjjthey were thus doubly exploited, as lower castes and 
lower classes. In British eyes and in local perceptions, they 
were considered unproductive from the point of view of rental 
income as well. Among recent observations about the
condition of the landless labourers, Dharma Kumar has 
emphasised that, whatever the impact of British imperialism, 
the structure of Indian society with its very high incidence 
of landlessness can be traced to slavery as a long standing 
institution; she holds the 'orthodox' Indian nationalists as 
well as the Marxists responsible for a distorted
interpret ^ation. b One could parfjciJly agree with her view of
the importance of the structure of the society. But on the 
other hand, I have also emphasised the impact of the growth of 
market economy and commercialisation of agriculture, and to 
some extent endorsed the ideas of Surendra J. Patel when he 
alleges that the British were responsible for the creation of 
landless labourers^ But this too is incomplete or misleading. 
It seems to be the case, as Utsa Patnaik claims, that the 
numbers of the servile classes, of paupers, artisans and other 
lower agriculturists, were increasing as a result of trade and 
economic policy which forced them to engage in agricultural 
labour**. But what was more important was the local control
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which immediately affected the. labour, and the continuing 
oppression by the dominant class. In this respect, the role 
of law on the prevailing social structure seems to be the 
crucial factor.
Tenancy legislation tried to streamline the agrarian 
system on modern lines as a two-tier social hierarchy based on 
the English principle of landlord and tenant. It did not help 
the peasantry as a whole or the lower orders of the society. 
The Bengal Tenancy Act of 188b and later the survey and 
settlement operations did not solve the problems of the poor 
but rather made them more complex. The idea of economic
equality never occured to lawmakers. If remodelling the 
social and economic structure had been the motto of tenancy 
legislations it would have been necessary to protect the land 
rights of the majority of the producing classes and to reduce 
the large gap between haves and have-nots. But the legal 
categories and economic goals of the British were established 
only for certain classes of people in India and these were not 
made into functioning social groups. Henry Maine had made it
clear in 1861: the imperial policy was to encourage the
movement from 'status to contract'. He thought that the
family obligations by which the Indian community was 
distinguished would gradually be dissolved in the face of the 
growth of individual obligations.3 The legislation was
therefore ultimately about personal control of land, and the
destabilizing of the rural structure  ^Indian society,
however much the rhetoric was of stability and protection. The 
picture that emerged was of a powerful zamindar and landed
aristocracy on the line of^ English system,   jnot so strong
that it could withstand altogether the demand for change, yet 
strong enough to vitiate^in^particular term. The protection of 
tenants was little more than nominal, while the dominant 
position of the landlord permitted him to manipulate the most 
well-intentioned tenancy act to his advantage. Indeed, to a 
whole complex of extra-legal exactions, physical as well as 
financial, was added resort to the damaging process of 
litigation; all were to maintain landed privilege and 
discourage the realization of tenant rights.-1 The situation
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in the North Bihar districts was thus, in a sense, a dual 
government, oi state and landlord controlling the society and 
economy.
The power oi the zamindars ensured high rates of rent. 
The superior legal power, both old and new, was reinforced due 
to^increase in the cultivation of land, despite the record of 
rights and the occupancy rights provided to a section of 
raiyats. These measures strengthened the economic position of 
the zamindars, but also of allied groups. The intermediaries 
also grew - the role of village xaahajans and moneylenders 
became important in local production and marketing, but in 
this advantage they merely linked themselves to the landed 
gentry as part of the ruling class.
For the majority of rent payers there was greater 
hardship as a result of the increasing burden of rent. 
Because of the role of creditors and the growing rate of 
transfer of raiyati rights into the hands of the richer 
section of the society, the poorer raiyats were reduced below 
the level of subsistence agriculturists to that of the lowest 
in the society - many were added to the number of the landless 
labourers. Appropriation of raiyats' holdings and seizing of 
their personal property were very common. The stronger
groups,^ bothi> caste and economic hierarchy^ also manipulated
the judicial verdicts and court cases. Some officials were 
often critical of the misdeeds of the maliks, and of policies 
which did not give relief to the weaker section of the 
society. But they did not devise policies which improved the 
situation. They attributed the problem, as in the incidence 
of famines and the suffering of the poor, rather more to the 
pressure of population and the scarcity of land than to the 
nature of society and government. But the growth of
population cannot be regarded the only reason for the poverty. 
It is true that there was hardly more than 12 percent of the 
land left uncultivated in the North Bihar region. But the 
holdings oi the zamindars and their personal assets including 
zirat land, and those of other dominant groups, formed the 
major portion of the cultivated areas. Thus there was no land 
for the landless labourers and insufficient for the poor 
tenants-at-wi11 . They had no place in an open credit market,
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but their labour was saleable at a very cheap rate at the 
instance of the controllers of production and to meet the 
commercialised demand jay agricultural products.
In recent years there has been much discussion on the 
commercialisation of agriculture and its impact not only in 
the Eastern regions, but on the whole of^ Indian sub­
continent • There is, however, much difference of opinion, 
sometime apparently according to the crop under consideration 
-such as sugarcane, oil seeds, jute, poppy and indigo - and 
sometimes according to qualitative differences between
markets, ______ the involvement of money-lending classejand the
monetisation of^ cash crops. Neil Charlesworth held that the 
commercialisation of agriculture in Western India depended on 
special circumstances, such as ecological conditions, and the 
demand of wider markets, and hence varied from region to 
region and village to village. However, in his view,
differential commercialisation brought quantitative expansion 
and influenced the society. Christopher Baker finds that in 
the nineteenth century^ agriculture in South India was extended 
under the impetus of a growing population and an increasing 
demand for agricultural produce among new industries and newly 
rich consumers in the industrialised tyest, though he has some 
reservation about the casual role of the latter. Some of 
these writers suggest that the persistence of a peasant 
economy and a hierarchical structure arrested the development 
processes. But the majority, especially the most recent
rethinking, have tried to prove instead that it was the nature
of the commercialisation which delayed the developmental
<b-
processes. Krishna Bhaijfdwaj has linked the process of rural 
indebtedness and bondage, the servile dependence of small 
cultivators on moneylanders, merchants and landlords. She has 
related the production and exchange processes in order to 
establish the different categories of very small cultivators, 
small cultivators, medium cultivators and large or dominant 
cultivators, each of which exercised qualitative differences 
in the type of exchanges and their market involvement.
It is clear that capitalistic relations in production and
the involvement of only limited elements of society in the
tMimarket, as in exchange and credit  -all synonym^ with the
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development of commercialisation of agriculture— -resulted in 
the impoverishing of the producing classes. But cash crops, 
subsistence farming, credit relations, regional economy and 
the further transmission to ^  international market can be 
articulated in terms of the existing class structure and the 
caste-based dominance of local social groups who controlled 
both land and labour. Here the crucial factors were the 
historical roots of the social and econom ic hierarchy and its 
nineteenth-century adaptation by the British in land 
legislation and judicial interpretations.
B. R. Tomlinson says about the late nineteenth century 
British policy: 'the search of power and profit in its most
important dependency' , apart from the structure of the 
society, the reinforced commercialization of agriculture and 
the most augmented revenue policy in feudal society, rather 
resulted in the accumulation of capital in the hands of the 
privileged class. The effective control of land was more 
important than its ownership. The control of land and capital 
made the society more complex. j^ural credit,^ involvement
of various elements in the market economy .^social and economic 
power relations within the framework of the British agrarian 
policy put great pressure on the poorer class on the one 
hand, and on the other hand hindered economic development
over the years. Hence not only was there a gradual decline of 
cottage industry and no sign of industrial growth, but there 
was no sign of modernity at all in the life of the masses. 
The servile and poverty-stricken agricultural labourers were 
growing in number; for them the economic structure was 
definetely in a state of decay at the end of the nineteenth 
century. There was no improvement to be seen in the condition 
of the majority of those on whom agricultural production 
depended.
230
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: the Agrarian Society of North Bihar
in the 19th Century
Footnotes
(1) Some recent published works on Bihar are:
(i) B. B. Chaudhuri , 'Agrarian Relations in Bengal <1859- 
1885'), In N. K. Sinha (ed.), H i s t o r y  o f  B e n g a l  
1 7 5 7 - 1 9 0 5 ,  (Calcutta, 1967).
<ii) B.B. Chaudhuri, 'Movement of Rent in Eastern India',
1793 - 1930, 1 H R , Vol. Ill, No. 2, January,
1977.
(iii) B. B. Chaudhuri, 'The Process of Depeasantization in
Bengal and Bihar, 1885 - 1946', 1 H R , 1 (1975).
<iv) B. B. Chaudhuri, The Land Market in Eastern India
(1793-1940)', I E S H R , 12, 1 and 2 (1975), 1-42, 133-
68 .
(v) B, B. Chaudhuri, 'The Agrarian Movements in Bihar
and Bengal', (1919-1939), in B. R. Nanda (ed.), 
S o c i a l i s m  i n  I n d i a  (Delhi, 1972).
(vi) G_irish Mishra, A g r a r i a n  P r o b l e m s  o f  P e r m a n e n t  
S e t t l e m e n t : A case Study of Champaran, (Delhi,
1978).
(vii) Stephen Henningham, P e a s a n t  M o v e m e n t s  i n  C o l o n i a l  
I n d i a ,  N o r t h  B i h a r ,  1 9 1 7  -  1 9 4 2 ' ,  ( C a n b e r r a ,  1 9 8 2 ' ) ,
(viii) Peter Robb (ed.), Ruya_l India Land Power and Society 
under British Rule, (London, 1983).
(ix) Peter Robb, 'Hierarchy and Resources: Peasant
Stratification in Late Nineteenth Century Bihar,'
MAS, 13, 1 (1979).
(x) Peter Robb, 'Law and Agrarian Society in India: The
Case of Bihar and the Nineteenth Century Tenancy 
Debate', MAS 22,, 2. (1988).
( x i )  J a c q u e s  P o u c h e p a d a s s , L o c a l  L e a d e r s  a n d  t h e
I n t e l  1  i  g e n t  s i  a  i n  t h e  C h a m p a r a n  S a t y a g r a h *  ' C I S ,  New
Series, No. 8, (November, 1974).
(xii) Jacques Pouchepadass, 'Peasant Indebtedness in
Colonial Bihar, P u i q s a r t h Q ,  t N o .  4 ,  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
( x i i i )  J a c q u e s  P o u c h e p a d a s s ,  ' P e a s a n t  E c o n o m y  a n d  t h e  
M a r k e t  S y s t e m  i n  E a r l y  2 0  t h  C e n t u r y  B i h a r ' F ' u b l  i  s h e d  
i n  P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  M o d e r n  
S o u t h  A r i a n  S t u d i e s ,  S O A S ,  L o n d o n ,  J u l y  1 9 8 1 .
( x i v )  J a c q u e s  P o u c h e p a d a s s ,  T h e  M a r k e t  f o r  A g r i c u l t u r a l
L a b o u r  i n  C o l o n i a l  N o r t h  B i h a r ' ( 1 8 6 0 - 1 9 2 0 ) '  
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  9 t h  E u r o p e a n  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  M o d e r n  
S o u t h  A s i a n  S t u d i e s ,  H e i d e l b e r g ,  J u l y ,  1 9 8 6 .
( x v )  A n a n d  A .  Y a n g ,  ' A n  I n s t i t u t i o a n l  S h e l t e r :  T h e  C o u r t
o f  W a r d s  i n  L a t e  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  B i h a r ' .  M A S ,
13,2 (1979).
(xvi) Stephen Henningham, 'Bureaucracy and Control in
India's Great Landed Estates: The Raj Darbhanga of
Bihar, 1879 to 1950’, MAS, 17, 1 (1983)
(xvii) A. K. Bagchi, 'De industrialization in Gangetic
Bihar, l & 0 9 - 1 9 0 1 /' ^ - ] ) t ( e - ( L i )  E s s a y s  i n  H o n o u r  o f
P r o f e s s o r  S. C. Sarkar, (Calcutta, 1976).
231
( XV I'i'O
( x / x ;
( x x ;
(xxii)
( x x i i i )  
( x x j v  )
(2 )
(3 )
(4 )
(5)
<.6)
<7;
<8)
(9)
cio)
ai)
Asok Sen, Partha Chaterjee and Saugata Mukharji, 
Perspectives in Social Sciences, 2, Three Studies on 
the Agrarian Structure in Bengal 1850-1947,
(Calcutta, 1982)
F. T. Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis in India, The Case of 
Bihar, (Delhi, 1974).
Arvind Narain Das, Agrarian Unrest and Socio- 
Economic Change in Bihar, 1900-1980 (Delhi, 1983).
‘ P.J. Marshall, The New Cambridge History of 
India II. 2 Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern
India 1740-1828, (Cambridge, 1988).
C. A. Bayly, The New Cambridge History of India, II. 
I, Indian Society and the making of the British 
Empire, (Cambridge, 1988).
> C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen And Bazars, North
Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770- 
1870 (Cambridge, 1983).
Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (ed.) The Cambridge 
Economic History of India, vol. 2, 1757-1970,
(Cambridge, 1983).
Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy Social 
Structure, and politics, 1919 - 1947, (Cambridge,
1986)
Thomas R. Metcalf, 'Laissez Faire and Tenant Right in 
mid-nineteenth century India, vol.1, 1IESHR (1963),
pp. 74 - 76.
B. R. Grover, Predential address, Medieval India, IHCF 
(1976), pp. 162 - 63.
H. R. Ghosal, 'A Study of the Land Revenue Records of 
Tirhut (17 - 1838),* JBRS, Vol. XXX, pt. II, (1954), 
pp. 43 - 4.
D. Rothermund, The Phases of Indian Nationalism and 
other Essays (Bombay, 1970), p. 170 -
Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of
Capi talism, revised edition, (London, 1963).
D. D, Kosambi, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient 
India in Historical Outline. (London, 1965) pp. 15 - 
17.
R. S. Sharma, Indian Feudalism, (Calcutta, 1965) and 
also see his, Material Culture and Social Formati on
in Ancient India, (Delhi, 1983), Introduction and 
Chapter 1, 'Problem of Social Formations in Early 
India.'
H. Risl£-y, Tribes and Castes of Bengal, (Calcutta,
1891) Vol. 1, pp. 440 - 446.
P. C. Roychoudhury, Saran Gazetteers, (Patna, 1930).
Z3Z
i
(12) 
(13)
(J*r)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(2 1 )
(22 )
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
V. V. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal,
(London, 1876)
David G. Mandelbaum, Society in India: Conti nui ty and
Change, (California, 1970), see part I: Introduction.
Fifth report, (Firminger ed. ) Vol. II, p. 739.
C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Final Report on the Survey and 
Settlement Operations in the Champaran District, 1892
to 1899 (Calcutta, 1900) (Henceforth S. R.
Champaran).
J. H. Kerr, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement 
Operations in the Darbhanga District, 1896 to 1903,
(Patna, 1926) (Henceforth S. R. Darbhanga).
C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Final Report on the Survey and 
Settlement Operations in the Muzaffarpur District 
1892 - 99) (Henceforth S. R. Muzaffarpur)
B. S. Cohn, 'Structural Change in Indian Rural 
Society' in R. E. Frykenberg (ed. ) , Land Control and 
Social Structure in Indian History (Wisconsin,
1969), pp. 53 - 121.
S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 319.
S. R. Darbhanga, para, 289.
Gazetteers: Saran, (Patna, 1960), Champaran (Patna,
1960), Darbhanga, (Patna, 1964), Muzaffarpur, (Patna, 
1958).
G. A. Grierson, Bihar Peasant Life, (Second edition, 
Patna, 1929), pp. 125 - 30.
S. R. Champaran, para, 406.
Muzaffarpur G^azetteer , pp. 60 - 61.
Saran Gazetteer ,, p. 66.
S. R. Darbhanga, para 479.
Ibid, para, 466 - 70.
B. N. Ganguly, Trends of Agriculture and Population 
in the Ganges Valley (London, 1938), pp. 193 - 4.
P. J. Marshall, op.cit., pp. 152-55.
B. B. Mishra, The Indian Middle Class Their Growth in 
Modern Times, (London, 1961) p. 129.
P. J. Marshall, op. cit. Chapter 5, 'A New Society?'.
See his assessment of the Society of Eastern India 
under the British in the late 18th and early 19th 
century.
233
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds. ), Cambr'ii^e 
Economic History of India, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1983) 
94™!
P. J. Marshall, op. cit., pp. 152 - 55.
Bengal Be venue Proceedings, 17 September, 1877,
Selection from Papers Relating to Bengal Tenancy 
Act, 1885, pp. 35 - 40.
A. Sen, Partha Chatterjee and Saugata Mukherji, 
Prespectives in Social Sciences 2, Three Studies on 
the Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850 - 1947, 
(Calcutta, 1882) p. 28.
S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 351, C. J. Stevenson-Moore, 
quoting from the minutes of Sir, A. P. Macdonnell, 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.
23 4
CHAPTER II
ZAMINDARS
EflQtUQtSS
(1) R. S. Sharma, Indian Feudalism, (Calcutta, 1965). See 
Introduction.
(2) D. D. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient Indian 
In Historical Outline, (London, 1965), pp. 16 - 21.
(3) Bernard S. Cohn, 'Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society 
and Culture? in Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn, (ed.), Structure 
and Change in Indian Society, (Chicago 1968), p. 16.
(4) B. H. Baden-Powell, The Land Systems of British India, Vol. I,
(Oxford, 1892), pp. 94 - 240.
(5) Ronald Inden, 'Orientalist Construction of India', MAS 20.3. (1986), p.
428.
(6) S. Nurul Hasan, Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal India,
(Delhi, 1973), p. 19.
(7) Satish Chandra, Medieval India;Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the
Village (Delhi, 1982), pp. 62 - 66.
(8) Tapan Raychaudhuri, 'Permanent Settlement in Operation: Bakarganj District, 
East Bengal,' in R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), Land Control and Social
Structure in Indian History (Visconsin, 1967), p. 164.
(9) Ibid, pp. 164 - 65.
(10) Quamuddin Ahmad, 'Origin and Growth of Darbhanga Raj (1514-1666), Based on 
some Contemporary and unpublished Documents' IHRCP, (1962), pp. 89 - 91.
The auther has traced the origin and development of the Darbhanga raj, 
deciphering some unpublished original Persion and other documents of^l6th 
century since the time of emperor Akbar, and enlightened with facts about 
the fiscal and administrative set up of the big feudal estate of North 
Bihar. These unpublished records are preserved in Darbhanga Record Room.
(11) 'The Aristocracy of Bihar: The Hathwa Raj', Calcutta Review, Vol. LXXVI, 
(1883), pp. 80 - 101.(N.A.)
(12) Giri sh Mishra, 'The zamindars of Champaran,' in his Agrarian Froblems of 
Permanent Settlement: A case Study of Champaran, (Delhi, 1978) pp. 11-15.
(13) Minute of John Shore, Extract, Bengal Revenue consultations, (21st
December, 1789), Fifth Report, Vol. II, pp. 520 - 22 (App).
(14) Henry S. Maine, Village Communitties in the East and Vest, (London, 1876),
p. 60
(15) H. R. Ghosal, quoting extract of letters from Secretary. Sadar Board, to 
Commissioner of Saran 6, December 1837; letters from Commissioner of 
Munghyer to Collector of Tirhut, 22 March 1834, letter from Commissioner 
of Saran to Collector of Tirhut, 22 August 1833; from the unpublished 
documents of record room of the Muzzaffarpur Collector for the period 1833"
235
38. 'The Problem of Effecting Permanent Settlement in Tirhut,' JBRS, 
February 1960. The author reveals the fact that the unsettled mahals were 
kept temporarily settled by the Collectors with those who were in actual 
possession of management, or mahals were farmed out or were 
kept under Rhas management of the Collector.
<16) S. Nural Hasan, 'Zamindars under the Mughals', R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), Land 
Control and Social Structure in Indian History, (Wisconsin, 1969), p. 28.
(17) Report of the Government of Bengal on the proposed Amendment of the Law 
of Landlord and Tenant in that province with revised bill, (Calcutta,
1881), p. 201.
(18) Ibid, From A. P. Macdonnell, officiating Collector of Saran, Chapra, to the 
Commissioner of Patna Division, 'Remark on Proposal Rent Bill Law for 
Bihar', dated Chapra, 15 December 1880, p. 734.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Tapan Raychaudhuri, op.cit., p. 166.
(21) B. B. Chaudhuri, 'Agrarian Relations in Bengal 1859 - 1885', in N. K. Simha, 
(ed.) History of Bengal Volume II, 1757 - 1905, (Calcutta
1967) p. 265.
(22) S. R. Darbhanga, para 100.
(23) Tapan Raychaudhuri, op.cit., pp. 169 - 70.
(24) Girish Mishra, op.cit., p. 51.
(25) S. R. Muzaffarpur, p. 334.
(26) S. R. Saran, pp. 152 - 53.
(27) S. R. Muzaffarpur, p. 154.
(28) Ibid., para, 439.
(29) Ibid, para, 441.
(30) S. R. Saran, p. 153, and S. R. Muzaffarpur, p. 326.
(31) S. R. Muzaffarpur, pp. 327 - 28, and S. R. Saran, para, 543.
(32) Jacques Pouchepadass, 'Land Power and Market: The Rise of the Land
Market in Gangetic India', in Peter Robb, (ed.), Rural India:
Land Power and Society Under British Rule, (London, 1983), pp.
89 - 99.
(33) S. R. Saran, para 206, (Legal Rememberancer's opinion on the question of
right on private land of landlord).
(34) S. R. Muzaffarpur, p. 156.
(35) Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings, 8 April, 1794, Letter
from Commissioner of Bihar to the Board of Revenue, dated 5, November, 
1793.
236
<36) Tapan Raychaudari, op.cit., pp. 169 - 70.
(37) Anand A. Yang, 'Institutional Shelter; The Court of Wards in Late Nine­
teenth Century Bihar', M A S , 13, 2 (1979), pp. 242 - 64. The author
discusses various aspects of the zamindari estates being brought under the 
Court of Wards as well as administration of the estates during the 
wardship,
(38) Stephen Henningham, 'Bureaucracy and Control in India's Great Landed 
Estates: The Raj Darbhanga of Bihar, 1879 to 1950' MAS 17, 1 (1983)
pp. 35 - 37.
(39) Bernard S. Cohn, 'Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India: The 
Banaras Region, JAOS, 82 (July - September 1962), pp.
312 - 20.
(40) P. J. Musgrave, 'Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate Management and
Social Control in Uttar Pradesh 1860 - 1920', MAS, 6, 3, (1972), pp. 270.
(41) A. Ghosh and K. Datt, Development of Capitalist Relation in Agriculture,
Delhi, 1977), p. 61.
(42) R. N. Sinha, Bihar Tenantry, (1793-1833), (Bombay, 1968), p. 119.
(43) B. B. Mishra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times,
(London, 1961) p. 134.
(44) Girish Mishra, op.cit., pp. 51 - 52.
(45) Sirajul Islam, Permanent Settlement in Bengal (1790-1819, (Dacaa, 1979), 
p. 254.
(46) Jacques Pouchepadass, op.cLt, p. 97.
(47) B. B. Chaudhuri, 'Rural Credit Relations in Bengal,' 1859 - 85, Vol. VI, No.2, 
IESHR (June 1969), p. 209.
(48) P. C. RoyjChoudhuri, 'The Changing Villages in Bihar' in his, Inside 
Bihar, (Patna, 1962), p. 67.
(49) R. S. Sharma, 'How Feudal was Indian Feudalism? JPS, Vol. 12,
No. 2 and 3, January/April (1985), pp. 26 - 29.
(50) Bernard S. Coh-w , op.cit., pp. 312 - 19.
(51) B. R. Grover, 'Nature of Dehati-Taluqa (zamindari Villages) and the 
Evolution of the Taluqdari System During the Mughal Age', IESHR, Vol. II,
No. 3, 1965 pp. 260 - 61.
(52) Peter Robb, 'Hierarchy and Resources: Peasant Stratification in 
Late Nineteenth Century Bihar', MAS, 13, (1979), p. 101
nr
23 7
CHAPTER III
RAIYATS
Epptnotfijs
(1) D. D. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India 
in Historical Outline, (London, 1965) the Chapter on the 
Historical Perspective, pp. 15-18.
(2) D. N. Jha, Ancient India: An Introductory Outline,
(Del1i , 1977), p. 101.
(3) B. D. Chattopadhyaya.,'Trade and Urban Centres in Early Medieval North 
India’, IHE, I, (1974) pp. 203-19.
(4) B. N. S. Yadav, Society and Culture in Northern India in the 
Twelfth Century, (Allahabad, 1973), and another work, 'Immobility 
and Subjection of Pesantry in Early Medieval Complex', 1ER., I, (1974), 
p. 18-27.
(5) R. S. Sharma, Perspectives in Social and Economic History of Early 
India, (Delhi, 1983), pp. 233-39. His article, 'How Feudal was Indian 
Feudalism?' JPS (1985), pp. 23 - 25.
(6) B. R. Grover, IHCP (1976), Presidential address, 'Medieval 
Indian History' Section, pp. 145 - 46.
(7) Irfan Habib, 'The Peasant In Indian History', General Presidential, 
Address, IHCP&l pp. 30 - 31.
(8) Satish Chandra, Medieval India: Society, The Jagirdari Crisis 
and the Village, (Delhi, 1982), pp. 32-3.
(9) Ibid., p. 36.
(10) B. R. Grover, 'Land Rights in Mughal India', IESHR I, July- 
September 1963, p. 5. He quotes the evidence of the land right of 
pahi-kasht raiyat from Persian manuscripts for Subah
Delhi (available in Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, for the reign of 
Shahjanan, and also manuscripts found in Berlin Archive).
(11) Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India, (Bombay 
1965), pp. 112 - 13.
(12) B. R. Grover, IHCP, (1976), pp. 146-52.
(13) Satish Chandra, op. cit., pp. 36 - 37. His interpretation of the dis­
tinction between khud-kasht and paki-kasht raiyats and
evidence produced for the district of Purnea, in case of raiyat of a
mauza cultivating land in another mauza as pahi 
as well as a raiyat, signifies the status of a cultivator called 
raiyat glri (tan ba raiyat giri ayad) .
(14) T. H. Colebrooke, Remarks on the Hushband^ry and Internal Commerce oi
Bengal, (London 1806), pp. 164 - 65.
238
(15) B. R. Grover, 'Land Rights in Mughal India', IESHR, 1 July - 
September, (1963), p. 6.
(16) Bernard S. Coh^n, 'Comments on Papers on Land Tenure', IESHR. (1965), 
pp. 178 - 79.
(17) Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law: its connection with the early history of 
Society and its relation to modern idea (original publication, 1861,
London 1917), see Chapter on 'Primitire Society and Ancient Law',
p. 99.
(18) S. Gopal, The Permanent Settlement in Bengal and its Results,
(London, 1948), p. 12.
(19) Hastings Papers, British Museum European ^ dditiont(MSS 19090.
(Br. M u . )
(20) V. K. Firminger (Ed.), Fifth Report from the Select Committee of
the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company, vol. 11 
July, 1812, p. 57.
(21) Henry S. Maine, Village Communities in the East and Vest, (London,
1907), p.160.
(22) Fifth Report, Volume III, pp. 398-400, Harrington's analysis
of land tenure in the Bengal Presidency is important for^better under­
standing of the problem. He was an East India Company official from 
1780 to 1823.
(23) Minute oi Governor General, (Bengal), 1 September, 1789, Fifth 
Report, Volume ii, pp. 11-12 (Appendix).
(24) B. H. Baden Powell, The Land Systems of British India Vol. 1,
(Oxford, 1892), p. 404.
(25) Report of the Government of Bengal on the proposed Amendment of the 
Law of Landlord and Tenant (henceforth to be called Law of the 
Landlord of Tenant) in that Province with revised bill and 
Appendixes, Vol. I, (Report, Bill and Appendixes, 1881) Revenue Dept. 
Appendix II, A, 'Extract from Philip's lecture on the Land Tenure of 
Lower Province of Bengal' Chapter VIII, p. 311. (IOL).
(26) Irfan Habib, op. cit., p. 336 and also see Tapan Ray__Chaudhuri,
Permanent Settlement in operation: Bakarganj District East Bengal in 
R. E. Frykenberg (ed}} Land Control and Social Structure in Indian 
History, (Wisconsin, 1969). “ ~““"~
(27) R. Stevenson-Moore, Final report on the Survey and Settlement 
Operations in the districts of Muzaffarpur, 1892 - 99, (Patna 1900), 
pp. 79 - 84.
(28) Hetukar Jha, 'Permanent Settlement in Bihar', Social Scientist I ftm-19 %o )Kt^J
ETC r- /- '  ' -*pp. 55 - 56.
(29) Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of 
Commons (1832), Vol. Ill, p.186.
(30) S. Gopal, op. cit. p. 37.
239
(31) M. N. Gupta, Land System of Bengal, (Calcutta, 1940), pp.
239 - 243.
(32) D. C. Vadhwa, 'Transferability of Raiyati Holdings in Bihar: A Long
Journey (1793-1950)', D. N. Panigrahi (ed«), Studies in History and 
Society: Economy, Society and Folitics in Modern India, (DelhCJ, 1985). 
The author discusses and analyses the various aspects of transfer
of land holdings of the raiyats of Bihar during the above period, and 
a.dvfl/rf-V-S the argument that the courts employed the phrase, 'rights 
and interests of the raiyats which 'could be sold without determining 
what they consisted of-> pp. 160-81.
(33) K. C. Chaudhuri, The History and Economics of the Land System in 
Bengal, (Calcutta, 1928), pp. 143 - 44.
(34) Girish Mishra, Agrarian Problems of Permanent Settlement: a case 
Study of Champaran, (Delhi, 1978) p.31.
(35) B. B. Chaudhuri, 'Agrarian Relations in Bengal (1859 - 1855)'; N. K. 
Sinha (ed. ), Hi story of Bengal (1757 - 1905), (Calcutta, 1967)
p. 265.
(36) Thomas P. Metcalf, 'Laissez Faire and Tenant Fight in Mid-nineteenth 
century India' Vol. 1, No. 1, IESHR (1963), pp. 75 - 76.
(37) C. D. Field, Landholding and the Relation of Landlord and Tenant in 
Various Countries, (Calcutta, 1885) p. 786.
(38) Girish Mishra, op, cit. p. 129.
(39) D. C. Vadhwa, op. cit. p. 166.
(40) Sydney Vebb, The Decay of Capitalist Civilization (London, 1923).
(41) L. H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital to 1875, (London, 1963)
Chapters VII, X, and XI.
(42) Ratna Lekha Ray,'The Changing Fortunes of the Bengali Gentry Under 
Colonial Rule-Pal Chandhuris of Mahesganj, 1800-1950, MAS (1987)/Vlr**i '^'^'
She discusses the capitalist enterprise of the zamindars 
of Bengal who invested their capital in land and agriculture after the 
Permanent Settlement of 1793. In Bengal it was true in most of the 
cases, but in Bihar, only in case of those wealthy zamindars who 
realised that the nature of agriculture was gradually becoming 
commercial, such as indigo, poppy, oilseeds, sugarcane, tobacco and 
rice. They also took incentive in both production as well as in mono­
polising the village market.
(43) John Beames, Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian, (London,
1961) pp. 129 - 30.
(44) Report of the Committee on the Agrarian Condition in Champaran, Vol.
I, Chapiter III, (Patna, 1917).
(45) Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces
of Bengal for the year 1892 - 93, (Calcutta, 1894), p. 47. Also see
the Report for the year 1900, p. 26.
240
(46) Under a s s a m i w a r  system, cultivation of the crop was carried o v  
by the individual cultivator's family on his own holding. He did 
not hold land on lease. He loaned money from the village m a h a j a n  to 
carry on production and bore all the risks investing capital and 
labour and surrendered almost^entire share of the produce to the 
creditor. A s s a m ! w a r  means cultivation through tenants. The term 
z i r a t  means direct cultivation of land holding at a rate
fixed by the landholder, f h i k a d a r  or planter. Under this 
system,^maximum prof it j : f m  the produce was appropriated by the m a l i k .  
The z i r a t  land was generally private land of zamindarswhich tenure 
holders leased out to the r a i y a t s  on high rent. The t h i k a d j r s  and 
planters worked as tenure-holders and earned much profit receiving 
z i r a t  land from zamindarson tenure and leasb^jf&ut to poor raiyats and 
exploitf-n^ them.
Also, see A. P. Macdonnell's note in 'Memoirs of my India Career, vide 
No. 127, 1876 - 77, Appendix B, Macdonnell's Report of 22 June 1877.
(47) F a m i n e  C o m m i s s i o n  R e p o r t ,  1 8 8 1 , Appendix 1, para 4, p. 188.
(48) B e n g a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  R e p o r t  f o r  1 8 7 1 - 7 2 .  ( C a l c u t t a ,  1 8 7 3 )  
{ G o v e r n m e n t  o f  B e n g a l  t o  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  2 1  S e p t e m b e r  1 8 6 3 ) ,
( 4 9 )  P a p e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  w o r k i n g  a n d  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  A c t  X  o f  1 8 5 9 ,  
(Calcutta, 1888) pp. 2-3. (IOL).
(50) Dietmar Rothermund, ‘The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 and its influence 
on Legislation in other Provinces', B e n g a l  P a s t  a n d  P r e s e n t ,  Diamond 
Jubilee Number, (1967),
(51) B e n g a l  L a n d  R e v e n u e  M i s c e l l a n e o u s  P r o c e e d i n g s ,  November 1876,
Collin 14-20/30, Temple's Minutes of 18 April 1876. (IOL).
(52) Ibid, para 13 - 16.
(53) I n d i a n  F a m i n e  P r o c e e d i n g s , December 1876 Appendix C.
Geddes to the Commissioner of Patna and Bhagalpur, 24 January 1876, 
para 112. (IOL).
(54) J. S. Jha, H i s t o r y  o f  D a r b h a n g a  R a j (Patna 1966), pp. 81-85.
Also see Charles James O'Donnell, T h e  R u i n e  o f  a n  I n d i a n  P r o v i n c e  (An  
I n d i a n  F a m i n e  E x p l a i n e d ) , 'A Letter to the Marquis of Hartington, 
Secretary of State for India' (London, 1880), pp. 21-3.
(55) Ibid.
(56) B e n g a l  R e v e n u e  P r o c e e d i n g s ,  S e p t e m b e r  1 8 7 8 ,  N o s .  9 2  - 9 3
(57) L a w  o f  L a n d l o r d  a n d  T e n a n t , 1881, Report, Bill and Appendixes. (IOL).
(58) S .  R .  M u z a f f a r p u r  para 336.
(59) B e n g a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  R e p o r t ,  1 8 8 5  - 8 6 , (Calcutta, 1887), 
pp. 96 - 98.
(60) Dufferin Report, G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  R e v e n u e  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r e  
D e p a r t m e n t ,  R e s o l u t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  e c o n o m i c  C o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  L o w e r  
c l a s s e s  o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  m e a s u r e s  f o r  t h e  r e l i e f  o f  
d e n s e l y  p o p u l a t e d  t r a c t s ,  1 8 8 8 , (Simla, 1888) (Henceforth, Dufferin 
Report).
24 1
(61) See L a w  o f  L a n d l o r d  a n d  T e n a n t , 1881.
(62) The Lieutenant Governor, Ashley Eden, said that tenants-at-will were 
enormous in number and weak in position. They were not significant
in the eyes of law as they were too weak to protect their interest
in the society. Therefore, much stress was given on strengthening the 
position of the occupancy raiyats. Although they were to be protected 
under the provisions with certain reservations, k h u d - k a s b t  raiyat 
had all the rightsfor cultivation of land under his possession under 
the Acts of 1859 and Act VIII of 1869. But hardly did the zamindar
allow the raiyat to enjoy the right or did the laws specifically
empower the raiyat.
(63) D. Rothermund, op. c.it. p. 95.
(64) S .  R.  M u z a f f a r p u r ,  p. 54.
(65) Ibid, para, 44- 41.
(66) J. H. Kerr, F i n a l  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  S u r v e y  a n d  S e t t l e m e n t  O p e r a t i o n s  i n
t h e  D a r b h a n g a  D i s t r i c t ,  1 8 9 6  t o  1 9 0 3 , (Patna, 1926), para, 364. 
(Henceafter S. R. Darbhanga).
(67) Peter Robb, 'Hierarchy and Resources: Peasant Stratification in late 
Nineteenth Century Bihar', MAS, 13, 1 (1979), p. 116.
(68) S .  R.  M u z a f f a r p u r , para 784, p. 285.
(69) H. J. Kerr, F i n a l  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  S u r v e y  a n d  S e t t l e m e n t  O p e r a t i o n s  i n
t h e  D i s t r i c t  o f  S a r a n ,  1 8 9 3  t o  1 9 0 1 , (Patna, 1903) para, 445 
(Henceforth S. R. Saran, 1893 - 1901).
(70) S .  k .  D a r b h a n g a pp. 104-5.
(71) S e e  S .  R.  M u z a f f a r p u r , pp. 308 - 12.
(72) Ibid, p. 153.
(73) Ibid, para, 434.
(74) Peter Robb, op. cit. p. 104.
(75) V. V. Hunter, S t a t i s t i c a l  A c c o u n t  o f  B e n g a l ,  V o l u m e  X I I I ,  (London 
1877), p. 241.
(76) See F a m i n e  R e p o r t ,  1 8 8 8 ,  D u f f e r i n  R e p o r t  1 8 8 8 ,  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  
F a m i n e  P r o c e e d i n g s ,  D e c e m b e r  1 8 8 8 ,  N o s .  1 - 2 4 ,  P a t n a  C o m m i s s i o n e r  t o  
G o v e r n m e n t  2 / 6 / 1 8 8 8 .  ( 1 0 2 ) .
(77) D u f f e r i n  R e p o r t  1 8 8 8 ,  A p p e n d i x  B . , M. F i n t t p a n e ' s  R e p o r t  o n  M i g r a t i o n  
a n d  E m i g r a t i o n ,  B e n g a l ,  4  A p r i l ,  1 8 8 8 .
(78) S .  R.  S a r a n ,  p a r a s  4 6  -  4 7 .
(79) J. A. Hubback, F i n a l  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  S u r e v y  a n d  S e t t l e m e n t  O p e r a t i o n s  i n
t h e  S h e h a b a d  D i s t r i c t ,  1 9 0 1 - 3 , (Patna, 1904), para 245, (Henceforth,
S. R. Shahabad, 1901 -3).
(80) S .  R .  S a r a n ,  p a g e  1 4 9 ,  p a r a  5 3 3 .
242
(81) Ibid, para, 535.
(82) S. R. Darbhanga, pp. 118 - 22.
(83) S. R. Shahabad, para 332.
(84) Peter Robb, op. cit., p. 107.
(85) Report of Bengal Government to Government of India, Dufferin Report, 
Appendix A, p.6.
(86) 'Statement of Collector of Darbhanga' Dufferin Report, p. 7, para 11.
Z43
C H A P T E R  t v
LAND RENT
Footnotes
(.1) R. S. Sharma, Perspectives in Social and Economic History
of Early India, (Delhi, 1983) pp. 150 - 53.
(2) The Fifth Report from the Select Committee of the House of
Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company <1812)
Vol. 2, (Calcutta, 1917), pp. 84 - 88.
(3) A. P. Macdonnell, Report on Food Grain Supply and 
Statistical Review of the Relief Operations in the 
distressed District of Bihar and Bengal During Famine of 
1873 - 74, (Calcutta, 1876), pp. (Henceafter, Report
on Food Grain Supply). (IOL)
(4; W. V. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. XTT1,
(London, 1877), Tirhut, p. 112.
(5; Ibid, p. 99.
(6) A. P. Macdonnel1, o p . c i t . p. 84.
(7) Ibid, p. 84.
<.6; V. V. Hunter, op. ci t . p. 302.
(9) Report an Rent Law Commission, (Calcutta 
(IOL;.
(10; Jacques Pouchepadass, 'Land, Power And Market: The Rise
oi the Land Market in Gangetic India, in Peter Robb 
(ed. ) Rural India: Land, Fower and Society under British 
Rule, (London, 1983) pp. 89 - 98. Also see 
Pouchepadass's 'Peasant Indebtedness in Colonial Bihar', 
Purusartha No. 4, (Paris, 1981).
(11) Bihar Rent Papers, 1877 - 78, (Calcutta, 1879), from S.
C. Bayley, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the 
Patna Commissioner, Judicial Department, dated 7 August, 
1877. (IOL).
(12) Bihar Rent Papers, p. 2.
(13) Ibid, 'extract from the letter of C. E. Vorseley, 
Magistrate and Collector of Muzaffarpur dated 9 October, 
1877, p. 26.
(14) Ibid, 'extract from the proceedings of the meeting of 
zamindars of Hajipur with the sub-divisional officer, Mr.
A. J. Primrose, dated 10 September, 1877, pp. 29 - 31.
244
(15.) B. B. Chaudhuri, ‘Movement of Rents in Eastern India, 
1793 to 1930,' IHR (1976), p. 349.
(16) Report of the Government of Bengal on the proposed 
Amendment of the Law of the Landlord and Tenant in the 
Bengal Province, 1881, p t . II, From F(H\Ucane (Deputy 
Collector) to the Government of Bengal, Revenue 
Department, 9 May, 1881 (Henceforth, Amendment of Law of 
Landlord and Tenant, 1881).
(17) Eric Boserup, The Condition of Agricultural Growth, 
(London, 1965), See the Introduction'
(18) B. B. Chaudhuri, op.cit. p. 355.
(19) S. R. Saran, paras, 39 - 40, [Note: if the rent rate is
compared with the 16th century during the time of Akbar, 
it was only Re. 1 and anna 8 per acre. Since then
for 200 years, no evidence of rent rate was forthcoming, 
except in the beginning of the 19th century something 
over Rupee 1 in the northern part which was unsettled, 
and i n v e s t  of the parts it was Rs. 2 to 43 .
(20) S. R. Darbnhanga, para, 37 - 39.
(21) S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 830 - 31.
(22) S. R. Darbhanga, para, 407
(23) S. R. Saran, para , 502.
(24) S. R. Champaran, para 419.
(25) Peter Robb, 'In Search of pominant Peasants. Notes on The 
Implementation in Bihar of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885/, ^  
~3)ariiyt&Arrested Development in India, (New Delhi, 
forthcoming), p. 10.
(26) S. R. Saran, para 294.
(27) Ibid, para, 288.
(28) S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 834.
(29) Board of Revenue Proceedings, Government of Bengal, 8 
January, 1883, No. 135. (IOL).
(30) B. B. Chaudhuri, 'Agrarian Relations in Bengal 1859 - 
85' , N. K. Sinha (ed. ), History of Bengal , 1757 - 1905) 
(Vol. 2, (Calcutta, 1969) p. 276.
(31) Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (ed.), Cambridge Economic 
History of India, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1983), Section on 
'Eastern India', pp. 136 - 37.
c
245
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 646, 'extract from the evidence
of the increase in rent and payment to be made by the 
raiyat even if the price of food had gone up' Mr. Lyon, 
District Officer, Saran quoting in his annual Settlement 
r.eport for the year 1894 — 95, the Statement of Mr. Graun 
tlett, Assistant Settlement Officer Saran, during the 
above period.
S. R. Muzaffarpur, pp. 231 - 32.
Amendment of Law of Landlord and Tenant, 1881, from 
Finucane to the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department, 
9 May, 1881.
Bengal Survey and Settlement Proceedings, Finucane, 
on Special duty to the Board of Revenue, 10 February, 
1883, para 4. (IOL).
Ibid, 1892 - 99, para, 831.
S. R. Muzaffarpur, para 1085.
B. B. Chaudhuri, in N. K. Sinha (ed.) History of Bengal,
Vol. 2, p. 276.
Peter Robb, op.cit., Section dealing with 'the tenancy 
law and rents', p. 17.
S. R. Muzaffarpur, para, 922.
246
CHAPTER V
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR
Footnotes
1. R. S. Sharma, I n d i a n  F e u d a l i s m , (Calcutta, 1965),
2. Der Raj Cbanana, S l a v e r y  i n  A n c i e n t  I n d i a ,  ( D e l h i ,  I 9 6 0 ) ,  p p . 6 - 5 .
3. The agricultural labour and occupational castes in Bihar were and are
Badhai, Bullock carte-drivers, Dusadh and Goala, mainly, apart from 
their agricultural occupation, Chamar, Dhobi, Gandedi, Hajam, Halwai, 
Jolaha, Kandu, Kumhar, Kahar, Lohar, Mali, Mallah, Ronia, Teli, and 
some other castes.
4. Irfan Habib, P e a s a n t  a n d  A r t i s a n  R e s i s t a n c e  i n  M u g h a l  I n d i a , McGill 
Studies in International Development. Ro. 34, (Montreal, 1984) p.3.
5. R. S. Sharma, P e r s p e c t i v e s  i n  S o c i a l  a n d  E c o n o m i c  H i s t o r y  o i  E a r l y
I n d i a , (Delhi, 1983), pp. 301-1.
6. Richard Fick, T h e  S o c i a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  N o r t h  E a s t  I n d i a ,  translated
from German, Shishir Kumar Mitra (first published in Germany, Kiel 
1^^7 ; Calcutta, 1922), pp. 310 - 11.
7. Rhys Davids (Mrs.), E c o n o m i c  C o n d i t i o n s  A c c o r d i n g  t o  E a r l y  B u d h i s t  
L i t e r a t u r e ,  in E. J. Rapson (ed.), T h e  C a m b r i d g e  H i s t o r y  o f  I n d i a ,
Vol. I, Ancient India, (Cambridge, 1922), p. 205.
8. H. R. Ghos^ 1 ,  'Labour in Early Rineteenth Century, Bihar', J o u r n a l  o f  
B i h a r  R e s e a r c h  S o c i e t y ,  Vol. XXXII. Ft. 1, (Patna, 1956), quoting from 
a Bengali Journal, J n a n a n v e s a n , p. 165.
9. Irfan Habib, A g r a r i a n  S y s t e m  o f  M u g h a l  I n d i a ,  (Bombay, 1963), pp.121-3.
10. R. Montgomery Martin, Statistics of the Colonies of British Empire in 
the Vest Indies, South America. Rorth America, Asia, Australia,
Africa, and Europe, (London, 1839), Book IV, Possessing in Asia,
Chapter 1 - Hindostan, pp. 288 - 89 and 293. The estimates are
derived by the author from Buchanan’s Official survey and data 
found in 1809 to 1816 also given in vols. 1.11 and 4,11 of E a s t e r n  
I n d i a j p u b l i s h e d  i n  1 8 3 8 )
1 1 .  D  a n d  B.  B h a t t a c h a r y a ,  ( C e n s u s  o f  I n d i a ,  1 9 6 1 :  R e p o r t  o n  P o p u l a t i o n  
E s t i m a t e  o f  I n d i a , 1820 - 30, (Volume IV), pp. iii-xix, xxii-xxix, 3- 
10, 71-72 and 7-123.
12. Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib (eds.) T h e  C a m b r i d g e  E c o n o m i c
H i s t o r y  o f  I n d i a ,  V o l .  I , (Cambridge, 1982) Chapter on 'Population',
pp 166 - 68. Also see Irfan Habib 's, 'Colonization of the Indian 
Economy, 1757 - 1900, Social Scientist. 32, (Trivandrum, March,
1975) pp. 34 - 35.
13. John Crawfurd, T h e  E c o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  I n d i a  u n d e r  t h e  E a s t  I n d i a  
C o m p a n y ,  1 8 1 4 - 5 8 :  A S e l e c t i o n  o f  C o n t e m p o r a r y  w r i t i n g s , K. N. 
Chaudhuri (ed.), (Cambridge, 1971) , p. 234. The author discusses food 
of the lower classes of population in India during the period 
mentioned above and their wages too.
247
14. B. If. Ganguly, Trends of Agriculture and Population in Ganges Valley, 
(London 1938), pp. 118-25.
15. P. C. Tallent, Census Report of India, 1921, Bihar and Orissa p. 22.
16. Eric Bos^ rup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, (London 1965),
P.13 Note: Eric Boserup says that 'this kind of phenomenon as time 
honoured distinction between cultivated and uncultivated land' would 
have to be replaced by a concept of frequency of cropping.
17. Census Report of India, 1911, Vol. 4, p. 124. The extension of 
cultivation in the districts of Bengal took place as a result of 
emigration of agricultural and manual labourers from South Bihar, 
especially from Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganas into the Sundarban 
delta and other alluvial districts.
18. Peter Robb, (ed.), Rural India: Land, Power and Society under British 
Rule, (London 1983), p. 3-4.
19. Francis Buchanan, An Account of the District of Bihar and Patna in 
1 8 1 1 - 1 2 , Vol. 1. t m j -
20. Govt, of India, Revenue and Agriculture Department, Famine (Simla,
1888), Resolution regarding the economic condition of the lower classes 
of the agricultural population and measures for the relief of densely 
populated tract's' (Dufferin Report 1888), P.(Henceforth Dufferin 
Report).
21. L. H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital to 1 8 7 5 , (New York, 1927), 
pp. 207-8. Note: The author discusses the accumulation of Indian 
capital, especially in the Bengal Presidency and provides evidence 
from Lees, V. Nassau’s Land and Labour in India, (1897) pp. 232-33.
A writer in the Westminster Review, LXIX: 202, estimated this measured 
income at £10,000,000. So also Anglo-Bengalese in The Times, 12 
August, 1857. The latter computes his total as follows: £3,000,000 
in pensions, interest, and salaries, £3,000,000 in family, and partner­
ship remittances, the balance in profits and freight upon an Anglo- 
Indian trade of £55,000,000 a year.
22. Francis Buchanan^ op. cit., Vol. 11, p. 506.
23. Francis Buchanan, Ibid, pp. 556-57, and Purnea Report,
(Patna, 1928) PP. 445-46.
24. H. R. Ghosal, op. cit., pp 100-1.
25. Letter from Collector of Shahabad to Henry Douglas, Magistrate of 
Patna, September 1 1 , 1803, and Letter from Secretary Fublic Department 
to Henry Douglas, Sept. 1 8 0 3 , (Patna Judges Court Records, Patna).
26. Letter from a private merchant to V. H. Tippett, May 28, 1 8 1 9 ,  Letter 
from Thomas Morvant to W. H. Tippett , January 1820, (Patna Judges 
Court Records, Patna).
27. Bengal Judicial Department Proceedings, 5  January, 1798, (Patna Judges 
Court Records, Patna).
28. Extract from a Letter of Magistrate of Behar to the Secretary, Judical 
Dept, dated November 1 0 ,  1 8 1 5 , (Patna Judges Court Records, Patna).
248
29. V. V. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal Vol. Xiii (London 1876) 
p. 77.
30. F.H. B. Skrine, Memorandum on the Material Condition of the Lower 
Orders in Bengal during the ten years from 1881-82 and 1891-92, 
(Calcutta, 1892) page 7, para 26.
31. Dufferin Report, Secretary, Govt, of Bengal (Rev. and Agr.) to the 
Govt, of India, dated, August 1887.
32. Famine Report, 1888, Report on the Conditions of the Lower Classes of 
Population in Bengal, 1888, From Secretary Govt, of Bengal dated 30 
June, 1888, to the Secretary, Govt, of INDIA Rev. & Agr. (IOL).
33. Ibid.
34. B. Foley, Report on Labour in Bengal, (Calcutta 1906), p.4. (Br. Mus.)
35. Government of Bengal, General Proceedings, dated, 19 March, 1904.
36. Lieutenant Grovernor of Bengal, General Dept. , Emigration, (Calcutta 
June, 1904), from the Protector of Immigrants, Trinidad, to the Govt. 
Emigration Agent for Trinidad, No. 109A, dated Trinidad, 12 Feb. 1904 
(IOL).
37. G. A. Grierson, Report on Colonial Emigration from Bengal 1896, 
(Calcutta, 1896), p. 16-18. (Br. Mus,).
38. J. A. Bcjrdillon, Census Report, 1891, P. 402.
39. Dufferin Report, (M. Finucane, Director of Land Records and 
Agriculture, to Secretary Govt, of Bengal, dated April 1988}
40. Ibid, M. Finucane, 'Report on Migration and Emigration of Labour in 
Bengal, Appendix 'B', April 1988.
41. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, S. R. Muzaffarpur, Para 680, and J. H. Kerr,
S. R. Saran, para, 374.
42. Peter Robb, 'Bihar, the Colonial State and agricultural development in 
India 1880 - 1920', unpublished paper in the possession of the author.
43. F.H.B. Skrine, op. cit, Para 31.
44. Ibid, Para 31.
45. B. Foley, op. cit. p,1.
46. Ibid. p.4
47. Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, The Export of Indian Labour
Overseas 1830-1920, (Oxford, 1974), pp. 118-19.
48. V. V. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. XI, Saran, p. 296-7.
49. Ibid, Vol. Xiii, Tirhut p. 107-8.
50. Dufferin Report, Para, 12.
249
5 1 .  R e p o r t  o n  B e n g a l  L a b o u r  E n q u i r y  C o m m i s s i o n , (Calcutta, 1896), p. 7 
(Br, Mus.).
52. Ibid, Para 14.
53. Ibid para 8.
54. Ibid para 15.
55. Government of India Famine Proceedings, December 1888, Nos. 1 to 24. 
(IOL)
56. Dufferin Report, para, 17.
57. Bengal Administration Report, 1876-77, (Calcutta 1877), p. 109.
58. B. Foley, op. cit., p.40.
59. S.R. Muzaffpur, para, 492.
60. Ibid., Appendix IX.
61. Colin M. Fisher, 'Indigo Plantation and Agrarian Society in North Bihar 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries', (unpublished PH. D. thesis,
(Cambridge, 1976), p. 231. [He estimates that hardly 10% of the
cultivated a r e a - under indigo plantation in the North Bihar 
districts as a whole. But the expansion of indigo cultivation in Z i r a t  
land and b h i t  land rather increased the percentage of Indigo 
cultivation in the late 19th century^over 10 percent!.
62. Govt, of India, Famine Proceedings, H. Crook, Collector of Purnea to 
Bhagalpur Commissioner, 2/4/1888, December 1888, Nos. 1-24 (IOL).
63. Patna Divisional Administration Report, 1876-77, para, 126.
64. B. Foley, op. cit. p.40.
65. Dufferin Report, Para, 27.
66. Report of Inspector General of Jails, Bengal, 20 May, 1888, para 4,
Dufferin Report.
67. See Peter Robb, ' State ^ .Peasant and Money-Lender in the Late nineteenth 
century Bihar: Some colonial inputs' in Robb (ed.), R u r a l  I n d i a .
68. Asok Sen, Partha Chatterjee and Saugata Mukherkji, P e r s p e c t i v e  I n  
S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s ,  2 ,  T h r e e  S t u d i e s  o n  t h e  A g r a r i a n  S t r u c t u r e  i n  B e n g a l  
1 8 5 0  - 1 9 4 7 , (Calcutta, 1982) p. 57.
69. Mr. Quinn, Collector of Patna District, reports, o n  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f
L o w e r  c l a s s e s  o f  t w o  v i l l a g e s  o f  P a t n a  D i s t r i c t , included in the 
‘Report of Patna Commissioner on Lower classes of Patna Division,' 
Dufferin Report, para, 15.
70. Ibid., Para 9 - 10.
71. B. Foley, op. cit., Para 114, P.56.
72. Dufferin Report, Appendix A, Page 4.
250
73. Dufferin Report Ibid.
a
74. See J. A. Bojrdillon - Census Report, 1891, North Bihar districts.
75. C. J. Stevenson - Moore, Report on the Material Condition of Small 
Agriculturists and Labourers in Gaya, (Calcutta 1893), PP 1-4, refuting 
the report of G, A. Grierson, Report on condition of Lover Class of 
Population of Gaya; Dr. Grierson wrote the truth in the capacity of a 
district officer , vide, circular number 35 of the Govt, of Bengal, 
dated 9 Dec. 1887. His report was revised in order to give it a 
flavour of prosperity among the lower classes. Later on, Dr.Grierson 
published his report in the form of a book, Notes on the district of 
Gaya, printed in the Bengal Secretariat Press (Calcutta, 1893). (IOL)
76. Stevenson-Moore, Ibid, para, 13 and 20.
77. Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of the Mughal India,
(Bombay, 1963) p. 117.
78. See B.B. Chaudhuri's, Agricultural Production in Bengal, 1850-1900, co­
existence of Decline and Growth, Bengal Past and Present , July - 
December, 1969, Section 3 - 36.
79. Tapan Raychandhuri, Historical Roots of Mass Poverty in South Asia, A.
Hypothesis, E.P.V., Bombay, Vol. XX, No. 18,
May 4, 1985, pp. 804-5.
80. Dufferin Report, Summary of Report, para 29.
81. B. B. Chaudhuri; *The Process of De^peasan^_tization in Bengal and Bihar, 
1 8 8 5 - 1 9 4 7 I HR, II, I (1975). ~
251
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Footnotes:
1. T. J. Byres,^Modes of Production and Non-European, Pre-Cololonial 
Societiesj The Nature and Significance of the Debate': in T. J. Byres 
and Harbans Mukhia (eds.). F e u d a l i s m  a n d  N o n - E u r o p e a n  S o c i e t i e s ,  
(London, 1985), pp. 7 - 1 2 .
2. Maurice Dobb, S t u d i e s  i n  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  C a p i t a l i s m ,  revised 
edition, (London, 1963).
3. Utsa Patnaik, C h a i n s  o f  S e r v i t u d e ,  B o n d a g e  a n d  S a l v e r y  i n  I n d i a ,  
(Delhi, 1985), see Introduction, by Utsa Patnaik.
4. T. R. Metcalf, L a n d ,  L a n d l o r d ,  a n d  t h e  B r i t i s h  R a j , (California, 1979),
p. 381.
5. Dharma Kumar, 'Caste and Landlessness in South India', CSSH, Vol. IV,
(1961 - 63), pp. 362 - 63.
6. Surendra J. Patel, A g r i c u l t u r a l  L a b o u r e r s  i n  M o d e r n  I n d i a  a n d  F a k i s t a n ,
(Bombay, 1952).
7. Utsa Patnaik, op.cit., p. 27.
8. Henry S. Maine, op.cit. A n c i e n t  L a w , (London, 1961,
1917), p. 99.
9. Valter Hauser, 'The Indian National Congress and Land Policy in the
20th Century,' 1ESHR, Vol. 1, No. 1, July - September, 1976.
10. Some recent years' debates on commercialization of Indian agriculture
pubi ished:
i) B. B. Chaudhuri, G r o w t h  o f  C o m m e r c i a l  A g r i c u l t u r e  i n  B e n g a l ,  
(Calcutta, 1964).
ii) A. K. Bagchi, P r i v a t e  I n v e s t m e n t  i n  I n d i a ,  1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 9 , (Cambridge, 
1972).
iii) Amit Bhaduri, ‘A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi- 
Feudalism' , E J , 1973.
iv)_____________ , 'Class Relation and the Pattern of accumulation in an
Agrarian Economy, 'C J E , March, 1981.
vii) K. Kautsky, L a  Q u e s t i o n  A g r a i r e ,  M a s p e r o ,  1 9 7 0 ,  t r a n s l a t e d  a n d  
s u m m e r i z e d  b y  J a i r u s  B a n a j i  i n  T h e  A r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  M o d e s  o f  
P r o d u c t i o n  ( e d .  H.  V o l p e ) ,  L o n d o n ,  1 9 8 0 . ) ,  
v i i i )  U t s a  P a t n a i k ,  ' T h e  P r o c e s s  o f  C o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n  u n d e r  C o l o n i a l
C o n d i t i o n s ' , i m i m e o ,  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  S e m i n a r  o n  C o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n  
o f  I n d i a n  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  T r i v a n d r u m ,  1 9 8 1 .  
i x >  S h a h i d  A m i n ,  S u ^ g a r c a n e  a n d  S u g a r  i n  G o r a k h p u r :  An  I n q u i r y
i n t o  P e a s a n t  P r o d u c t i o n  f o r  C a p i t a l i s t  E n t e r p r i s e  i n  C o l o n i a l  I n d i a ,  
(Delhi, 1984).
x) Satish Chandra Mishra, 'Commercialisation, Peasant Differentiation 
and Merchant Capital in Late N ineteenth Century Bombay and Panja6', 
J P S , Vol. 10, No. 1, Oct. 1982.
252
xi) Elizabeth Vhitcombfc^Agrarian Conditions in Northern India, Vol.
1: The United Provinces Under British Pule, 1860-1900,
Berkeljy, 1971).
xii) Christopher John Baker, An Indian Rural Economy 1800-1955, The 
TamiTno~d Countryside, (Oxford, 1984). 
xiii) David Ludden, Peasant History in South India, (Princeton,
1985).
xiv) Neil Charlesworth, Peasants and Imperial Rule: Agriculture and 
Society in the Bombay Presidency, 1850-1935, (Cambridge, 1985). 
xv) Asok Sen, Partha Chatterjee, Saugata Mukherji, Perspectives In
Social Science 2 Three Studies On The Agrarian Structure In Bengal 
1850-1947, (Calcutta, 1982). 
xvi) Meghnad Desai, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,A. Rudra, (eds.), Agrarian 
Power and Agricultural Productivity in South Asia, (Delhi, 1984). 
xvii) K. N. Raj. Neel a dr i Bhattacharya, sjmit Guha, Sakti Padhi (ed. ), 
Essays On The Commercialization Of Indian Agriculture, (Delhi,
1 9 8 5 ) .
xviii) Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and 
Folitics, 1919 - 1947, (Cambridge, 1986). 
xix) B. R. Tomlinson, 'The Historical Roots of Indian Poverty: Issues in 
the Economic and Social History of Modern South Asia: 1880 - 1960,' 
MAS, 22, (1988), pp. 126 - 29. Apart from the above, a number 
of monographs and occasional research papers have been published.
253
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Government Records and Publications
(i) Proceedings (Selection):
Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings, Calcutta
Bengal Land Revenue Miscellaneous Proceedings, Calcutta
Indian Famine Proceedings, 1881, Calcutta
Bengal Revenue Proceedings, Calcutta
Government of India, Famine Proceedings, Calcutta
Bengal Judicial Dept. Proceedings, Patna Judges 
Court Records, Patna.
Bengal General Dept. Proceedings, Emigration,
Calcutta
Government of Bengal, General Proceedings, Calcutta
Board of Revenue Proceedings Government of Bengal, 
Calcutta
Bengal Survey and Settlement Proceedings, Calcutta,
Patna Judges, Court Records, Patna.
(i i) Reports
Settlement Reports:
Final Reports on the Survey and Settlement Operations in 
the districts of —
C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Champaran (1892 to 1899),
Calcutta 1900
J. H. Kerr, Darbhanga (1896 to 1903), Patna, 1926.
C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Muzaffarpur (1892 to 99), 
Calcutta, 1903
J. H. Kerr, Saran (1893 to 1901), Calcutta, 1903.
J. A. Hubback, Shahabad (1901 to 3) Patna, 1904.
District Gazetteers:
Saran 
Champaran 
Muzaf f arpur 
Darbhanga
254
Census Reports of India
/
/
P.C. Tallent, 1921, Bihar and Orissa
J. A. Bourdillon 1891
L. S. S. O'Malley 1911
D and B. Bhattacharya, 1961
(iii) Other Official Reports and Enquiry
Colebrook^ T. H. Remarks on the Husband .ry and Internal 
Commerce of Bengal, (London, 1806)
W. K. Firminger (ed. ) , The Fifth Report from the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of 
the East India Company, 1812, Vol. 2 (Calcutta, 1917).
A. P. Macdonnell, Report on Food Grain Supply and 
Statistical Review of the Relief Operations in the
di stressed Districts of Bihar and Bengal During Famine 
of 1873-74, (Calcutta, 1876).
W. V. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. XI, 
XIII, (London, 1877)
1tTt.
Report ojP^Rent Law Commission, (Calcutta, 1886).
Bihar Rent Papers, 1877 - 78 (Calcutta, 1879).
Report of the Government of Bengal on the proposed 
amendment of the Law of the Landlord and Tenan. t in the
Bengal Province, pt. II, 1881, (Calcutta, 1881).
Francis Buchanan, An Account of the District of Bihar
and Patna 1811 - 12, (Patna, 1921).
F. H. B. Skrine, Memorandum on the Material Condition 
of the Lower Orders in Bengal during the ten years from 
1881 - 82 and 1891 - 92, (Calcutta, 1892).
Government of India, Revenue and Agriculture Dept., 
Resofufl on Regarding the economic condition of the Lower 
Class of the agricultural population and measures for 
the relief of densely populated tracts, 1888, 
popularly known as Dufferin Report, (Calcutta, 1888).
B. Foley, Report on Labour in Bengal, (Calcutta, 1906).
G. A. Grierson, Report on Colonial Emigration from 
Bengal, 1896, (Calcutta, 1896)
Report of the Bengal Labour Enquiry Commission, 
(Calcutta, 1896)
Bengal Administration Report, 1876 - 77 Patna 
Divisional Admins tration Report, 1876 - 77, (Calcutta,
1877).
255
C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Report on the Material Condition 
of Small Agriculturists and Labourers in Gaya,
(Calcutta, 1893)
C. D. Field, Landholding and the Relation of Landlord 
and Tenant in various countries, (Calcutta, 1885).
Report of the Committee on the Agrarian Condition of Champaran, 2 
Vols. , (Patna, 1917).
Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces of 
Bengal, for the year 1892-93, (Calcutta, 1894).
Famine Commission Report, 1881
Bengal Administration Report, 1871 - 72 (Calcutta, 1873)
Papers relating to the working and amendment of the Act X of 1859, 
(Calcutta, 1888).
Bengal Administration Report, 1885 - 86 (Calcutta, 1887)
Indian Famine Report, 1888.
Selection from papers relating to Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885.
P. Montgomery Martin, Statistics of the colonies of British Empire 
in the Vest India, South America, North America, Asia, Australia, 
Africa and Europe, (London, 1839).
Hastings Papers, European add. MSS 19090 (Br.Mus.)
(iv) Printed Books, Articles and unpublished Dissertations:
Ahmad, Quamuddin, 'Origin and Growth of DarbhaX^o- Raj (1519-1666), 
Based on some Contemporary and Unpublished Documents', JHRC,
1962.
Amin, Shahid, Sugarcane and Sugar in Gorakhpur: An 
Inquiry into Peasant Production for Capitalist 
Enterprise in Colonial India, (Delhi, 1984).
Baden Powell, B. H. The Land System of British India,
Vol. I (Oxford, 1892).
Bag^chi, A. K. Private Investment in India, 1900-1939,
(Cambridge, 1972).
--------------  'Deindustrialization in Gangetic Bihar,
1900 - 1901' , in Barun De (ed.), Essay in Honour of 
Prof. S C Sarkar, (Calcutta, 1976), pp. 499-521.
Baker, Christopher John, An Indian Rural Economy 1800 - 1955, The 
Tamilnad Countryside, (Oxford, 1984).
256
Bayly, C. A. , Rulers, Townsmen and Bazajrs, North Indian 
Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770-1870, 
(Cambridge, 1983).
--------------- , The New Cambridge History of India, II,
1, Indian Society and the making of the British Empire, 
(Cambridge, 1988)
Beames John, Memoirs of A Bengal Civilian,
(London, 1961).
Bhaduri, Amit, 'A Study in Agricultural Backwardness 
under Semi Feudalism', EJ , 1973.
 , 'Class Relations and the Pattern of
accumulation in an Economy*, CJE, March, 1981.
o~
Bhaijjdwaj Krishna, 'A view on Commercialization in 
Indian Agriculture and the Development of Capitalism', 
JPS, Vol. 12, No. 4, July, 1985.
__________________ , Production Conditions in Indian
Agriculture, (Cambridge, 1974).
Bhattacharya, Neeladri, (eds.), Essay on the 
Commercialization of Indian Agriculture, (Delhi, 1985.
Bose, Sugata, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, social 
structure, and politics, 1919 - 1947, (Cambridge,
1986).
Buchanan Francis, An Account of the District of 
Bihar and Patna in 1811 - 12, (Patna 1928)
Byres, T. J., 'Modes of Production and Non-European, 
Pre-Colonial Societies: The Nature and Significance of
the Debate', in T. J. Byres and Harbans Mukhia (eds.), 
Feudalism and Non-European Societies, (London, 1985).
Chanana, Delf Raj, Slavery in Ancient India, (.Delhi,
196 0.)
Chandra, Satish, Medieval India, Society, the 
Jagirdari Crisis and the Village, (Delhi, 1982).
Chaudhuri, B. B. 'Agrarian Relations in Bengal (1859- 
1885), ' in N. K. Sinha (ed. ), History of Bengal, 1757- 
1905, (Calcutta, 1967)
___________________ , ’The Agrarian Movements in Bihar and
Bengal', (1919-1939), in B. R. Nanda (ed.), Socialism 
in India, (Delhi, 1972).
___________________ , Growth of Commercial Agriculture in
Bengal, (Calcutta, 1964)
257
_____________________, Growth of Commercial Agriculture
and its Impact on the Peasant Economy’ , IESHR,
VII, 1, 2 March and June 1970
_____________________, 'Rural Credit Relations in Bengal
1859 - 85’, Vol. VI, No. 2, IESHR, June 1969, pp. 203-57
____________________ , *The Process of Depeasantisation in
Bengal and Bihar, 1885 - 1947' II, I 1HR, (1975), 105-
65.
_____________________, 'The Land Market in Eastern
India (1793 - 1940)', IESHR, 12, 1 and 2 (1975),
1-42, 133 - 68.
_____________________, Movement of Rent in Eastern India
1793 - 19301 , 3, 2, I HR (1977), pp. 308 - 90
Cohn# Bernard S, ^Structural Change in Indian Rural 
Society 1596 - 1885' , in R. E. Frykenberg (ed. ),
Land Control and Social Structure in Indian 
History, (Wisconsin, 1969) pp. 53-122.
Cohn, Bernard, and Singer, Milton, (eds.) Structure and 
Change in Indian Society, (Chicago 1968).
 , ^Political System in Eighteerft Century
India: The Banaras Region’, JAOS, 82 July - September,
19o2, pp. 312-20.
 , 'Comments on Papers on Land Tenure',
IESHR, (1965), pp. 1 7 8 - 7 9 .
Crawfurd, John, in K. N. Chaudhuri (ed.), The Economi 
Development of India under the East India Company 181 
58: A Selection of Contemporary writings, (Cambridge, 
1971) pp. 217-316.
Datt, K, Development of Capitalist Relation in 
Agriculture, (A Case Study of Vest Bengal 1793—1971), 
(Delhi, 1977).
Davids (Mrs), Rhys, 'Economic Conditions According to 
Early Bujclhist Literature', in E. J. Rapson (ed. ) . The 
Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1, Ancient India,
(Cambridge, 1922), 198-219.
Desai, Meghnad (eds.) Cambridge Economic History of 
India, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1983).
Dobb, Maurice Studies in the Development of 
Capitalism, revised edition, (London, 1963).
Firminger, V. K. (ed.), Fifth Report from the Select 
Cojmittee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the 
East India Company, Vol. II, July 1812.
258
o
Fick, Richard, The Social Organisation in North East 
India, translated from German, Shishir Kumar Mitra 
(first published) in Germany, Kiel 1888, Calcutta, 1922)
Field, C. D. Landholding and the Relation oi Landlord 
and Tenant in various Countries, (Calcutta, 1885).
Fisher, C. M. , 1 Indigo Plantation and Agrarian Society
in North Bihar in the 19th and early 20th centuries^ 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1976).
Ganguly, B. N. Trends of Agriculture and Population in 
the Gauges Valley, (London, 1938).
Ghosal, H. R. rA Study of the Land Revenue Records of 
Tirhut (1793 - 1838),' JBRS, Vol. XXX, pt. II, (1954) 
pp. 43-47.
_________________, 'The Problem of Effecting Permanent
Settlement in Tirhut,' JBRS February, 1960, pp. 91-95.
_________________, 'Labour in Early Nineteenth Century,
Bihar', JBRS, Vol. XXXII, pt. 1, (Patna, 1956),
pp.98-105.
Ghose, A, Development of Capitalist Relations in 
Agriculture (A Case Study of Vest Bengal (1793 - 1971) 
co-author, (Delhi, 1977).
Grierson, G. A. , Bihar Peasant Life, Second edition, 
(Patna, 1929).
Grover, B. R. , ^Land Rights in Mughal India, IESHR, I,
July-September, 1963, pp. 1 - 23.
_________________, 'Nature of Dehati-Taluka (Zamindari
Villages) and the Evolution of the Taluqdari System 
During the Mugal Age', IESHR, Vol. II, No.3, 1965, pp.
_________________ , Presidential Address, Medieval India,
IHCP, (1976), pp. 143 - 78.
Guha, Sumit, (eds.), Essays on the Commercialisation of 
Indian Agriculture, (Delhi, 1986).
Gupta, M. N. , Land System of Bengal, ([Calcutta, 194 0)
Habib, Irfan, Agrari an System of Mughal India, (Bombay, 
1965)
________________, (eds.) The Cambridge Economic History
oi India, Vol. 1, (Cambridge, 1982).
_________________ , 'Colonization of the Indian Economy,
1757 - 1900', SS, 32, (Trivandrum, March 
1975) pp.
________________, 'The Peasant in Indian History', General
Presidential Address, IHCP, (1982), pp. 3-55
259
_________________, P e a s a n t  a n d  A r t i s a n  P e s i  s t a n c e  i n
M u g h a l  I n d i a , McGill Studies in International 
Development, No. 34, (Montreal, 1984)
Hasan, S. Nurul., Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in 
Mughal India, (Delhi, 1973).
________________ , 'Zamindars under the Mughals', in R.
E. Fryfconberg (ed. ), Land Control and Social 
Structure in Indian History, (Wisconsin, 1969), 
pp. 1 7 - 3 2 .
Hauser, Valter, ’The Indian National Congress and 
Land Policy in the 20th Century, ' IESHR,
Vol. 1, No. 1 July - September 1976,
Henningham, Stephen, ’Bureaucracy and Control in 
India's Great Landed Estates: The Raj Darbhanga of
Bihar, 1879 to 1950/ MAS, 17,1 (1983) pp. 35-57.
___________ , Peasant Movements in Colonial India,
North Bihar, 1917 - 1942, (Canberaa, 1982).
Inden Ronald, 'Orientalist Construction of India', 
MAS, 20, 3, (1986), pp. 401-46.
Jairus, Banaji, The Articulation of Modes of 
Production (ed. H. Volpe) London, 1980.
Jann^juzi, F. T. , Agrarian Crisis in India, The Case
of Bihar, (Delhi, 1974)
Jenks, L. HtfUMi gra t i on of British Capital
to 1875), (New York, 1927)
Jha, D. N. Ancient India: An Introductory Outline, 
(Delhi, 1977)
Jha, Hetukar, 'Permanent Settlement in Bihar',
Social Scientist, No<77(19flo) pp. 53-57.* 1 /
Jha, J. S. History of Darbhanga Raj (Patna, 1966)
Kautsky, K. 'La Question Agraire', Maspero, 1970 
translated and Summarised by Jairus Banaji in The 
Articulation of Modes of Production' (ed. M. Wolpe) 
London,1980
Kosambi , D. D. The Culture and Civilization of 
Ancient India in Historical Outline, (London, 1965).
Kumar, Dharma, (ed. ) The CambyicLge Economic History 
of India, Vol. 2, 1757 - 1970, (Cambridge, 1983).
___________ , 'Caste and Landlessness in South India',
CSSH, Vol. IV, 1961-63, pp. 337 - 363.
260
Ludden, David, Peasant History in South India, 
(frinceton, 1985)
Maddison, Angus, 'The Historical Origin of Indian 
poverty,' Banca, Nazionale Del Lavoro, Quarterly 
Review, No. 92, (March, 1970, Rome), pp! 3"! = 81.
Maine Henry, S. Ancient Law: its connection with the 
early history of Society and its relation to modern 
idea (original publication, 1861, London 1917)
_____________ , Village Communities in the East and
West, (London, 1907)
Mandelbaum, David, G, VoJ;I, Society in India: 
Continuity and Change, (California, 1970)
Marshall, P. J. The New Cambridge History of India,
II. 2 Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India,
1740-1828, (Cambridge, 1988) 'Laissez Fair and
Tenant
Metcalf, T. R. 'Laissez Faip*and Tenant Right in 
Mid-Nineteenth Century India', IESHR 
Vol. No. 1, (1963) pp. 74 - 31.
________________ , Land, Landlord, and the British
Raj, (California, 1979)
Mishra B. B. , The Indian Middle Class: Their Growth
in Modern Times, (London, 1961)
of
Mishra, Girish, Agrarian Fr obi ems^_Per mane nt 
Settlement: a Case Study of Champaran, (Delhi,
1978).
Mukherjee S. (co-author): Perspectives In Social
Sci ence 2 Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in 
Bengal, 1850-1947, (Calcutta 1982).
Musgrave, P. J. 'Landlords and Lords of the Land: 
Estate Management and Social Control in Utt^ar 
Pradesh 1860-1920', MAS 6, 3, (1972), pp. 257-75.
Padhi, Sakti, (eds.) Essays on the Commercialization 
of Indian Agriculture, (Delhi, 1985)
Patel Surendra J . , Agricultural Labourers in Modern 
India and Pakistan, (Bombay, 1952)
Patnaik, Utsa, Chains of Servitude, Bondage and 
Slevery in India, (Delhi, 1985)
_________________, The Process of Commercialisation
under Colonial Conditions, (mimeo), presented at the 
Seminar on Commercialization of Indian Agriculture, 
Trivandnum, 1981
261
Pouchepadass, Jacques, 'The Market For Agricultural 
Labour in Colonial North Bihar (1860 - 1920)'
Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Modern 
South Asian Studies, Heidelberg, July, 1986.
______________ , 'Peasant Economy and the Market,
System in Early 20th Century Bihar', Proceedings of 
the 7th European Conference on Modern South Asian 
Studies, School of Oriental and African studies 
London, July 1981
 , 'Peasant Indebtedness in Colonial
Bihar, PurusarthjLjllo. 4, Paris, (1981)
______________ , Local Leaders and the Intellige­
ntsia in the Champaran Satyagrahfi. CIS, New 
Series, No. 8, (November, 1974)
_______________ , 'Land Power and Market: The Rise
of the Land Market in Gangetic India,' in Peter 
Robb (ed.), Fural India: Land Power and Society 
under British Pule (London, 1983), pp. 76-105.
Raj, K. N. (eds.) Commercialization of Indian Agriculture,
(Delhi, 1985)
Ray,Ratna Lekha 'The Changing Fortunes of the Bengali Gentry 
under Colonial Rule —  Pal Chaudhuris of Mahesganj, 1800 - 
1950' , MAS, Vol' 2iy p^Tu.1y fppJI-/*?
Raychaudhuri Tapan, (eds.) Cambridge Economic History of 
India, Vol. I, C. 1200 - C. 1750, (Cambridge, 1982)
_________ , 'An Old Custom of Estate Division in Bihar, An
Interesting Record of the Sadr Diwani Adalat', IHPC, Vol. XXVI, 
(Delhi, 1951), pp. 21 - 22.
_________ , 'Permanent Settlement in Operation: Bakarganj
District East Bengal* in R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), Land Control and 
Social Structure in Indian History, (Eisconsin, 1969), pp. 163 - 
174.
_________ , 'Historical Roots of Mass Poverty in South Asia, A
Hypothoesis, EPV/ Bombay, Vol. XX. No. 18, May 4, 1985, pp. 801-6.
Risl«y, H. Tribes and Castes of Bengal, (Calcutta, 1819)
Robb, Peter, 'Hierarchy and Resources: Peasant Stratification in 
Late Nineteenth Century Bihar', MAS, 13, 1, (1979) pp. 79 - 126
_________ , Pural India, Land Power and Society under British
Puler, (London, 1983)
_________ , 'In Search of Dominant Peasants: Notes on the
Implementation in Bihar of the Bengal tenancy Act 1885', in Clive 
J. Dewey (ed.) Arrested Development in India (Riverhead and 
Delhi, 1938JPP I88-*12-
262
_________ , 'Law and Agrarian Society in India: The Case of Bihar
and the Nineteenth Century Tenancy Debate', MAS 2V 2t (1988)PP
_________ , 'Bihar, The Colonial State and agricultural
development in India, 1880 - 1920' , (unpublished paper in the 
possessing^the author).
Rothermund Dietmar, Phases of Indian Nationalism and Other 
Essays , (Bombay, 1970).
__________ ,'The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 and its Influence on
Legislation in other Provinces, BFF, Diamond Jubilee number,
1967, pp. 90 - 105.
_________ , Government Landlord, And Peasant in India:
Agrarian Relations under British Rule, 1865 - 1935, (Wiesbaden,
1878)
Roy^jhoudhuri P.C. Inside Bihar, (Patna, 1962) 
District Gazetters: Saran, (Patna, 1930); Champaran, (Patna, 
1960), Darbhanga, (Patna , 1964); Muzaffarpur, (Patna, 1958).
Rudra, A. Agrarian Power and Agricultural Productivity in
South Asia, Delhi, 1984).
Sen, Asok, Perspectives in Social Science 2, Three Studies on 
The Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850 - 1947, (Calcutta 1982)
Sen, Chiranjib , Essay on the Transformation of India's Agrarian 
Economy, (New York, 1984)
Sharma, R. S. Indian Feudal ism, (Calcutta, 1965)
_________ , Perspectives in Social and Economic History of Early
India (Delhi, 1983) -
_________ , Material Culture and Social Formations in Ancient,
India, (Delhi, 1983)
_________ , How Feudal was Indian Feudalism? JPS, Vol. 12, No. 2
and 3, January/April 1985. pp. 19 - 43
Sinha, R. N. Bihar Tenantry, 1783 - 1833, (Bombay, 1968)
0-
Sinha, S. C. Studies in Indo-British Economy^Hundred Years ago, 
(Calcutta 1946)
Thorner A1ice, ^ Semi-Feudalism or Capitalism: The Counter- 
porary debate on Classes and modes of production in India( 
Purusartha, No. 6, (Paris, 1982) 19-72.
_________ , Daniel and Alice, Land and Labour in India, (Bombay
1965)
Tinker, Hugh, A New Sys^tem of Slavery, The Export of Indian 
Labour Overseas (1830-1920), (Oxford 1974)
263
Tomlinson, B. R. 'The Historical Roots of Indian Poverty: Issues
South Asia: 1880 - I960'. MAS, 22, 1 <1988), 
pp 123 - 140.
Wadhwa, D. C. 'Transferability of R a i y a t i  Holdings in Bihar: A
Long Journey (1793-1950)’ in p. N. Panigrahi (ed.), S t u d i e s  i n  
H i s t o r y  a n d  S o c i e t y : E c o n o m y  S o c i e t y  a n d  P o l i t i c s  I n  M o d e r n  
I n d i a ,  (Delhi, 1985) pp. 160-85.
Washbrook, David A* ' Law State and Agrarian Society in Colonial 
India7, MAS, 15, 3 (1988), pp. 649 - 721.
____________, 'Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and
Social History', 1120 - I860*, MAS, 22, 1 (1958), pp. 57 - 96.
Webb, Sydney, T h e  D e c a y  o f  C a p i t a l i s t  C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  (London,
1923)
Wood, Geof, 'The Legacy of the Past: The Agrarian Structure' in 
J. L. Joy and Elizabeth Everitt (eds.) T h e  K o s i  S y m o o n i u m :  T h e
R u r a l  P r o b l e m  i n  N o r t h  E a s t  B i h a r :  A n a l y s i s  o f  P o l i c y  a n d  
P l a n n i n g  i n  t h e  K o s i  A r e a , Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, (1976) pp. 93 - 112
Yadav, B. N. S. S o c i e t y  a n d  C u l t u r e  i n  N o r t h e r n  I n d i a  i n  t h e  
T w e l f t h  C e n t u r y , (Allahabad, 1973).
 , 'Immobility and Subjection of Peasantry in Early
Medieval Complex' , 1HR, (1974)
Yang, Anand A. 'An Institutional Shelter: The Court of Wards in 
Late Nineteenth Century Bihar', MAS, 13, 2, (1979), 247-264.
 , 'The Limited Raj: The British Development of Control
Institutions 1866 - 1920', in 'Control and Conflict in an Agrarian 
Society: A Study of Saran District 1866 - 1920', (Unpublished Ph.
D. thesis, University of Virginia, 1976)
______________ , 'Peasants On the Move: A Study of Internal Migration
in India', JIS, X : 1 (Summer 1979), 37 - 58.
26 4
